<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Canada | OHRH</title>
	<atom:link href="https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/tag/canada/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk</link>
	<description>Oxford Human Rights Hub</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2026 11:48:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	

 
<site xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">39401664</site>	<item>
		<title>“Government is not banning books”: book ban legislation makes its first appearance in Canada</title>
		<link>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/government-is-not-banning-books-book-ban-legislation-makes-its-first-appearance-in-canada/</link>
					<comments>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/government-is-not-banning-books-book-ban-legislation-makes-its-first-appearance-in-canada/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Émilie Weidl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Jul 2026 06:47:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=87405</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The book-banning legislation crusade in the United States has officially spilled over into Canada with the passing of Bill 28 by Alberta’s United Conservative Party government under Premier Danielle Smith on the 15th of May 2026. Bill 28 empowers the Municipal Affairs Minister to appoint an individual to inspect libraries, including what property they make [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>The book-banning legislation crusade in the United States has officially spilled over into Canada with the <a href="https://www.caplibraries.ca/newsroom/alberta-public-libraries-disappointed-with-passing-of-bill-28">passing</a> of <a href="https://docs.assembly.ab.ca/LADDAR_files/docs/bills/bill/legislature_31/session_2/20251023_bill-028.pdf">Bill 28</a> by Alberta’s United Conservative Party government under Premier Danielle Smith on the 15<sup>th</sup> of May 2026.</strong></p>
<p>Bill 28 empowers the Municipal Affairs Minister to appoint an individual to inspect libraries, including what property they make available to the public (para 2(2)). It also introduces language granting the Minister “regulation-making authority” pertaining to the access of library property, including age-based restriction (para 2(3)). In other words, the Minister has been tasked which determining which “offensive books” are currently freely available in public libraries and then drafting regulations to restrict this. Bill 28 has also <a href="https://factsmtr.substack.com/p/alberta-library-law-explained-how">handed</a> gender critical groups a direct pathway to book-banning through a complaint process.</p>
<p>Although this is not Smith’s first foray into book-banning, it is the first time this has taken legislative form. Her government’s July 2025 ministerial <a href="https://smartcdn.gprod.postmedia.digital/calgaryherald/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/2025_030_Education_and_Childcare.pdf">order</a> to remove certain books from school libraries was met by well-deserved <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/03/canada-alberta-book-ban-pause">malicious compliance</a> on the part of the Edmonton school board.</p>
<p>Bill 28 will <a href="https://www.airdriecityview.com/community/library-official-warns-bill-28-undermines-parental-rights-and-privacy-12257953">allow</a> Smith’s government to draft lists of materials to be removed from <a href="https://www.alberta.ca/system/files/ma-supporting-age-appropriate-access-public-libraries-fact-sheet.pdf">general shelves</a> in public libraries. Notably, the government no longer must rely on librarians or school boards to determine what materials are captured by policy. In its explanatory <a href="https://www.alberta.ca/system/files/ma-supporting-age-appropriate-access-public-libraries-fact-sheet.pdf">guide</a>, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs insisted that it “is not banning books” and is instead focused on “explicit visual depictions of sexual acts” and “age-appropriate access.” Bill 28 contains no language restricting the Minister’s newly vested powers in this manner. The guide goes on to explain that identified materials will be physically removed from general shelves. This means that even adults attempting to access age-restricted material will be <a href="https://www.airdriecityview.com/community/library-official-warns-bill-28-undermines-parental-rights-and-privacy-12257953">subject to staff &#8220;supervision.&#8221;</a></p>
<p>Such legislation is offensive to the <em>Charter</em> guarantee of freedom of expression under section 2(b) in that it <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1989/1989canlii87/1989canlii87.html?resultId=e8de55e4afeb4e38a4a7257e999b6ec8&amp;searchId=2026-06-01T18:10:23:506/e1865d5321984e259b5ed96e9dc7c78e">controls access</a> to certain expressive material. This violation cannot be <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1986/1986canlii46/1986canlii46.html?resultId=45f6be632ea948f2904f21eafbea44f4&amp;searchId=2026-06-01T17:42:53:290/972095cd62694e01955498563b45f722">saved</a> under the <em>Charter</em>’s reasonable limits clause, as Bill 28 does not represent a reasonable and demonstrably justified response to a sufficiently important goal.</p>
<p>According to the explanatory guide, the ostensible goals of this legislation are to “protect children” and to recognise parents’ decision-making role in the content their children access. These stated goals are specious and the proposed furthering action is an unnecessary overreach of ministerial power.</p>
<p>Smith’s book-banning efforts are the results of lobbying from <a href="https://thetyee.ca/News/2025/06/03/Conservative-Activists-Alberta-Book-Ban-Plan/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">two groups</a> – Parents for Choice in Education (PCE) and Action4Canada – who have openly claimed credit for their influence. These groups were proudly responsible for the removal of four books from Alberta school libraries in 2025, three of which included 2SLGBTQIA+ content; they do not represent parents concerned about their children accessing pornographic materials. PCE and Action4Canada are openly <a href="https://thetyee.ca/News/2025/06/03/Conservative-Activists-Alberta-Book-Ban-Plan/">anti-2SLGTBQIA+ groups</a> who seek to portray the 2SLGBTQIA+ community as sexual predators for merely existing outside of “traditional” gender and sexual norms.</p>
<p>Bill 28 is counterintuitive to the stated goal of acknowledging parents’ rights, as the introduction of government control overrides parental decision-making rather than empowering it. Concerning the other goal of child protection, <a href="https://www.airdriecityview.com/community/library-official-warns-bill-28-undermines-parental-rights-and-privacy-12257953">librarians</a> already play a role in ensuring that children do not have access to depictions of sexually explicit acts. Bill 28 is thus superfluous – at best – to the stated goals.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/canadian-journal-of-political-science-revue-canadienne-de-science-politique/article/notwithstanding-centralism-the-resurgence-of-the-notwithstanding-clause-and-the-conservative-provincial-rights-movement/24F2F2EEBEF3C79ADA57444419F945F0">in an era</a> where the political taboo of the notwithstanding clause no longer holds the same weight it once did, a successful <em>Charter </em>challenge will likely not be enough to put an end to Smith’s book-banning designs. Section 33 of the <em>Charter</em>, also known as the notwithstanding clause, allows Canadian governments to pass legislation in violation of specific guaranteed rights, including the freedom of expression, for a period of five years at a time. Bill 28 raises renewed concerns about the far-reaching consequences that the resurgence of section 33 will have on Canadian human rights and democracy. Book-banning has, historically, never been a positive sign for democratic health. Moreover, in a time where transphobic rhetoric and legislation are on a meteoric rise, the use of section 33 to ban content humanising the trans community will only contribute to societal ignorance and disdain for this vulnerable community.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/government-is-not-banning-books-book-ban-legislation-makes-its-first-appearance-in-canada/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">87405</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia: A profound shift in how Canadian tort law recognises and redresses intimate partner violence – but what will the material impacts be for survivors?</title>
		<link>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/ahluwalia-v-ahluwalia-a-profound-shift-in-how-canadian-tort-law-recognises-and-redresses-intimate-partner-violence-but-what-will-the-material-impacts-be-for-survivors/</link>
					<comments>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/ahluwalia-v-ahluwalia-a-profound-shift-in-how-canadian-tort-law-recognises-and-redresses-intimate-partner-violence-but-what-will-the-material-impacts-be-for-survivors/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikki Godden-Rasul]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 14:16:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=87248</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia 2026 SCC 16, the Supreme Court of Canada recognised (6-3) a new tort of intimate partner violence, based on coercive and controlling behaviour, overturning the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision that the character of intimate partner violence could be captured by the existing torts of battery, assault and intention to inflict emotional distress, [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>In </strong><a href="https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/21505/index.do"><strong>Ahluwalia v<em>.</em> Ahluwalia</strong></a><strong> 2026 SCC 16, the Supreme Court of Canada recognised (6-3) a new tort of intimate partner violence, based on coercive and controlling behaviour, overturning the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision that the character of intimate partner violence could be captured by the existing torts of battery, assault and intention to inflict emotional distress, but agreeing with the level of damages awarded, $100,000.  </strong></p>
