On July 9^th, 2025, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Ukraine and the Netherlands v Russia clarified several intriguing questions. Scholars like Marko Milanovic consider the Judgement (merits) as ‘As good as it gets (Almost)’.  The Judgement broadened the jurisdictional scope of the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention) and the standard of attribution, ie, the conduct of pro-Russian separatists from 2014 is attributed to Russia, which implies that the act of a de facto organ with complete dependence and control on the State is attributed to that State, thereby consolidating the observations of ICJ in Nicaragua and the Bosnian Genocide.   Additionally, clarity was rendered on jus ad bellum (the law governing the use of force) and its wider implications on human rights. In this post, I map the court’s treatment of the relationship between International Human Rights Law (IHRL) vis-à-vis International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The findings are significant, as the court (including the ICJ) has grappled with this issue since the convergence of both regimes. The attitude of the Court indicates a shift towards norm coordination over norm priority in line with contemporary practice.

Treatment of IHL Question

In situations of armed conflict, the scholarship is nestled between the principle of lex specialis and the principle of complementarity (co-application).  Lex specialis favours the application of specialised rules of IHL, whereas complementarity favours the co-application of IHL and IHRL.

The ICJ, for instance, has endorsed both these frameworks. The Wall Advisory opinion [105] backed IHL as lex specialis, whereas in DRC v Uganda [180], it abandoned the lex specialis in favour of complementarity. In the words of the ICJ, “both branches of international law, namely international human rights law and international humanitarian law, would have to be taken into consideration” [216]. The Grand Chamber’s ruling makes it evident that IHL is used as an interpretative tool to gauge the scope of the Convention in terms of human rights guarantees. I reckon this jurisprudential development indicates that human rights, which was traditionally conceived as a self-contained or specialised regime, is mindful of the development in other regimes; no wonder the Grand Chamber observed that, “its duty to interpret the Convention in the light of the rules set out in Article 31 § 3 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and so far as possible in harmony with other rules of international law of which it formed part, including IHL”  [22]. Hence, the Grand Chamber abandoned lex specialis, barring scenarios in the absence of derogation under Article 15 of the Convention, as the provisions might conflict with one another.

Diminishing Relevance of Lex Specialis

The Grand Chamber’s Judgement clarified the fluctuating relationship between IHRL and IHL. This is timely because, as Prof. Yuval Shany aptly puts it, “[T]he instability of existing law and practice relating to co-application caused by the aforementioned two tensions is at the root of efforts to move beyond the lex specialis framework.” The Grand Chamber has echoed this sentiment; also, lex specialis can pose a unique set of challenges. In the context of IHL and IHRL, it is difficult to locate which regime constitutes lex specialis, as lex specialis comes into play in cases of incompatible norms. In certain scenarios, IHRL provides more nuanced conduct of regulation than IHL in situations of armed conflict or occupation. For example, in the Wall Advisory opinion, Israel’s construction of the wall according to the ICJ violated the panoply of IHRL norms in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT); these violations had no parallel in the IHL regime. Similarly, in situations involving arbitrary deprivation of liberty or non-refoulement, the concurrent application of IHL and IHRL would offer comprehensive protection by filling the gap left by the other regime.  Therefore, in a situation of armed conflict, the co-application would offer a higher standard of protection for the victim, rendering IHRL as a preferred regime geared towards pro hominem interpretation. This position aligns with the views of the Human Rights Committee (HRCtee) General Comment 35, where it was observed that Article 9 of the Covenant applies to situations of armed conflict to which rules of IHL are applicable; in other words, rules of IHL are relevant in interpreting Article 9 of the Covenant. Moreover, complementarity means excluding the controversial ‘context of chaos’ embraced in Georgia v Russia (II), which plausibly abandoned the Convention because of the lack of effective control.

Conclusion

The Grand Chamber brings to the fore the diminishing relevance of the lex specialis framework; instead, the emphasis is on complementarity. However, there may be backlashes from the States, Judges, and scholars who may view IHL as lex specialis because of the inherent distinction in these regimes. The Grand Chamber giving impetus to norm coordination over norm priority would be relevant for the comprehensive protection of victims. This does not come as a surprise, as the ICJ, which introduced the lex specialis framework, has deserted it.

