The task of supervising execution is entrusted to the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers (Art. 46 (1) ECHR) which, in March 2024, held its first meeting about KlimaSeniorinnen. The decision to hold this meeting is itself unremarkable. The relevant Rules provide for special, confidential human rights meetings on the execution of judgments. But the meeting on KlimaSeniorinnen merits further discussion, both as concerns the public submissions made by the various stakeholders involved, and its outcome.

Run-up to the first examination

The implementation of this case is informed by the backdrop of Swiss politics. Although calls to terminate Swiss membership in the ECHR post-KlimaSeniorinnen – themselves the reincarnation of a longer political project by the right-wing Swiss People’s Party – did not find majority appeal, resistance against KlimaSeniorinnen resonated with parliamentarians across the political spectrum. After a parliamentary declaration from both houses of the Swiss legislature lamenting ‘judicial activism’ on the part of the Court, the Federal Executive decided to communicate an ‘action report’ to the Committee of Ministers in October 2024. This report was submitted on time and emphasized domestic legislative changes as well as confirming that the costs and expenses awarded in the case had been paid. So far, so good.

However, the content of the Swiss submission is far from laudable. Instead of an action plan detailing how the government intends to remedy the human rights violations found in KlimaSeniorinnen, the government submitted an action report. This signals its understanding that KlimaSeniorinnen has already been implemented, and that no further action is required, meaning that the monitoring process can be concluded. This is also the position that the government appears to have taken in the March supervision meeting. This complements its endorsement of an ongoing parliamentary proposal to reform the ECtHR by binding it to an originalist, textual interpretation of the Convention.

Has Switzerland actually complied with the judgment?

The argument that Switzerland has sufficiently amended its domestic law to comply with KlimaSeniorinnen relies on recent legislative amendments, namely the Climate Act (which the Court considered in its judgment) and the revised CO2 Act, along with their respective ordinances. These laws do set out decade-by-decade intermediate reduction targets and a linear emissions reductions path towards the country’s net-zero-by-2050 target. However, as the Swiss NHRI noted, this ‘report’ has several shortcomings. Its interim targets are still broadly framed, it does not consider emissions abroad, and it does not quantify the emissions that Switzerland has remaining by creating a carbon budget or similar, which is a core element of KlimaSeniorinnen (para. 550).

Switzerland’s position is that there is no internationally agreed methodology for defining a carbon budget, because defining the relevant principles of “fair shares” and equity is up to individual States. This is not contradicted by the Paris Agreement, or by KlimaSeniorinnen. However, Switzerland simultaneously refuses to conduct its own science-informed quantification, e.g. mirroring the one provided by NGOs intervening in the implementation proceedings, instead substituting its current emissions reductions goals as if these were the result of such a calculation. This implies that human rights law cannot demand more from States than the Paris Agreement does, while also overstretching the discretion of States in determining what constitutes ‘fair’ national emissions and ignoring global climate justice concerns.

As amply demonstrated by the intervening NGOs and the Swiss NHRI, Switzerland has not yet complied with the Court’s ruling in full, omitting the arguably most important obligation concretized therein. The Swiss media has correctly understood this approach for what it is: a decision to ignore the judgment. The question, then, is what will happen now.

The Committee of Ministers’ response, and an outlook

On 6 March 2025, the Committee of Ministers rejected Switzerland’s position that it had completed implementation of the judgment. It opted to continue monitoring, noting that climate change is a particularly pressing issue and inviting Switzerland to provide more information on its quantification methodology, adaptation measures, procedural safeguards and associations’ access to justice. The next monitoring meeting has been scheduled for September 2025.

Although only an interim step, the outcome of the first supervision meeting is an important success: it demonstrates that the representatives of the other Council of Europe member States – who make up the Committee of Ministers – will not accept Swiss efforts to ignore the ruling. But what if Switzerland doubles down? The relevant Rules give the Committee of Ministers several options for dealing with non-compliant States. It can schedule new supervision meetings, adopt interim resolutions noting the state of progress or expressing concern, refer questions back to the Court, or even (highly exceptionally, and unlikely here) trigger infringement proceedings.