<p><span data-olk-copy-source="MessageBody">Kuldeep Kaur Ahluwalia, had been subject to abuse by her husband, Amrit Pal Singh Ahluwalia, over their 16-year marriage, which included but was not limited to physical assault, emotional and psychological abuse, social isolation, economic control, and sexual coercion.</span> Damages were sought through tort law, alongside family law remedies following the relationship breakdown. Properly reflecting the nature and harms of intimate partner violence in law is important. Tort law has typically worked – and often still does work – to <a href="https://bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/diverse-voices-in-tort-law">reproduce inequalities and harms</a> along the lines of gender, race, class, sexuality and ability. The majority, with Karakatsanis J. concurring, characterised intimate partner violence as violating the rights to dignity, autonomy, and equality, as well as identifying the inherent gendered power dynamics and intersecting power relations which can increase vulnerability and violence (Kasirer J., for the majority, paras 124-125). Existing torts which typically centre on isolated incidents were deemed insufficient to capture the wrong and harms (Kasirer J., for the majority, paras 10, 20 122-124). This case is thus symbolically powerful and marks a watershed moment for tort law in Canada.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, I have my reservations as to what this will mean for the majority of survivors in practice. One concern is about accessibility of the law. In Canada, <a href="https://www.mfclawyers.com/the-latest/ahluwalia-v-ahluwalia-a-landmark-victory-for-domestic-violence-victims-but-a-potential-crisis-for-family-law-litigation/">family law courts</a> are already fraught with excessive delays, increasing legal costs, and limited trial resources. Increasing civil litigation within this is likely to exacerbate these difficulties, and there is a real question as to who will be able to access the courts and afford to litigate. Moreover, as is the case with tort law generally, where tortfeasors are uninsured – which is likely the case for all individual tortfeasors as opposed to an organisation or state body – most will not have the ability to pay any damages awarded. This is coupled with family law proceedings following relationship breakdown where usually the problem is that there is not enough money to go around, and the challenge is to meet needs, especially where children are involved. So whether survivors will often materially benefit from the new tort of intimate partner violence is a significant question.</p>
<p>Another concern is about backlash and defensive tactics used by perpetrators which end up penalising survivors and subjecting them to further harm. There is a risk that gendered and racialised myths and stereotypes will be invoked; indeed, as the <a href="https://www.womenslegalcentre.ca/publications/riseintervention-ahluwalia-v-ahluwalia">Rise Women’s Legal Centre</a> points out, this was a strategy used by Mr Ahluwalia at trial, and the myth that women lie about abuse was present in the Ontario Court of Appeal decision. There is also a risk of counter-claims. Since civil claims for sexual violence have become increasingly possible due to doctrinal and procedural legal changes, combined with increased public recognition of abuse and the potential for legal liability, there has been an increase in defamation claims, or other legal tactics, to <a href="https://www.allenandunwin.com/browse/book/Jennifer-Robinson-and-Keio-Yoshida-How-Many-More-Women-9781761471797">silence survivors</a>. In addition, as has been seen in criminal and family law proceedings involving intimate partner violence, perpetrators make allegations against survivors, with legal and other professionals often failing to identify the ‘primary aggressor’. In this context – tort law claims alongside family law proceedings – similar issues are likely to arise. Indeed, the majority recognised this and aimed to frame the new tort so it would not capture acts of resistance against abusive behaviour (Kasirer J., for the majority, para 15). However, as Karakatsanis J. (concurring) points out, even if the new tort may not easily be used for a counter-claim, other torts such as battery could be (paras 286-287). And as is seen in the criminal law, self-defence is very limited and does not easily work for victims of domestic abuse.</p>
<p>My point here is not to say that the law should not change, or that survivors should not pursue legal remedies for fear of being sued. Many individuals who find themselves in circumstances like Amrit Pal Singh Ahluwalia often have few options but to turn to law, and should be supported. However, feminist activists and organisers need to be careful not to get tied up in legal battles. As I have argued <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09646639251322752?_gl=1*2a8sk3*_up*MQ..*_ga*ODI2MzEzNzM2LjE3ODA0OTEzODU.*_ga_60R758KFDG*czE3ODA0OTEzODUkbzEkZzAkdDE3ODA0OTEzODUkajYwJGwxJGg2NjgxMDI3NjE.">elsewhere</a>, doing so can mean focusing only on making improvements to the current systems at the expense of organising and strategizing for more radical social, economic and political transformation. What would family law look like if we <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/3f9LzeNNA45Ha2sEuMZco1">abolished the family</a>? Would we need tort law if harm and violence were addressed and resolved collectively, and the consequences were properly addressed through more radical redistributive mechanisms? We should avoid over-reliance on systems which individualise and depoliticise abuse, and which do not encourage meaningful accountability, that is, where individuals, groups, communities, organisations and institutions accept responsibility for harm and act to change at all levels. Instead, we have to focus on addressing the underlying conditions which enable gendered harms like intimate partner violence.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/ahluwalia-v-ahluwalia-a-profound-shift-in-how-canadian-tort-law-recognises-and-redresses-intimate-partner-violence-but-what-will-the-material-impacts-be-for-survivors/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">87248</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Cognitive Challenges of Integrating Large Language Models to Assist Judges and the Threat to Fair Trial</title>
		<link>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-cognitive-challenges-of-integrating-large-language-models-to-assist-judges-and-the-threat-to-fair-trial/</link>
					<comments>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-cognitive-challenges-of-integrating-large-language-models-to-assist-judges-and-the-threat-to-fair-trial/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[MD Raisul Islam Sourav]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2026 06:33:13 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Argentina]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Brazil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ireland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New Zealand]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Kingdom]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=87124</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[General Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude, and DeepSeek, and even field-specialised models, are being widely used in almost every sector, including healthcare, business, engineering, education, law enforcement, and even various administrative decision-making processes. The judiciary is also no exception: across the world, judges and court staff are applying LLM systems in [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>General Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude, and DeepSeek, and even field-specialised models, are being widely used in almost every sector, including <a href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12189880/">healthcare</a></strong><strong>, <a href="https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/3-ways-businesses-can-use-large-language-models">business</a></strong><strong>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1474034624007171">engineering</a></strong><strong>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666920X25001699?__cf_chl_rt_tk=E9HBAdwDEiHXHdbqvzslb_7pjvQcxte08lJuSy2xCd4-1774886751-1.0.1.1-x6ywAee3XOd7z1Lh6eSCcUSL8oww7UydXEE2IiiBe8Q">education</a></strong><strong>, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/policing/article/doi/10.1093/police/paaf012/8128457">law enforcement</a></strong><strong>, and even various <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-risk-regulation/article/potentials-and-challenges-of-large-language-models-llms-in-the-context-of-administrative-decisionmaking/EAE8564B67B49B1D77E948E058935060">administrative decision-making</a></strong><strong> processes. The judiciary is also no exception: across the world, judges and court staff are applying LLM systems in court proceedings. The application of LLMs and other Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools in the judicial decision-making process, even for non-core judicial functions, creates a tension in the procedural integrity of adjudication where these tools have potentials to improperly influence the final decision to the detriment of fair trial rights. </strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">There are projects in some jurisdictions – including <a href="https://aibusiness.com/verticals/ai-helps-judges-decide-court-cases-in-china">China</a>, <a href="https://www.techandjustice.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/brazil">Brazil</a>, and <a href="https://www.techandjustice.