Six French citizens of African or North African origin, residing in Roubaix, Marseille, Vaulx-en-Velin, Saint-Ouen, and Besançon, denounced “racial profiling” during 2011 and 2012. They therefore sought a conviction for discrimination, violation of privacy, and freedom of movement. They also sought to compel the French authorities to implement measures to prevent discriminatory checks and ensure the traceability of these checks.

These six plaintiffs are part of a group of 13 men who launched a legal battle, denouncing unjustified checks, sometimes associated with frisking, insults, or informal address.

After losing at first instance in October 2013, all the plaintiffs appealed, and in June 2015, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled in favor of five of them, ordering the State to pay €1,500 in damages to each. In November 2016, the Court of Cassation definitively condemned the State in three cases, a historic first. The six men who had not won their case therefore decided to appeal to the ECtHR in 2017.

The decision handed down on Thursday, June 26, 2025 comes at a time when the extent of this racist practice was confirmed by the Defender of Rights, Claire Hédon in a report which states that “Young men perceived as Black, Arab, or North African are four times more likely to have been stopped than the rest of the population, and 12 times more likely to be subject to a more intensive stop”.

This is the first time France has been condemned on this ground. While stating that it was “aware of the difficulties police officers face in deciding, very quickly and without necessarily having clear internal instructions, whether they are facing a threat,” [129] the Court concluded, regarding  Karim Touil, who was stopped nearly 15 years ago, that there exists in his case “a presumption of discriminatory treatment against him, which the government has failed to rebut” [92]. Five other applicants, however, had their applications dismissed. Like the domestic courts, the Court considered that, for the identity checks of five of the six applicants, all of which had had at least one identified legal basis, no individualised prima facie evidence of a differentiation of treatment had been produced by demonstrating the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences capable of giving rise to a presumption of discriminatory treatment [122].

Defender of Rights Claire Hédon recommends (p. 43) implementing traceability for identity checks to ensure that those stopped have the opportunity to seek redress, particularly in the event of an allegation of discrimination. She also suggests amending the legal framework for identity checks by specifying in Article 78-2 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure that identity checks must not be based on protected characteristics, and that the reason for the person’s selection must be objectively clarified and stated to the person stopped, wherever possible.

As early as 2021, the Paris Court of Appeal had already condemned the State for gross negligence following the identity checks of three high school students in 2017 by police officers at Gare du Nord. However, it is clear that no action has been taken since then. This state of affairs is all the more worrying in the context where, a week earlier, the Minister of the Interior, Bruno Retailleau, had launched a veritable hunt for exiles in stations and on trains, against which several unions from the world of justice had filed an appeal with the Conseil d’Etat.

The decision is important, but suffers from a real ambiguity: the Court assures, on the one hand, that “identity checks motivated by physical characteristics, associated with a real or supposed origin” are well established in France, and certainly cannot be reduced to “isolated cases”, but disputes that this is a “systemic” or “generalized” practice. The Council of State (where, notably, the French president of the ECHR, Mattias Guyomar, has spent his entire career) had made a comparable analysis in 2023.

This decision represents a crucial step towards justice and accountability. However, it is clear that the Court did not address the structural nature of discriminatory stop and search practices in France. The risk is that this decision could further entrench the practice of arbitrary stop and search, already common in much of Europe, which stigmatizes migrants and other visible minorities, perpetuates stereotypes, and constitutes an ineffective and counterproductive method of policing.

Judge Jelić noted in her dissenting opinion that the Court in AM had only focused on the private life aspect of Article 8 ECHR, instead of the family life aspect of that Article [30-32]. The Judge underlined the missed opportunity to assess the proportionality of the interference with intended mother’s family aspect of the right, referring to applicant’s interest in developing family relationships as per Marckx v Belgium [31]; recognition of family life being dependent on the ‘real existence in practice of close personal ties’ (Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy [140]);  and the principle that ‘[w]here there is no legal recognition between a child and his or her parents, the Court observes the existence of de facto family ties’ (Johnston and Others v Ireland [56]).