Importantly, the scope of climate-related international obligations considered feasible and legitimate is constantly evolving. By the next Committee of Ministers meeting, there may be advisory opinions on climate change from the Inter-American Court or even the International Court of Justice. Several Council of Europe Member States have recently emerged as champions of environmental rights, and an upcoming (13-14 May 2025) high-level meeting of the Committee of Ministers stands to adopt a Strategy on the Environment, as well as potential guidance on the right to a healthy environment. Such developments could reinforce the Committee of Ministers’ resolve to demand compliance with the judgment. In any case, because the Swiss response to this judgment stands to influence expectations of future climate cases, KlimaSeniorinnen’s implementation – which can be monitored via the HUDOC-EXEC database – deserves to be closely watched.

On 21 August 2023, the DRC submitted an application against Rwanda, asserting breaches of various human rights instruments. These include the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”), the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on Women’s Rights, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (“ACRWC”), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).

The case presents a complex historical backdrop. The dispute has provenance in the Second Congo War (1998–2003), often referred to as the Great War of Africa and the human rights violations that took place during that war. The Second Congo War was a multifaceted and devastating conflict that ensnared numerous domestic and international actors. The war left a profound humanitarian crisis, with millions perishing from violence, disease, and displacement. While the Second Congo War ended in 2003, tensions between the DRC and Rwanda persisted, culminating in renewed hostilities in 2021.

The DRC’s complaint focuses on events that reportedly  occurred during an armed conflict which broke out in November 2021 between the DRC army and ‘the Coalition’ comprising M23 rebel fighters and the Rwandan army. The DRC claims that, due to a conflict involving its military and a coalition of Rwanda’s armed forces alongside the M23 rebel group, Rwanda should be held accountable for violating several rights enshrined in the African Charter and other human rights instruments. These alleged violations include the right to an effective remedy and reparation, the right to life and personal security, the right to human dignity, the prohibition of slavery, human trafficking, torture, and degrading treatment, the right to liberty, education, property, housing, and the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. Additionally, the DRC asserts violations of the right to family protection, food, development, a clean and sustainable environment, and the collective right to peace.

However, before arriving at the doorstep of the African Court, there are two significant legal confrontations. The first happened in the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Commission”). On 3 March 1999, the DRC filed a communication with the African Commission against Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. Notably, this was the African Commission’s first-ever interstate communication. Rwanda, however, disengaged from the proceedings after the admissibility phase.

The DRC accused the armed forces of these State Parties of committing extensive human rights violations on the DRC’s soil. It argued that the State Parties violated the following rights: equality, right to life, right to liberty and security of persons, freedom of movement, right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health, right to education, right of all peoples’ to equality, right to existence, freedom to freely dispose of wealth and natural resources, right to economic, cultural and social development; and right to national and international peace and security. The African Commission agreed with the DRC and held that the State Parties liable for violating these rights.

The second legal confrontation occurred in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). On 28 May 2002, the DRC submitted a case against Rwanda to the ICJ, alleging breaches of multiple human rights treaties. Specifically, the DRC requested the ICJ to find Rwanda liable and responsible for aggression against the DRC, including large-scale massacres, rape, throat-cutting and crucifying.

In a judgment delivered on 3 February 2006, the ICJ determined it lacked the authority to assess the substance of the claims. The Court found that Rwanda was not a signatory to some of the treaties involved, such as the Convention Against Torture, while for others, like the Genocide Convention, Rwanda had entered reservations limiting the ICJ’s jurisdiction.

Before the African Court, the DRC requested an expedited procedure, but the African Court rejected this request. In response to the allegations raised by the DRC, Rwanda argued that the Court has no jurisdiction as this is a political matter. Rwanda also alleged that the application is inadmissible and that at the time of the filing of the application, there was no dispute between them. Rwanda has previously criticised the African Court for what it perceives as interference in political issues. Rwanda withdrew its 34(6) Article Declaration of the African Court Protocol, thus restricting the ability of the African Court to receive applications from individuals and NGOs.

Undoubtedly, this case is a landmark moment for the African Court, testing its authority in interstate disputes and the enforcement of human rights obligations. The case challenges the Court to determine its jurisdiction and Rwanda’s accountability. Its outcome could set a precedent for interstate human rights litigation in Africa or expose the limits of regional enforcement.