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/argentina">Argentina</a> – as to how these technologies could be employed in the judicial decision-making process to reduce case backlogs and enhance the delivery of justice. Contrarily, some countries – such as <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Artificial-Intelligence-AI-Guidance-for-Judicial-Office-Holders-2.pdf">the UK</a>, <a href="https://judicialcouncil.ie/assets/uploads/AI%20Guidance%20-%20Guidelines%20For%20Judges%20(June%202024).pdf">Ireland</a>, <a href="https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/assets/6-Going-to-Court/practice-directions/practice-guidelines/all-benches/20231207-GenAI-Guidelines-Judicial.pdf">New Zealand</a>, and <a href="https://cjc-ccm.ca/sites/default/files/documents/2024/AI%20Guidelines%20-%20FINAL%20-%202024-09%20-%20EN.pdf">Canada</a> – have taken an opposing stance to prevent the adoption of LLMs in core judicial functions, including determination and adjudication. Instead, they permit LLMs as support tools for judges and court staff to perform routine work like summarising text, speech writing, searching for information, sources, and precedents, enhancing clarity and linguistic flourish, translating, and transcribing.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">However, such ‘innocent’ use of LLM tools in routine or secondary court functions has the potential to influence judicial cognition and thereby affect the core judicial decision-making process. Institutional permission and <a href="https://pmri.co.za/ai-cognitive-offload-effect-legal-judgement/">repetitive use</a> of these tools may lead to several cognitive effects, such as automation bias, cognitive offloading, anchoring, and the framing effect. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/brycehoffman/2024/03/10/automation-bias-what-it-is-and-how-to-overcome-it/">Automation bias</a> leads to over-reliance on automated recommendations, while <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364661316300985">cognitive </a>offloading reduces mental effort through external tools. <a href="https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/social-sciences-and-humanities/anchoring-cognitive-bias">Anchoring</a> causes over-dependence on initial information, and the <a href="https://link.springer.com/rwe/10.1007/978-3-319-55065-7_1571">framing effect</a> shows how decision-making shifts based on information presentation.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Judging involves reading the case materials, identifying the issues, and developing the reasons by themselves, whereas a preliminary recommendation produced by an LLM system has the potential to serve as a starting point for such cognitive involvement of judges, anchoring the point of departure. On the other hand, when a judge outsources the meaning of legal lexicon, a summary of long texts, or the identification of precedents to an LLM, they ultimately engage in <a href="https://patentlyo.com/patent/2025/05/cognitive-laziness-lawyers.html">cognitive offloading</a>. This cognitive offloading can lead to a superficial review process where judges make only ‘surface-level’ scrutiny or modifications to LLM-generated text, bypassing the deep cognitive work required to fully understand the legal reasoning and verdict.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Therefore, simply relying on a human judge to use LLM systems in preparatory stages, or to audit the veracity of the outcomes of such systems subsequently in the judicial decision-making process, is potentially problematic. Though judges are trained to be impartial, cognitive and behavioural science demonstrates that no decision-maker is <a href="https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.analchem.0c00704">immune</a> to systematic <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0379073818304559">cognitive biases</a>. Decades of <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124">behavioural research</a> demonstrate that professional expertise does not eliminate susceptibility to anchoring, framing, or automation bias. Judges, like other professionals, work within <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262192057/models-of-bounded-rationality-volume-1/">cognitive constraints</a>.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">These cognitive defects are significant because human judges are regarded as the principal safeguard to check and control any type of bias and are also regarded as <a href="https://abovethelaw.com/2015/01/how-anchoring-can-influence-judges-and-other-cognitive-biases/">neutral</a> decision-makers to ensure justice. In the circumstances of heavy judicial workloads, exhaustion, and in some cases institutional pressure to deliver timely decisions with limited resources, cognitive issues can arise. As a result, it can undermine the fundamental principles of fair trial, including judicial independence, the judicial duty to provide well-reasoned decisions, and ultimately the rule of law.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The inherent persuasive features of LLMs that randomly generate text with <a href="https://stanford.edu/~jlmcc/papers/DasguptaLampinenEtAl22LMsShowHumanLikeContentEffectsInReasoning.pdf">human-like reasoning</a> and confidence, in spite of factual or legal accuracy, may make human judges vulnerable to this uncritical adoption of LLMs even as a support tool for judicial decision-making. This creates a deep tension with the fundamental and uncompressible judicial duty of independent reasoning, signifying that without precise safeguards and a deep understanding of this cognitive susceptibility, the integration of LLMs in adjudication, even as secondary tools, could unintentionally undermine the deliberative process it seeks to augment. Hence, in an increasingly technology-driven judiciary, it is critical to examine whether judges’ cognitive limitations prevent them from effectively guarding against aggravating this tension.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-cognitive-challenges-of-integrating-large-language-models-to-assist-judges-and-the-threat-to-fair-trial/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">87124</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>La Cour suprême du Canada déclare que l’exclusion des demandeurs d’asile de l’admissibilité aux services de garde subventionnés établit une discrimination fondée sur le sexe : Québec c Kanyinda</title>
		<link>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/la-cour-supreme-du-canada-declare-que-lexclusion-des-demandeurs-dasile-de-ladmissibilite-aux-services-de-garde-subventionnes-etablit-une-discrimination-fondee-sur-le-sexe/</link>
					<comments>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/la-cour-supreme-du-canada-declare-que-lexclusion-des-demandeurs-dasile-de-ladmissibilite-aux-services-de-garde-subventionnes-etablit-une-discrimination-fondee-sur-le-sexe/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Isabelle St-Hilaire]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Apr 2026 05:59:35 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=87015</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[L’exclusion des demandeurs d’asile de l’accès aux services de garde subventionnés viole-t-elle le droit à l’égalité ? Dans l’affaire Québec c Kanyinda (2026 CSC 7), une majorité des juges de la Cour suprême du Canada (CSC) conclut que l’exclusion crée de la discrimination fondée sur le sexe étant donné son effet disproportionné sur les femmes [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>L’exclusion des demandeurs d’asile de l’accès aux services de garde subventionnés viole-t-elle le droit à l’égalité ? Dans l’affaire <em>Québec c Kanyinda</em> (<a href="https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/2026/2026csc7/2026csc7.html?resultId=3f969e27a69748f6afcecb1ba07d00d8&amp;searchId=2026-03-16T10:19:20:132/2507425b267c465fba6e30f83eacd096">2026 CSC 7</a>), une majorité des juges de la Cour suprême du Canada (CSC) conclut que l’exclusion crée de la discrimination fondée sur le sexe étant donné son effet disproportionné sur les femmes qui demandent l’asile.</strong></p>
<p>Ayant fui au Québec, province canadienne, en 2018, Mme Bijou Kanyinda a dû attendre plus de deux ans pour que sa demande d’asile soit traitée et ultimement accueillie par le gouvernement fédéral. Pendant cette période, elle s’est vu refuser l’accès au programme de garderies subventionnées par la province, en vertu de <a href="https://www.canlii.org/fr/qc/legis/regl/rlrq-c-s-4.1.1-r-1/derniere/rlrq-c-s-4.1.1-r-1.html#sec3">l’art. 3 du Règlement sur la contribution réduite</a> pris en application de la <a href="https://www.canlii.org/fr/qc/legis/lois/rlrq-c-s-4.1.1/derniere/rlrq-c-s-4.1.1.html">Loi sur les services de garde éducatifs à l’enfance</a> du Québec. Cette disposition rend admissibles au programme huit catégories de parents qui résident au Québec, y compris les citoyens canadiens, les résidents permanents et certains types d’immigrants ayant un statut temporaire – mais pas les demandeurs d’asile dont la demande n’a pas encore été tranchée.</p>
<p>Mme Kanyinda a plaidé que la disposition viole son droit à la protection contre la discrimination fondée sur le sexe, la citoyenneté ou un nouveau motif de discrimination analogue proposé, soit le statut d’immigration ou de demandeur d’asile, en vertu du <a href="https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/legis/lois/annexe-b-de-la-loi-de-1982-sur-le-canada-r-u-1982-c-11/derniere/annexe-b-de-la-loi-de-1982-sur-le-canada-r-u-1982-c-11.html#sec15">par. 15(1) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés</a> – la disposition constitutionnelle protégeant le droit à l’égalité. À la Cour suprême, huit des neuf juges concluent à une violation non justifiée du droit à l’égalité, bien qu’ils parviennent à ce résultat par le biais d’approches analytiques différentes.</p>
<p>S’exprimant au nom de cinq de ses collègues, la juge Karakatsanis choisit de trancher l’affaire en fonction du motif de discrimination fondée sur le sexe, en appliquant le cadre d’analyse à deux étapes fondé sur l’art. 15 bien établi dans la jurisprudence antérieure. À la première étape de l’analyse, elle conclut que la disposition contestée a un effet disproportionné sur les demanderesses d’asile et qu’elle créé donc, de par ses effets, une distinction fondée sur le sexe.</p>
<p>À la deuxième étape, elle conclut que le fait de nier aux demanderesses d’asile le bénéfice des services de garde subventionnés a pour effet de renforcer, de perpétuer ou d’accentuer les désavantages auxquels elles sont confrontées. En ce qui concerne la question de la justification à l’article premier de la Charte, la juge Karakatsanis conclut qu’il n’existe aucun lien rationnel entre l’exclusion des demandeurs d’asile et l’objectif législatif mis de l’avant par le gouvernement du Québec, soit celui de <a href="https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/2026/2026csc7/2026csc7.html#par97">« limiter l’admissibilité à la subvention pour les services de garde aux personnes ayant un lien suffisant avec le Québec »</a>.</p>