The decision seems curious even when looking at the doctrine of the child’s best interest due to the visible overlooking of the importance of a child becoming familiar and having an existing relationship with an intended parent from the very beginning of the pregnancy as well as the strengthening of this bond (which had already been forged between the child and the applicant).

In fact, Judge Jelić considered that the Court had failed to take into account the de facto family situation and several factual aspects which would have been relevant to the matter at hand, including recognition of the birth certificate, principles on the best interest of a child, as well as the issues with the domestic interpretation of the couple ‘raising a child together’ [33-42].

The Court failed to account for the State’s refusal to correctly apply relevant case law and a varied approach to the current case due to different marital status which resulted in discriminatory treatment of the applicant [47]. The ECtHR jurisprudence clearly states that differing treatment on the grounds of birth within or out of wedlock could only be made if very weighty reasons existed (Sahin v Germany; Mazurek v France; Camp and Bourimi v the Netherlands). Such reasons, however, did not exist in the analysed case. Not taking into account relevant case law resulted in an arguably unjust and discriminatory outcome towards the applicant based on flawed and fragmented legal analysis.

The majority of recent cases, including growing recognition of the rights of LGBTQ+ community members, demonstrate that the ECtHR is awarding increasingly more rights to non-conventional family constellations and people with differing sexual orientations or identities [49]. Some of this case law could be relevant and applied analogously to the AM matter, including X and Others v Austria; Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal, or EB v France. This lack of general consistency in the Court’s jurisprudence is therefore curious. As Judge Jelić rightfully noted, it is the Court’s role ‘to afford equal protection to all the citizens of its Contracting Parties and to adapt, in line with the “living instrument” doctrine, to new emerging social concepts’ [50].

Overall, the visible asymmetry of rights and protections in the very particular situation of designated mothers’ results in the lack of consideration of gender equality as well as general equitability, such as in the discussed case. This discussion raises further questions concerning the meaning of family and why a more holistic approach to what its definition entails is merited with special attention paid to the so-far overlooked rights of the intended mothers. Similar concerns should be considered in light of same-sex couples where only one or neither of the parents are biological ones and can only be classified as ‘intended’ parents – especially in light of the recent efforts of States (at least in the European context) to recognise the uniquely vulnerable position of selected groups of individuals, and the particular threat of having their rights violated as a result of their protected characteristics. It is high time that similar considerations entered ‘the chat’ on surrogacy cases.

Some argue that ‘[s]urrogacy indeed entails the commodification of women’s body for reproductive purposes and the selling of children’ and a decision was taken jointly in 2021 by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) that ‘sexual exploitation for surrogacy and reproductive purposes […] is unacceptable and a violation of human dignity and human rights’. Vulnerability of surrogate mothers from poor countries and deprived backgrounds has been noted. However, on the other hand, some have attempted to analyse the phenomenon from the perspective of potential landscapes of empowerment.

The debate has thus far been centred around surrogate mothers and the best interest of the child. Various abuse risks and challenges have been identified regarding the children born out of surrogacy arrangements as well as the vulnerable biological mothers which has resulted in such strict legal frameworks. However, studies have confirmed that the arrangement can be conducted in a safe and respectful manner where the biological mother has little difficulty separating with the children. Empirical studies have also reported that surrogacy appears to be predominantly a positive experience both for the surrogates and intended parents.

However, this discussion canvasses the other dimension of the debate, that is, the vulnerability and ineffective rights’ protections of the intended mothers. Looking into the case law of the Strasbourg Court (European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)), Judge Jelić in her dissenting opinion in the case of AM v Norway, provided relevant observations while disagreeing with the majority view that there was no violation of Article 8 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights) nor Article 14 (applied in conjunction with Article 8). It was stated that the position of the majority not only points to national legislation flaws in Norway, but also reveals several issues with the Court’s ‘process-based approach in assessing the applicant’s capacity for becoming a legal mother while being biologically incapable herself of procreating’ [24].

