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	<title>Guarantor Institutions | OHRH</title>
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	<title>Guarantor Institutions | OHRH</title>
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		<title>Can National Human Rights Institutions Hold Governments Accountable Without Institutional Independence? Lessons from Bangladesh&#8217;s NHRC Bill 2026</title>
		<link>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/can-national-human-rights-institutions-hold-governments-accountable-without-institutional-independence-lessons-from-bangladeshs-nhrc-bill-2026/</link>
					<comments>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/can-national-human-rights-institutions-hold-governments-accountable-without-institutional-independence-lessons-from-bangladeshs-nhrc-bill-2026/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sanjida Armin Meem]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 08:51:36 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bangladesh]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=87626</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[On 20 December 1993, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Paris Principles, which established a simple but enduring proposition: a national human rights institution cannot effectively protect rights unless it is institutionally independent from the government it may be required to investigate. More than three decades later, that principle lies at the centre of [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>On 20 December 1993, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the <a title="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/principles-relating-status-national-institutions-paris" href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/principles-relating-status-national-institutions-paris" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="8dd648b9-887d-4062-bcca-095f0f89ff3e">Paris Principles</a>, which established a simple but enduring proposition: a national human rights institution cannot effectively protect rights unless it is institutionally independent from the government it may be required to investigate. More than three decades later, that principle lies at the centre of Bangladesh&#8217;s proposed <a title="https://nhrc.org.bd/" href="https://nhrc.org.bd/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="03b1d173-a6bd-43cf-82be-1759789c8465">National Human Rights Commission</a> (NHRC) Bill, 2026. The Bill is not merely another legislative reform; it raises a broader constitutional question that resonates far beyond Bangladesh: can an institution created, funded, and regulated by the State genuinely hold that same State accountable for human rights violations?</strong></p>
<p>International human rights standards make clear that an <a title="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/PTS-4Rev1-NHRI_en.pdf" href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/PTS-4Rev1-NHRI_en.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="533e5b5c-9ba8-41b0-adb8-c9bfea49b86f">NHRI’s effectiveness depends substantially on its institutional design</a>. The <a title="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/principles-relating-status-national-institutions-paris" href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/principles-relating-status-national-institutions-paris" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="7e1b6b32-ff15-4e13-8fa5-9c767ec7642e">Paris Principles</a> require NHRIs to have a broad human rights mandate, adequate investigative powers, pluralistic composition, transparent appointment arrangements, sufficient resources, and guarantees of independence. These safeguards are intended to prevent executive capture and ensure that an NHRI can investigate abuses, even when allegations involve the government itself. Compliance also determines whether an NHRI receives <a title="https://ganhri.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Accreditation-Status-Chart_Dec2025.pdf" href="https://ganhri.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Accreditation-Status-Chart_Dec2025.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="08b7eec3-02db-451d-aeee-ab84d53ffd95">&#8220;A Status&#8221; accreditation</a> from the <a title="https://ganhri.org/" href="https://ganhri.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="6cc42e49-fcb8-4f86-8642-14a2761a244f">Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI)</a>, enabling independent participation before the <a title="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/about-council" href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/about-council" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="dcfdc193-1ee3-4292-ade1-db35c55bdf18">UN Human Rights Council</a> and treaty-monitoring bodies. <a title="https://ganhri.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Accreditation-Status-Chart_Dec2025.pdf" href="https://ganhri.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Accreditation-Status-Chart_Dec2025.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="0bac48a3-37ac-42ef-ae0d-4c55f9afa83b">Bangladesh has yet to obtain this status</a> because of longstanding concerns regarding the NHRC&#8217;s independence and effectiveness.</p>
<p>Bangladesh&#8217;s <a title="http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-1023.html" href="http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-1023.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="3733efe1-9643-4121-9883-faeb831aea0d">National Human Rights Commission Act 2009</a> established the country&#8217;s first NHRI, but its effectiveness has long been questioned because of its limited investigative powers and perceived executive influence. Seeking to address these shortcomings, the Interim Government enacted the <a title="http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-details-1575.html" href="http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-details-1575.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="89dcecd4-9f5d-406c-a414-e63dd069146a">National Human Rights Commission Ordinance 2025</a> following consultations with <a title="https://bangladesh.un.org/en/311614-empowering-national-human-rights-commission-must-bangladesh" href="https://bangladesh.un.org/en/311614-empowering-national-human-rights-commission-must-bangladesh" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="9eba9836-8fe4-4a68-8ea1-e4c6c957138d">more than 600 stakeholders, including human rights defenders, victims, legal academics, judges, civil society organizations,</a> and the <a title="https://www.undp.org/bangladesh/press-releases/national-consultation-draft-nhrc-ordinance-2025-held-dhaka" href="https://www.undp.org/bangladesh/press-releases/national-consultation-draft-nhrc-ordinance-2025-held-dhaka" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="01b14528-b1c9-4c12-9596-44db3334faa8">United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</a>. The Ordinance expanded the Commission&#8217;s authority to investigate allegations against security forces, strengthened safeguards against arbitrary removal of commissioners, introduced a more pluralistic appointment process, and designated the NHRC as Bangladesh&#8217;s National Preventive Mechanism following <a title="https://www.apt.ch/news/opcat-and-path-forward-building-strong-national-prevention-mechanism-bangladesh" href="https://www.apt.ch/news/opcat-and-path-forward-building-strong-national-prevention-mechanism-bangladesh" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="291d8018-b68e-4b88-8346-b4542e444a1d">ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT).</a></p>
<p>That momentum was interrupted when Parliament <a title="http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-details-1575.html" href="http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-details-1575.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="f95c0c9e-70fb-4dc4-8359-e779d50869aa">repealed</a> the Ordinance in April 2026, temporarily restoring the 2009 Act before publishing the National Human Rights Commission Bill, 2026, on 7 June 2026. <a title="https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/06/22/the-national-human-rights-commission-bill-2026-a-setback-for-human-rights" href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/06/22/the-national-human-rights-commission-bill-2026-a-setback-for-human-rights" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="dea2bd92-5341-4a7b-9c4a-fb51e7a96888">A coalition of thirteen international organisations led by Human Rights Watch</a>, together with <a title="https://www.ti-bangladesh.org/en/articles/press-release/7484" href="https://www.ti-bangladesh.org/en/articles/press-release/7484" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="adabc631-46d5-4974-ad95-dfe883bec0dc">Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB)</a>, contends that the Bill retreats from several safeguards introduced by the 2025 Ordinance and falls short of the Paris Principles. Their concerns centre on an appointment process that could strengthen executive influence, weaker safeguards for pluralistic representation, and investigative powers that may constrain the Commission’s independence in scrutinising law enforcement and security agencies. If these concerns are borne out in the final legislation, Bangladesh&#8217;s prospects of achieving <a title="https://ganhri.org/membership/" href="https://ganhri.org/membership/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-outlook-id="a3cec8f1-8af3-4016-b05c-78a9670e63b8">GANHRI &#8220;A Status&#8221;</a> may remain uncertain.</p>
<p>The debate, however, is larger than one Bill. It concerns whether constitutional rights can be meaningfully protected without an institution capable of investigating the State independently. As Bangladesh seeks to reinforce its international human rights commitments and democratic institutions, the ultimate measure of the NHRC will be whether it enjoys the independence, authority, and public confidence necessary to hold power accountable. The effectiveness of the 2026 framework will therefore be measured not merely by the powers formally granted to the Commission, but by whether those powers are accompanied by the institutional safeguards necessary to ensure genuine independence in practice.</p>
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