<p>En guise de réparation, la majorité invoque « l’interprétation extensive » de l’art. 3 du Règlement de sorte que les demandeurs d’asile soient tous considérés comme admissibles aux services de garde subventionnés.</p>
<p>Dans des motifs concordants, le juge Rowe conclut lui aussi que la disposition contestée établit une discrimination fondée sur le sexe injustifiée, quoiqu’il aurait accordé au gouvernement une plus grande marge de manœuvre à plusieurs égards.</p>
<p>Pour sa part, dans le cadre de motifs concordants souscrivant au dispositif, le juge Wagner se dit d’avis que l’affaire peut être tranchée de manière plus naturelle en concluant à une discrimination injustifiée fondée sur le statut de demandeur d’asile, motif qu’il aurait reconnu à titre de motif analogue protégé aux termes de l’art. 15. Ses motifs font écho – et en fait amplifient – la reconnaissance de la majorité quant au fait que la disposition contestée renforce les stéréotypes néfastes concernant les demandeurs d’asile.</p>
<p>La juge Côté, quant à elle, se dit en désaccord avec ses collègues quant à presque chaque élément de l’analyse. Bien que ses motifs trahissent une compréhension qu’on puisse dire appauvrie du vécu des réfugiés, ils démontrent cependant une sensibilité accrue aux inquiétudes quant la pérennité du système. De plus, en insistant que le gouvernement n’a pas « causé » les effets préjudiciables reprochés et qu’on doit lui permettre de s’attaquer à un problème sociétal de manière graduelle, les motifs de la juge Côté dénotent un respect plus profond pour les efforts déployés par le Québec pour promouvoir l’égalité des sexes par le biais d’un programme de garderies subventionnées robuste, si imparfait, qui fait d’ailleurs l’envie des autres provinces canadiennes et leur sert d’inspiration.</p>
<p>Trois observations clé ressortent des motifs majoritaires.</p>
<p>La première concerne l’accent indéniable que place la majorité sur l’adoption d’une approche intersectionnelle, insistant comme elle le fait sur l’examen des <a href="https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/2026/2026csc7/2026csc7.html?resultId=3f969e27a69748f6afcecb1ba07d00d8&amp;searchId=2026-03-16T10:19:20:132/2507425b267c465fba6e30f83eacd096#par39">« identités et réalités intersectées »</a> du groupe demandeur. La majorité affirme que l’approche intersectionnelle aux allégations de violation de l’art. 15 n’a rien de nouveau ; or, il est intéressant de noter la façon dont cette approche est intégrée à chaque étape de l’analyse.</p>
<p>La deuxième observation concerne le peu d’importance qu’accorde la majorité aux arguments s’appuyant sur le principe du gradualisme, insistant sur le fait que le caractère amélioratif d’un programme n’empêche pas que ce dernier soit assujetti à un examen fondé sur le par. 15(1).</p>
<p>La dernière observation concerne la préférence qu’exprime la majorité pour aborder le litige sous l’angle d’une allégation de discrimination indirecte fondée sur le sexe plutôt que sous celle d’une allégation de discrimination indirecte fondée sur un motif analogue jusqu’ici non reconnu, soit le statut de demandeur d’asile.</p>
<p>Ce penchant semble témoigner de la flexibilité du cadre d’analyse consolidé applicable à la fois à la discrimination directe et indirecte en application du par. 15(1) et de la forte protection qu’offre la Charte à l’encontre des mesures apparemment neutres mais ayant un effet discriminatoire.</p>
<p>L’engagement de la majorité à détecter la discrimination insidieuse à l’encontre des femmes et son évaluation lucide du contexte global de la situation du groupe demandeur méritent d’être célébrés. Cela dit, la <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/supreme-court-asylum-seekers-subsidized-daycare-ruling-9.7117175">réaction politique</a> à la décision, soulevant immédiatement <a href="https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/legis/lois/annexe-b-de-la-loi-de-1982-sur-le-canada-r-u-1982-c-11/derniere/annexe-b-de-la-loi-de-1982-sur-le-canada-r-u-1982-c-11.html#sec33">la disposition de dérogation</a> de la Charte comme moyen potentiel de contourner la réparation accordée par la Cour, est plutôt décourageante. La décision dûment motivée de la CSC devrait plutôt inciter le gouvernement à solidifier son programme de garderies subventionnées de sorte à en assurer la pérennité. Un accès plus inclusif aux services de garde abordables bénéficie profondément aux enfants comme à ceux qui en sont responsables – en fait, cela bénéficie à <a href="https://www.canlii.org/fr/ca/csc/doc/2026/2026csc7/2026csc7.html#par251">toute la société</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/la-cour-supreme-du-canada-declare-que-lexclusion-des-demandeurs-dasile-de-ladmissibilite-aux-services-de-garde-subventionnes-etablit-une-discrimination-fondee-sur-le-sexe/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">87015</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Supreme Court of Canada Rules that Excluding Refugee Claimants from Subsidized Childcare Discriminates Based on Sex in Quebec v Kanyinda</title>
		<link>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/supreme-court-of-canada-rules-that-excluding-refugee-claimants-from-subsidized-childcare-discriminates-based-on-sex-in-quebec-v-kanyinda/</link>
					<comments>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/supreme-court-of-canada-rules-that-excluding-refugee-claimants-from-subsidized-childcare-discriminates-based-on-sex-in-quebec-v-kanyinda/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Isabelle St-Hilaire]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Apr 2026 06:02:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=86974</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Does excluding refugee claimants from access to subsidized childcare violate the right to equality? In Quebec v Kanyinda (2026 SCC 7), a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) concluded the exclusion did discriminate based on sex given its disproportionate impact on women refugee claimants. Fleeing to Quebec, Canada in 2018, Ms Bijou Kanyinda [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Does excluding refugee claimants from access to subsidized childcare violate the right to equality? In <em>Quebec v Kanyinda</em> (<a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2026/2026scc7/2026scc7.html?resultId=c16a86af1ff6419ca5e84a6ff3d56300&amp;searchId=2026-03-12T10:46:52:688/7ba47123ec054fdebde2b43000d61a1f">2026 SCC 7</a>), a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) concluded the exclusion did discriminate based on sex given its disproportionate impact on women refugee claimants. </strong></p>
<p>Fleeing to Quebec, Canada in 2018, Ms Bijou Kanyinda waited over two years for her refugee claim to be processed and ultimately approved by the federal government. During that period, she was denied access to the province’s subsidized childcare program pursuant to <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/qc/laws/regu/cqlr-c-s-4.1.1-r-1/latest/cqlr-c-s-4.1.1-r-1.html?resultId=1f6f742171914290827441d839683b1a&amp;searchId=2026-03-15T12:45:33:586/18f5eea626d4406ba9b60bc357709b33#sec3">s 3 of Quebec’s Reduced Contribution Regulation</a>, made under the <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/qc/laws/stat/cqlr-c-s-4.1.1/latest/cqlr-c-s-4.1.1.html">Educational Childcare Act</a>. The provision deems eligible eight categories of parents who reside in Quebec, including Canadian citizens, permanent residents and certain types of temporary immigrants – but not asylum seekers whose claim has yet to be determined.</p>
<p>Ms Kanyinda argued the provision breached her right to be free from discrimination based on sex, citizenship and a new analogous ground, namely immigration status or refugee claimant status, under <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html?resultId=b5d09d94ff114261b378d858a2b9873b&amp;searchId=2026-03-12T10:37:41:661/e0f2c0b5f5c543dd96d58694bfb8da4f#sec15subsec15.1">s 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms</a> – Canada’s constitutional equality provision. In the SCC, eight of the nine judges found an unjustified violation of the right to equality, though they reached that conclusion through different analytical pathways.</p>
<p>Writing for five of her colleagues, Justice Karakatsanis decided the case on the sex discrimination ground, applying the previously established two-step test for assessing violations of s 15(1). Under step 1, she found that the impugned provision had a disproportionate impact on refugee claimant women and thus created, in its effect, a distinction based on sex. Under step 2, she concluded that denying women refugee claimants the benefit of subsidized childcare reinforced, perpetuated and exacerbated their disadvantage in myriads of ways. Turning to justification under s 1 of the Charter, Justice Karakatsanis found that the exclusion of refugee claimants was not rationally connected with the Quebec government’s stated objective of <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2026/2026scc7/2026scc7.html?resultId=c16a86af1ff6419ca5e84a6ff3d56300&amp;searchId=2026-03-12T10:46:52:688/7ba47123ec054fdebde2b43000d61a1f#par97">‘limiting daycare subsidies to people with a sufficient link to Quebec’</a>. By way of remedy, the majority ordered ‘reading in’ s 3 of the Regulation the eligibility of all refugee claimants to subsidized daycare.</p>
<p>In concurring reasons, Justice Rowe also found unjustified sex discrimination, despite providing more leeway to the government in several aspects of the analysis. Meanwhile, Chief Justice Wagner, who concurred in the result, felt the case could be dealt with in a more straightforward manner by finding unjustified discrimination based on refugee claimant status, which he would have recognized as an analogous ground of prohibited discrimination under s 15(1). His reasons echo and amplify the majority’s acknowledgement that the law plays into harmful stereotypes about asylum seekers. Justice Côté disagreed with her colleagues on just about every issue. While her reasons betray an arguably poorer understanding of the refugee experience, they show greater concern for the system’s sustainability, and through her insistence that the government has not ‘caused’ the adverse effects complained of and must be allowed to tackle a problem gradually, they convey deeper respect for Quebec’s efforts in promoting gender equality via an overall robust – albeit imperfect – subsidized daycare program, one that has long been a source of envy and inspiration in other Canadian provinces.</p>