Starting with identifying relevant legal shortcomings, the Judge considered the case of Mannesson v France, stating that even though States have a margin of appreciation concerning the legal recognition of the parent-child relationship, ‘where a particularly important facet of an individual’s identity was at stake, such as when the legal parent-child relationship was concerned, the margin allowed to the State was normally restricted’ (Advisory Opinion, [44]). As such, it was rightfully argued by the judge that considering best interest of a child, the margin afforded to national authorities should be reduced ‘to allow for the primordial protection of the child’s interests’ [25]. In addition to the reasons outlined above, the Judge stated that other relevant criteria should have been taken into account as an essential part of the assessment, including ‘the joint intent of the (prospective) parents in having and raising the child, the inability of the intended mother to procreate by natural means, and the circumstances leading up to the pregnancy and birth of the child’ [26].

The wide margin and rigid approach by the Norwegian authorities does not account for the sensitivities of such complicated situations, vulnerability of parties concerned, nor diverging circumstances [27]. Therefore, a case-by-case individualised approach has been suggested with variable levels of the width of margin afforded. In the aforementioned case, the State had legitimate interests in view, such as protection from abuse and exploitation, however, there was no evidence as to such being present. Consequently, it is debatable if the broad prohibition against surrogacy can be used as a justification for rejecting the applicant’s claim to be recognised as the child’s legal mother [28], utterly overlooking the vulnerability of the position of the intended mother as well as the asymmetry that she faces as compared to the rights and protections afforded to the biological (intended) father.

Several instances of unfair and discriminatory treatment were noted [43-50], including the failure to award the applicant with legal recognition of motherhood which resulted in the father retaining sole authority and refusing the applicant any right to visit or stay in contact with the child. This created a certain imbalance of power, placing the absolute decision-making power in the sole hands of the father who may retaliate against the mother in face of a conflict, for instance.

The overly restrictive laws were argued to have effectively:

‘ruled out any favourable outcome for the applicant […] as the authorities could not consider crucial                     aspects affecting her situation, such as the fact that the applicant was biologically unable to procreate,                 that E.B. [the biological father] and she had tried to initiate a pregnancy on multiple occasions, that they             had been in a long-term relationship before their separation, that they were both the intended parents of             the child, and that they had agreed to raise the child together’ [29].

As such, the applicant was placed in a disadvantaged position where the applied law failed to account for her uniquely vulnerable position and afford any real chance of being given the same standing and recognition as an intended parent as that of the biological father. Thus, in pursuit of protection and equality for the (allegedly) exploited biological mothers, have the legal justice systems entirely forgotten about the ‘other’ women? Or, have we simply decided to cover our eyes, blind and deaf to the struggles of the intended mothers?

Understanding Encryption and E2EE

Encryption converts plain-text data into unintelligible forms for anyone else except the intended recipient, establishing confidentiality and preserving data integrity. David Kaye, the UN Special Rapporteur notes that encryption is necessary for the protection of key human rights by creating a ‘zone of privacy’, which further protects the freedom of opinion and expression. Hence, encryption is protected under various international conventions, such as the ICCPR (Articles 17 & 19), the UDHR (Articles 12 & 19) and the ECHR (Articles 8 & 10).

While there exist various kinds of encryption, E2EE particularly stands out for its unique nature of preventing even the host platform from accessing the data between the sender and receiver. Indeed, as per the UN, E2EE is ‘the most basic building block’ for privacy on modern messaging applications, such as WhatsApp, Telegram, Instagram, etc. E2EE’s uniqueness makes it technologically impossible for messaging platforms to comply with law enforcement demands (impossibilium nulla obligatio est), given that tracing the originator of even a single message would require disabling E2EE for all the users on that platform.

Podchasov vs. Russia – A Brief Overview

E2EE’s distinctiveness has opened a new chapter in the “Privacy vs. National Security” debate, prompting a legislative trend mandating E2EE breakdown on messaging platforms across various nations, such as the UK, the EU, and the USA. Joining this legislative trend is Russia, which via Section 10.1(4.1) of the Russian Information Technology Act, mandated digital communication providers to store all user data, including content, and furnish law enforcement (the Federal Security Serve (“FSB”)) with decryption capabilities – for specified durations. Telegram opposed this order arguing that ‘decoding of communications’ of specified users would create a backdoor jeopardising encryption for all 700 million monthly active users, given the unique nature of E2EE.

The Court in Podchasov evaluated three distinct yet interconnected infringements upon the rights of the applicant. Firstly, there was the overarching issue of bulk retention of personal communication data. Secondly, the Court scrutinized the FSB’s ability to access such data with minimal judicial oversight. Thirdly, a more targeted concern involved the accessibility of end-to-end encrypted communications, coupled with the obligation to divulge decryption keys.

Protection of E2EE under Freedom of Opinion and Expression – A Missed Opportunity?

This article primarily centres on the third issue, specifically the breakdown of E2EE. The Court observed that the breakdown of E2EE would extend beyond targeting specific individuals, affecting all users inclusively, regardless of any perceived threats [57, 77]. Introducing backdoors could facilitate indiscriminate surveillance practices, posing vulnerabilities to exploitation by illicit networks and fundamentally compromising the overall cybersecurity of electronic communications for all users [65, 77]. Furthermore, the Court noted various viable alternatives to the breakdown of E2EE, making the Russian legislation disproportionate to the legitimate aims it pursued [78, 79].

While scholars have critiqued the judgment for its procedural fetishism, an overlooked point is the Court’s singular reliance on the right to privacy (Article 8, ECHR) to prevent the breakdown of E2EE. In our view, the Court failed to sufficiently consider the interrelation between E2EE and the freedom of expression and opinion (Article 10, ECHR). David Kaye noted that encryption enables privacy to act as a gateway for freedom of opinion and expression, protecting the same from arbitrary and unlawful interference. Recognising the protection of E2EE under the right to freedom of opinion and expression provides it with an extra layer of legal protection, given that its threshold of violation differs from the right to privacy.

Conclusion – A Guiding Light

Regardless of any criticism, it is undeniable that Podchasov is a strong statement against the breakdown of E2EE globally. As noted earlier, there have been legislative efforts around the world to end E2EE, such as the EU’s CSAM Proposal, the UK’s Online Safety Act 2023, Australia’s (Assistance and Access) Act 2018, the USA’s EARN IT Act, etc. The said proposals have been met with fierce criticism, with some already being challenged in the respective nation’s courts. Being the first of its kind on an international level, Podchasov holds great potential in serving as a guiding light for domestic courts globally, in upholding the legality of E2EE – for the sake of preserving the human rights to privacy and the freedom of opinion and expression.

The Protection of Individuals’ HIV Status under the Right to Private Life

Under Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), all individuals have the right to respect for their private life. The European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) case law makes clear that the processing of an individual’s HIV status as data falls within Article 8(1). Generally, the Court has established that the collection, storage and disclosure of ‘highly sensitive personal data’ falls under Article 8(1) (Surikov v Ukraine, [75]). In both PT v Moldova and OG v Greece, the Court assessed alleged violations of Article 8(1) where individuals’ HIV status had been disclosed.

The disclosure of an individual’s HIV status is only compatible with the right to private life where the interference pursues a legitimate aim, was done in accordance with domestic law, and is necessary in a democratic society, in accordance with Article 8(2). The Court considers data protection to be of ‘fundamental importance for the effective exercise’ of the right to private life, therefore States’ margin of appreciation for determining whether the disclosure pursues a legitimate aim is limited (PT v Moldova, [27]). The PT judgment suggests that, in the HIV context, it is only where an individual’s HIV status poses health risks that a disclosure of that status could serve a legitimate aim (PT v Moldova, [29]). Even when a measure serves such a legitimate aim, the Court will closely scrutinise the necessity of the disclosure. In OG, the Greek authorities published the names, photographs, and HIV-positive status of several sex workers. Although the Court accepted that the measure served the legitimate aim of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others – insofar as the disclosure would encourage sex workers’ clients to undergo HIV testing – the Court affirmed that the disclosure of such information without an individual’s consent can only be reconciled with Article 8(1) where it defends an overriding public interest (OG v Greece, [149], [153]). The Court was not satisfied that the disclosure could achieve the legitimate aim identified, noting that no other measures had been considered which could expose the sex workers’ data to a lesser extent (OG v Greece, [155]-[156]).

ECHR Implications of the Grindr Litigation

Grindr is not a public body: its actions are not attributable to a State under the ECHR, nor does the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 require the company to protect ECHR rights. However, it is crystal clear that if a public body disclosed individuals’ HIV status without consent for commercial purposes, this would violate Article 8 ECHR.