<p>Three points stand out from the majority decision.</p>
<p>First is the emphasis the majority places on the adoption of an intersectional lens, insisting on considering the claimant group’s <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2026/2026scc7/2026scc7.html?resultId=c16a86af1ff6419ca5e84a6ff3d56300&amp;searchId=2026-03-12T10:46:52:688/7ba47123ec054fdebde2b43000d61a1f#par39">‘intersecting identities and realities’</a>. While the majority states that an intersectional approach to s 15 is nothing new, the manner in which it is integrated in every step of the analysis is remarkable.</p>
<p>Second is how little room the majority gives to arguments relating to incrementalism when determining whether the right to equality had been infringed,  insisting that the ameliorative character of a program does not shield it from s 15(1) scrutiny.</p>
<p>The final point is the majority’s preference for dealing with the case as an allegation of indirect sex-based discrimination rather than direct discrimination on an as-of-yet unrecognized analogous ground, namely refugee claimant status. This inclination is arguably a testament to the flexibility of the consolidated test applicable to both direct and indirect discrimination under s 15(1) and the strong protection the Charter offers against adverse effects discrimination.</p>
<p>The majority’s commitment to detecting insidious discrimination against women and its open-eyed consideration of the full context of the claimant group offer something to celebrate. Less encouraging is the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/supreme-court-asylum-seekers-subsidized-daycare-ruling-9.7117175">political discourse</a> immediately turning to the Charter’s <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html?resultId=b5d09d94ff114261b378d858a2b9873b&amp;searchId=2026-03-12T10:37:41:661/e0f2c0b5f5c543dd96d58694bfb8da4f#sec33">‘notwithstanding clause’</a> as a means of effectively bypassing the Court’s remedy. This carefully reasoned decision should instead prompt the government to bolster the sustainability of its program. More inclusive access to affordable childcare immensely benefits children and those responsible for them – in fact, it benefits <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2026/2026scc7/2026scc7.html?resultId=c16a86af1ff6419ca5e84a6ff3d56300&amp;searchId=2026-03-12T10:46:52:688/7ba47123ec054fdebde2b43000d61a1f#par251">all of society</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/supreme-court-of-canada-rules-that-excluding-refugee-claimants-from-subsidized-childcare-discriminates-based-on-sex-in-quebec-v-kanyinda/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">86974</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>A Bright Future for Canadian Equality Law?</title>
		<link>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/a-bright-future-for-canadian-equality-law/</link>
					<comments>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/a-bright-future-for-canadian-equality-law/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Meghan Campbell]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Mar 2026 12:30:05 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=86909</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Women who are claiming refugee status in Canada are now able to access to subsidized day care. The Supreme Court of Canada in Quebec (Attorney General) v Kanyinda held that the exclusion of refugee women from this benefit was a breach of s15 equality rights and that this exclusion could not be justified under s1 [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Women who are claiming refugee status in Canada are now able to access to subsidized day care. The Supreme Court of Canada in <a href="https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/21399/index.do"><em>Quebec (Attorney General) v Kanyinda</em></a> held that the exclusion of refugee women from this benefit was a breach of s15 equality rights and that this exclusion could not be justified under s1 of The Charter. Against a global backdrop of rising anti-immigrant sentiments, <em>Kanyinda </em>stands out in constitutionally recognising that refugee women are included within the equality provisions of The Charter.</strong></p>
<p>The Quebec law provided subsidized day care to a range of groups including citizens, permanent residents and foreign students but not to refugee claimants. The impact of this exclusion fell disproportionately on refugee women as, opposed to refugee men, as it prevented them from balancing their caring commitments and seeking employment in the labour market. Should the claim be analysed as sex discrimination? Is it the exclusion on the basis of refugee claimant status? Or is the claim best understood as intersectional where both sex and refugee claimant status are at stake? The Court was divided in answering these questions but ultimately this division is positive and portends a potentially strong future for Canadian equality jurisprudence.</p>
<p><strong>The Flatness of Single-Axis Discrimination </strong></p>
<p>Justice Cote, in dissent, analysed <em>Kanyinda </em>on a single ground. She found that the exclusion of refugees did not create a distinction based on sex. Women who are Canadian citizens, women who are permanent residents, women who are foreign students are all entitled to the subsidized daycare, it is only refugee women who are denied and thus according to Justice Cote, ‘sex&#8230;is not the source of the distinction…rather the distinctions is based on refugee claimant status.’ [296]. This single-axis approach implied that all women must have a similar experience for the law to create a sex-based distinction, failing to account for how women is not a monolithic category, and that there will be differences in how women experience the law.</p>
<p><strong>Moving Beyond Immutability </strong></p>
<p>In contrast, Chief Justice Wagner analysed the case on the ground of refugee status claimant. Unlike Justice Cote, he recognised this as a new analogous ground and concluded the law creates a distinction on this basis and that it was discriminatory. While his analysis demonstrated broad awareness of gender, it failed to squarely confront that how the exclusion would exacerbate refugee women’s financial dependence on men and cement their exclusion from pursuing economic opportunities in the labour market. The single-axis approach, again, flattens the realities of discrimination.</p>
<p>More encouragingly, in Chief Justice Wagner’s concurring judgment, he adopted a multi-factorial test for establishing new grounds of discrimination under the Charter. Prior to this, the Court would examine whether a proposed ground was immutable or constructively immutable, a test refugee claimant status would struggle to meet as this status was inherently temporary. Rather than adopting the rigidity of the immutability framework, Chief Justice Wagner assessed human dignity, stereotyping, historical disadvantage, discrete and insular minority, vulnerability, marginalisation and whether legislators and jurists have recognised the proposed ground [217]. Given the strong critiques of immutability, this is promising and hopefully ushers in a new era with respect to analogous grounds.</p>
<p><strong>Mainstreaming Intersectionality </strong></p>
<p>At first glance, the majority decision also appears to adopt a single-axis approach as it, like Justice Cote, analyses the case on the ground of sex. However, the majority judgment of Justice Karakatsanis, is more nuanced. She recognises that women’s intersecting and identities shape their experience of discrimination and each component of s15 analytical framework must be alive to women’s intersectional lives.</p>
<p>In assessing if the law creates a distinction, the first step required under the Charter, the analysis ‘cannot be divorced from a claimant group’s unique situation, which may include intersecting identities and realities that create or contribute to that distinction’ [41]. Under the second step, the Court explores whether the distinction, reinforces, perpetuates or exacerbates disadvantage and here too intersectionality plays a role. The investigation into disadvantage ‘is shaped by the claimant group’s unique circumstances’ [45]. Sex, the enumerated ground, is the tether, hook or pivot point and from this the Court can then explore, through a contextual inquiry, into the other identities that assist in determining if there has been a breach of s15. Intersectionality is now mainstreamed into Canadian equality law. Crucially, the intersectional analysis is not confined to examining how enumerated or recognised analogous grounds interact, it is a broader analysis that examines identities, realities, circumstances beyond grounds. Thestrength of this approach, in contrast with the dissent concurring judgments, is that by accounting for the nexus of sex and refugee status, the majority was able to identify with sophistication the harms of the exclusion including gendered financial precarity, limited opportunities to integrate into Canadian society and increased rates of isolation and depression [88].</p>
<p>It is impossible to know impact of this decision but the embracing of intersectionality, the moves away from immutability, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic on the future of Canadian equality law.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/a-bright-future-for-canadian-equality-law/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">86909</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Transphobia at the highest level: UN Special Rapporteur Reem Alsalem’s report on Violence Against Women and Girls in breach of the Special Mandate Code of Conduct</title>
		<link>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/transphobia-at-the-highest-level-un-special-rapporteur-reem-alsalems-report-on-violence-against-women-and-girls-in-breach-of-the-special-mandate-code-of-conduct/</link>
					<comments>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/transphobia-at-the-highest-level-un-special-rapporteur-reem-alsalems-report-on-violence-against-women-and-girls-in-breach-of-the-special-mandate-code-of-conduct/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Émilie Weidl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2025 08:35:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[England and Wales]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Nations]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=86547</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In June 2025, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls, Reem Alsalem, released a report entitled “Sex-based violence against women and girls: new frontiers and emerging issues” (“the Report”). Instead of addressing the root causes of the global rise in femicide and domestic violence — such as violent conflict zones and increased [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>In June 2025, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls, Reem Alsalem, released a <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/59/47">report</a> entitled “Sex-based violence against women and girls: new frontiers and emerging issues” (“the Report”). Instead of addressing the root causes of the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1157046">global rise in femicide and domestic violence</a> — such as violent conflict zones and <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/briefing-notes/unhcr-warns-devastating-spike-risk-gender-based-violence-women-and-girls-forced">increased displacement</a>, Alsalem used her platform to push a <a href="https://aninjusticemag.com/how-did-trans-exclusionary-feminism-become-so-powerful-in-britain-77275d77c632">trans-exclusionary radical feminist (TERF)</a> agenda, scapegoating gender-diverse individuals for violence against women and girls (VAWG). In endangering trans and intersex individuals the world over, the Report does not conform to the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/procedural-documents/code-conduct-special-procedures-mandate-holders-human-rights-council">Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate-holders of the Human Rights Council</a>, to which Alsalem is bound, because it fails to meet the required standards of integrity, impartiality, and credibility.</strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">At Article 3(e), the Code of Conduct obliges all mandate-holders to uphold “the highest standards of … integrity, meaning in particular … equity, honesty, and good faith.” Later, at Article 6(c), the Code of Conduct demands that mandate-holders: “Always seek to establish the facts, based on objective, reliable information emanating from relevant credible sources, that they have duly cross-checked to the best extent possible.” Finally, Article 8 binds mandate-holders to “(a) [b]e guided by the principles of discretion, transparency, impartiality, and even handedness” and “(c) [r]ely on objective and dependable facts” based on appropriate “evidentiary standards.”</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">In the Report, rather than establishing facts based on reliable information, Alsalem gives deference to pseudoscientific claims and presents disinformation as fact. Her partiality and lack of even-handedness are especially evident in her footnotes: she exclusively cites TERF organizations when discussing gender and sex diversity, and disregards the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2025/call-input-report-special-rapporteur-violence-against-women-and-girls-hrc">submissions</a> made by trans advocacy groups. The Report takes as true the premise that everyone can and should be defined exclusively by their sex assigned at birth and fails to acknowledge the harm this causes.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">When discussing harmful stereotypes, the Report breaches its duty to establish facts through credible sources by making the unsubstantiated and uncited claim that prohibiting youth access to gender-affirming care, including puberty blockers, is in their best interest. In fact, review of the peer-reviewed research on this subject reveals that such bans result in increases of <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39327480/">suicide</a> amongst trans and nonbinary youth.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Elsewhere, in two clear examples of breaches of the duty of integrity, Alsalem falsely attributes transphobic statements to credible sources. On page seven of the Report she cites Rape Crisis England and Wales’s <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/women/sr/cfis/new-frontier/subm-sr-violence-against-cso-120-rape-crisis-england-wales.pdf">submission</a> to support her contention that a “progressive elimination” of funding to support victims of VAWG is linked to a policy shift from “sex equality” to “gender equality,” the latter of which can be described as gender-inclusive policy. However, Rape Crisis England and Wales did not blame the lack of funding to support VAWG victims on a move towards better gender inclusion by the United Kingdom, but rather they explain that this funding crisis has existed for decades. Alsalem is injecting her own ideological stance into their submission to bolster her transphobic position.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Even more damningly, when advocating for sex-designated prisons, the Report misquotes a <a href="https://ia800506.us.archive.org/23/items/r-442-report-en/R-442%20-%20Report%20-%20EN.pdf">report</a> from Correctional Service Canada (CSC). According to the CSC report, “trans-women are more likely to experience verbal, physical, and sexual assault while in-custody [sic], particularly when housed according to their biological sex.” Alsalem cites this same report to support her claim that “female [cis women] prisoners, when housed and required to share facilities with male [transgender women] prisoners, experience harassment and physical, psychological and sexual violence.” This completely misunderstands the meaning of the statement in the CSC report, portraying transgender women as perpetrators of violence, rather than victims. The CSC report states the opposite of the position for which Alsalem invokes it as authority. This is a blatant falsehood uttered to justify policies which endanger transgender women.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">These sparingly chosen examples provide a mere snapshot of the Report’s obvious shortcomings in integrity and academic rigour. Such blatant breaches of the Code of Conduct should not be allowed to pass by unchecked. With this Report, and her recent <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/women/sr/statements/ms.-reem-alsalem-fourth-world-conference-high-level-meeting-general-assembly-thirtieth-anniversary-new-york-speech-violence-women-girls-1-en.pdf">speech</a> at the General Assembly, Alsalem is taking advantage of her office to contribute to the normalization of anti-gender discourse at the highest international level, which is directly contrary to her mandate to combat violence. She must be called to account by the Human Rights Council.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/transphobia-at-the-highest-level-un-special-rapporteur-reem-alsalems-report-on-violence-against-women-and-girls-in-breach-of-the-special-mandate-code-of-conduct/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">86547</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Positive and Negative Rights Strike Again: Mathur v. Ontario</title>
		<link>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/positive-and-negative-rights-strike-again-mathur-v-ontario/</link>
					<comments>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/positive-and-negative-rights-strike-again-mathur-v-ontario/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Margot Young]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 30 Nov 2025 10:46:13 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=86146</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The distinction between positive and negative rights continues to complicate, and defeat, constitutional recognition of social justice issues for Canadians. While many (convincingly) refute the relevance of this distinction, and some reframe it, the viewing of key constitutional issues in terms of negative and positive rights dominates in Canadian courts. Simply put, this tendency is [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>The distinction between positive and negative rights continues to complicate, and defeat, constitutional recognition of social justice issues for Canadians. While many (convincingly) refute the relevance of this distinction, and some reframe it, the viewing of key constitutional issues in terms of negative and positive rights dominates in Canadian courts. Simply put, this tendency is far from helpful in judicial comprehension of the difficult constitutional issues that social justice concerns present.</strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The latest case to illustrate the persistence of Canadian judicial reliance on this distinction, <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2024/2024onca762/2024onca762.html"><em>Mathur v. Ontario</em></a>, is an environmental justice challenge initiated in 2023 by seven Ontario youth. <em>Mathur </em>challenges the constitutionality of the Ontario <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2018-c-13/latest/so-2018-c-13.html">Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, 2018</a> (CTCA) and its greenhouse gas (GHG) emission target of 30% reduction from 2005 levels by 2030. The claimants make two claims focusing on contravention of the <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-12.html"><em>Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms</em></a>: first, the imminent harms of high GHG emissions infringe section 7 rights to life, liberty and security of the person and, second, the fact that youth and future generations disproportionately bear this burden contravenes section 15 equality rights. The remedy sought includes an order for a <a href="https://climatecasechart.com/wp-content/uploads/non-us-case-documents/2019/20191125_CV-19-00631627_complaint.pdf">“science-based GHG reduction target…consistent with Ontario’s share”</a> of global reductions.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">This case pairs with another youth environmental rights case:<em> </em><a href="https://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/fca-caf/decisions/en/item/521304/index.do"><em>La Rose v. Canada</em></a>. <em>La Rose</em> avoided, on appeal, preliminary dismissal and will be heard <a href="https://vancouversun.com/news/canadian-youth-climate-trial-vancouver-2026">next year</a>. <em>Mathur</em> is one step ahead. <em>Mathur</em> survived the predictable government justiciability claims, although its argument on the merits was dismissed, at first instance, by the <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2023/2023onsc2316/2023onsc2316.html">application judge</a>, Vermette J. Justice Vermette found the applicants’ claims to assert freestanding positive obligations, that is, to require proactive government intervention. Section 15 does not, the judge held, encompass positive rights.  And, she elaborated, any section 7 harm would be in accordance with the qualifying element of that section, the principles of fundamental justice. The judge pointedly grouped this case with other cases on <a href="https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/2027/index.do">poverty</a> and <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2014/2014onca852/2014onca852.html?autocompleteStr=tanud&amp;autocompletePos=1">homelessness</a>, challenges similarly doomed by positive rights attribution.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">However, the judge did hold that the issue of government responsibility for climate change can be litigated, thus granting justiciability to issues that are complex, contentious, and laden with social values. She accepted that the reduction target fell short of international scientific recommendations to avoid catastrophic climate change. She also found that the gap between the emission target of 30% and the target recommended by the <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/">Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</a> was <a href="https://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/mathur-et-al-v-her-majesty-the-queen-in-right-of-ontario/">“large, unexplained and without any apparent scientific basis”</a> [para 146]. Of particular note, Vermette J held that climate change has disproportionate impacts on young people and Indigenous peoples. These aspects buttress <a href="https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/canadian-youth-climate-action-challenge-proceeds-to-trial-la-rose-v-his-majesty-the-king/">similar recognitions</a> in <em>La Rose</em>.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The application judgment in<em> Mathur</em> was appealed. In a November 2024 <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2024/2024onca762/2024onca762.html">judgment</a>, the Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed with the application judge’s framing of the case as a positive rights claim, remitting the case for a rehearing under the corrected framework. A unanimous Court began by noting that the challenge seeks not to impose new positive obligations on the government, but, instead, simply to hold the government to its own statutory obligation to provide a <em>Charter</em> compliant target. The focus is on the requirement that  <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2024/2024onca762/2024onca762.html">“the execution of the government’s voluntarily imposed statutory obligations be constitutionally compliant where it has chosen to enact a specific scheme”</a> [para 38].  Consequently, the application judge’s failure to consider the correct question meant that her analyses under both sections 7 and 15 were flawed and inconsistent. Notably, however, the Appeal Court does not challenge the lower court’s rejection of positive rights <em>per se</em>; the Appeal Court simply finds that the case does not raise positive rights claims, dodging the broader question.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">This Appeal Court decision is hailed as a victory in the quest for environmental rights. Yet, in so saving the challenge for a new hearing, the Appeal Court keeps in place a high bar for future cases claiming substantive obligations that cannot so easily shape-shift between positive and negative rights. Social justice litigants repeatedly run up against judicial insistence that rights can be classified as clearly positive or negative. But, rights can be a mix of negative and positive features; the distinction is not analytically useful.  It is no coincidence that this conversation most plagues claims that seek to expand the impact of <em>Charter</em> rights beyond what is easily recognized under liberal rights regimes.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The Court of Appeal also instructed the lower court to be alert to the issue of whether societal preservation and economical sustainability are unwritten constitutional principles.  One can hope that the rehearing will be a significant moment in the trajectory of Canadian climate challenges. Although, the point remains that the Canadian judiciary has yet to engage in an adequately critical manner with its continued discomfort with assertions of positive government obligations under the Canadian <em>Charter</em>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/positive-and-negative-rights-strike-again-mathur-v-ontario/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">86146</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Clicks &#038; Consent Across Borders:  Briskin v. Shopify and the Global Reach of Privacy Rights</title>
		<link>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/clicks-consent-across-borders-briskin-v-shopify-and-the-global-reach-of-privacy-rights/</link>
					<comments>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/clicks-consent-across-borders-briskin-v-shopify-and-the-global-reach-of-privacy-rights/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Megan Cistulli]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2025 05:22:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=86010</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Can a technology company based in Canada be sued in California for allegedly violating Californian privacy laws? In Briskin v Shopify, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said yes. The April 2025 ruling opens the door for stronger enforcement of privacy rights in a global digital marketplace and ultimately reframes data protection as not just [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Can a technology company based in Canada be sued in California for allegedly violating Californian privacy laws? In <a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/04/21/22-15815.pdf"><em>Briskin v Shopify</em></a>, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said yes. The April 2025 ruling opens the door for stronger enforcement of privacy rights in a global digital marketplace and ultimately reframes data protection as not just a consumer concern, but a human rights issue grounded in dignity, autonomy, and access to justice.</strong></p>
<p>Brandon Briskin, a California resident, purchased athletic wear online from a local brand. Unbeknownst to him, when he clicked “Pay now,” his personal information—including name, address, credit card details, and geolocation—was transmitted not just to the merchant, but to Shopify, the Canadian platform powering the brand’s e-commerce backend. Shopify, according to the complaint, installed tracking cookies, gathered behavioral data, and compiled user profiles without notice or consent. Briskin sued under <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&amp;part=1.&amp;title=15.&amp;chapter=1.5">California’s Invasion of Privacy Act</a> for unlawful wiretapping, the <a href="https://www.calpers.ca.gov/documents/ca-penal-code-502/download?inline">Computer Data Access and Fraud Act</a> for data theft, and both the <a href="https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa">Consumer Privacy Act</a> and <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=BPC&amp;division=8.&amp;title=&amp;part=&amp;chapter=22.&amp;article=">Online Privacy Protection Act</a> for failing to provide notice and obtain consent. He also brought invasion of privacy claims under the <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CONS&amp;sectionNum=SECTION%201.&amp;article=I">California Constitution</a> and the <a href="https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-4/">Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution</a>.</p>
<p>Shopify argued it could not be sued in California simply because its software interacted with a California user. The lower court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. But the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed. It found that Shopify had “deliberately targeted” California residents by embedding software that collected and monetized user data, fully aware those users were in California.</p>
<p><strong>From Cookies to Courts: Why Jurisdiction Matters</strong></p>
<p>The Ninth Circuit’s decision rests on the doctrine of specific personal jurisdiction. Courts must assess whether a defendant’s actions were purposefully directed at the forum state. Shopify’s defense—that it merely built a platform accessible everywhere—failed to pass muster. The Court concluded Shopify purposefully directed its conduct toward California based on evidence the company tracked user location, extracted data, and marketed profiles derived from data to merchants in the state.</p>
<p>Importantly, the Court rejected the idea that jurisdiction depends on “differential targeting.” In other words, the Court rejected the argument that jurisdiction depends on treating California users differently from users in other locations. What matters, the Court held, is whether a platform makes the deliberate choice to enter a state through its digital infrastructure and engage with its residents. If so, it must answer for violations of their rights.</p>
<p>This framing has far-reaching implications. As digital commerce becomes more embedded in everyday life, so does the risk of data extraction that operates invisibly, without meaningful consent. For many users, especially in jurisdictions without robust federal protections, state laws like the <a href="https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa">CCPA</a> serve as the last line of defense.</p>
<p><strong>Privacy as a Human Right, Not Just a Statute</strong></p>
<p>International human rights law recognizes privacy as a core right. <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/treaties/1976/03/19760323%2006-17%20am/ch_iv_04.pdf">Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)</a> prohibits arbitrary interference with privacy, and the <a href="https://gdpr.eu/tag/gdpr/">European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)</a> enshrines principles of consent, transparency, and user control.</p>
<p>This stands in stark contrast to the U.S., where privacy law remains piecemeal, and enforcement is often limited to state-driven efforts. Without a federal equivalent to the <a href="https://gdpr.eu/tag/gdpr/">GDPR</a>, enforcement often depends on users’ ability to bring claims under state law. The <em>Briskin</em> decision strengthens legal pathways by affirming that privacy travels with the person—not the platform—even when foreign companies reach into Californians’ devices and homes.</p>
<p>The decision also echoes international principles of accountability. Under the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf">UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights</a>, companies have a duty to respect human rights wherever they operate, and states have an obligation to provide access to remedies. <em>Briskin </em>delivers on that mandate by ensuring users are not left without recourse simply because the company exploiting their data resides across a border.</p>
<p>As online platforms increasingly serve global audiences, cases like <em>Briskin</em> are setting new precedents for cross-border digital accountability. The Court’s opinion signals that companies cannot insulate themselves from local privacy laws by hiding behind backend infrastructure. <em>Briskin</em> reminds us that what happens on a user’s device without informed consent is not just a technical process—it is a matter of rights, power, and the ability to hold companies accountable when that power is abused.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/clicks-consent-across-borders-briskin-v-shopify-and-the-global-reach-of-privacy-rights/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">86010</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Does Excluding Refugee Claimants from Subsidized Childcare Violate the Right to Equality? Supreme Court of Canada Considers Appeal in Quebec v Kanyinda</title>
		<link>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/does-excluding-refugee-claimants-from-subsidized-childcare-violate-the-right-to-equality-supreme-court-of-canada-considers-appeal-in-quebec-v-kanyinda/</link>
					<comments>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/does-excluding-refugee-claimants-from-subsidized-childcare-violate-the-right-to-equality-supreme-court-of-canada-considers-appeal-in-quebec-v-kanyinda/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Isabelle St-Hilaire]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2025 05:51:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=85976</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Refugee claimants – and women refugee claimants in particular – are among the most vulnerable members of society. Does excluding them from access to subsidized childcare amount to discrimination based on sex, contrary to the equality provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (‘Charter’)? When the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Refugee claimants – and women refugee claimants in particular – are among the most vulnerable members of society. Does excluding them from access to subsidized childcare amount to discrimination based on sex, contrary to the equality provision of the <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html?resultId=6a6c79ce9578476788703b953298e769&amp;searchId=2025-05-09T23:25:09:014/af58c3e995834dd19224f42839fae2a3#sec15"><em>Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms</em></a> (‘<em>Charter’</em>)? When the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decide this issue in <em><a href="https://www.scc-csc.ca/cases-dossiers/search-recherche/41210/">Quebec v Kanyinda, heard on 14-15 May 2025</a></em>, they should find that it does.</strong></p>
<p>The challenged provision is section 3 of the <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/qc/laws/regu/cqlr-c-s-4.1.1-r-1/latest/cqlr-c-s-4.1.1-r-1.html?resultId=19f5f81e73074ec38ba3c2f2cbcb8f4a&amp;searchId=2025-05-09T23:26:46:622/f119caec3ee94afd8e904b9838cda417#sec3"><em>Reduced Contribution Regulation</em></a>, which defines eligibility to Quebec’s subsidized childcare regime. A parent is eligible if they reside in Quebec and fall within one of the listed categories. Refugee claimants – those who are awaiting a determination of their claim for protection – are not included.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/qc/qcca/doc/2024/2024qcca144/2024qcca144.html?resultId=040ffbd0135f4c488156389590016338&amp;searchId=2025-05-09T23:21:43:926/9d5f678ee8b8449e93d8d8b7b9782ce1">Quebec Court of Appeal found</a> that excluding refugee claimants has a disproportionate impact on women, whose participation in the workforce is more severely hindered when no affordable childcare is available.</p>
<p>The allegation is one of indirect, partial discrimination: the claimant argues that the provision has a <em>disproportionate impact</em> on a <em>subset</em> of a protected group, namely women who are also refugee claimants.</p>
<p>The SCC decision in <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2020/2020scc28/2020scc28.html?resultId=c2c0114c870d4d389401266a6d4e2cee&amp;searchId=2025-05-09T14:22:22:842/1d1ea1f509c64b75b2d527a400e1d120"><em>Fraser v Canada</em></a> provides guidance on this issue. That case concerned a challenge to a rule preventing employees who job-shared from ‘buying back’ pension rights, despite this option being available to employees in other circumstances. Most job-sharers were women with childcare obligations. The rule clearly did not bar <em>all </em>women from accessing a full pension, yet a majority of the SCC concluded that it had a disproportionate impact on women, and thus contributed to a distinction based on sex in its impact.</p>
<p>Similarly, the rule challenged in <em>Kanyinda </em>excludes both male and female refugee claimants – but the latter subgroup suffers disproportionately as a result of the exclusion.</p>
<p>Another issue arising in <em>Kanyinda </em>is whether immigration status – or, alternatively, refugee claimant status – ought to be recognized as an ‘analogous ground’ of prohibited discrimination under the <em>Charter</em>. This would enable claimants to argue that rules which explicitly exclude refugee claimants are directly discriminatory.</p>
<p>The main obstacle here is the emphasis previous case law (such as <em><a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2024/2024scc10/2024scc10.html?resultId=770b806942e747ae82c537ec67817306&amp;searchId=2025-05-24T15:11:35:342/df31a3aab6744e33a4c73aa6d0148372#par193">Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation </a></em><a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2024/2024scc10/2024scc10.html?resultId=770b806942e747ae82c537ec67817306&amp;searchId=2025-05-24T15:11:35:342/df31a3aab6744e33a4c73aa6d0148372#par193">[193]</a>) places on ‘immutability’ as a crucial consideration: a person’s immigration status is usually temporary. Yet people have <a href="https://www.scc-csc.ca/pdf/case-documents/41210/FM020_Respondent_Bijou-Cibuabua-Kanyinda.pdf">limited control over their immigration status</a>. Indeed, loss of control over one’s destiny, characteristic of the experience of forced migration, is at the heart of refugees’ vulnerability.</p>
<p>The <em>Kanyinda</em> case bears many similarities with the decision in <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/tcc/doc/2024/2024tcc19/2024tcc19.html?resultId=4f4983ecfc6b417f84ebcbd1386b300d&amp;searchId=2025-05-09T23:24:05:603/41a3786c023e4e879de636c36148bad9"><em>Yao v The King</em></a>, currently under appeal, where the Tax Court of Canada rejected a constitutional challenge to eligibility criteria that bar most refugee claimants from receiving the Canada Child Benefit. There, claimants argued that the exclusion disproportionately impacts persons of colour.</p>
<p>Looming in the background of both cases is a concern about the distribution of limited resources. The challenged provisions, and the arguments used to defend them, betray a tacit mistrust of – and perhaps even contempt for – refugee claimants. The implicit question seems to be: why should Canadians support these people without knowing whether they are ‘real’ refugees?</p>
<p>The cases also ask how much ‘external’ pressure can a system based on solidarity withstand? The Quebec government’s arguments highlight the strain on the subsidized childcare regime and the large influx of refugee claimants into the province in recent years. Quebec society is known for its sense of solidarity, and many of its social programs are a source of envy and inspiration. Some might find it ironic for Quebec’s impressive, though imperfect, subsidized childcare regime to be ruled unconstitutional for violating the right to gender equality, simply because it does not go quite far enough.</p>
<p>One might worry that such a finding would discourage governments from developing ambitious social programs altogether.</p>
<p>But such concerns are part of the reason why section 1 of the <em>Charter</em> enables governments to justify rights infringements. Whether extending eligibility to refugee claimants threatens the viability of Quebec’s subsidized childcare program ought to be considered at the justification stage.</p>
<p>In any event, acknowledging that excluding refugee claimants from subsidized childcare has an adverse effect based on sex would favour coherence in the law, and pave the way forward for a nuanced, intersectional analysis of disproportionate impact discrimination in future cases.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/does-excluding-refugee-claimants-from-subsidized-childcare-violate-the-right-to-equality-supreme-court-of-canada-considers-appeal-in-quebec-v-kanyinda/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">85976</post-id>	</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