There have been creative attempts by some national courts to enable litigation against companies for violations of international law, most notably the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Nevsun v Araya. However, without reinventing the wheel, the ECHR may indirectly allow for Grindr to be held to account for violating Article 8. The ECHR does not simply require States to desist from violating ECHR rights – States are also under positive obligations to protect those rights (see Council of Europe Human Rights Handbook No. 7, pp 5-6). Although positive obligations are clearest in other ECHR rights, particularly Article 2’s right to life (see, e.g., Osman v UK, [115]; McCann v UK, [202]-[214]), such obligations have also been recognized in cases of third party interference with the right to private life. In Beizaras and Levickas v Lithuania, the Court accepted that Article 8 may require the adoption of measures ‘in the sphere of relations between individuals’ to protect the right to private life. In that case, Lithuania’s failure to take effective measures to investigate homophobic hate speech against a gay couple violated Article 8(1) in combination with Article 14’s prohibition on the discriminatory enjoyment of ECHR rights ([110], [129]-[130]).

In a similar vein, if the UK courts’ application and interpretation of the UK GDPR fails to sanction Grindr for the disclosure of users’ HIV status, the UK may find itself before the ECtHR for having failed to protect those users’ rights to their private lives under Article 8(1). Hopefully, if the applicants’ case is proven, in accordance with their duties under the Human Rights Act 1998 to take account of ECtHR decisions, and interpret legislation in accordance with ECHR rights, the British courts will award an appropriate remedy against Grindr and underscore that the misuse of personal health data for commercial purposes is unacceptable.

Achtergrond

De Belgische regio’s Vlaanderen (2017) en Wallonië (2018; een codificatie van een decreet uit 2017) verplichten met nieuwe decreten het verdoven van herkauwers alvorens ze te slachten. Onverdoofd slachten is slechts toegelaten in limitatieve gevallen van visvangst, jacht of ongediertebestrijding. Wat betreft religieuze slachtingen, voorzien de decreten in een ‘uitzondering’, doch vereisen ook hier nog steeds een bepaalde mate van bedwelming wat onverenigbaar is met Joods (en bepaalde interpretaties van Islamitisch) recht.

Artikel 9 van het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens (EVRM) garandeert de vrijheid van eenieder om zijn godsdienst te belijden, welke aan geen andere beperkingen is onderworpen dan die die bij wet voorzien zijn en in een democratische samenleving noodzakelijk zijn in het belang van de openbare orde, gezondheid en goede zeden. Het EHRM werd bijgevolg gevraagd na te gaan of deze decreten daartoe noodzakelijk zijn en of de inperkingen van de mensenrechten van moslims en joden daarmee evenredig zijn.

De Belgische overheid bepleitte terecht dat dierenwelzijn een legitiem doel is in een democratische maatschappij. Met veel minder argumentatie daarentegen, stelde België dat het verdovingselement op religieus vlak niet essentieel is (bv. para 84). Dit suggereert, met alle respect, een gebrek aan kennis van de Talmoed en de Hadith bij de advocaten. Bovendien beargumenteerde België, weerom weinig onderbouwd, dat in het licht van het belang van dierenwelzijn en bij gebrek aan minder verregaande doch geschikte maatregelen, een absoluut verbod evenredig is.

De beslissing van het EHRM

Het EHRM erkende dat het niet aan België is om te bepalen wat religieus essentieel is (para 85), maar dat de partijen in kwestie een coherente, sterke en serieuze religieuze waarde hechten aan onverdoofd slachten en daarom beschermd worden door Artikel 9 (para 87). Het Hof concludeerde bovendien dat een evoluerend begrip als ‘openbare orde en goede zeden’ ook dierenwelzijn kan omvatten (para 100) en dat lidstaten vrij zijn om, binnen hun appreciatiemarge, dat te benadrukken (para 106).

Wat betreft de proportionaliteitstoets, stak het Hof snel haar kop in het zand onder het mom van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel. Het Hof plooide voor de (betwiste) conclusies van de Belgische overheden over het gebrek aan minder verregaande geschikte maatregelen en stelde, ongegrond, dat de gewestelijke overheden grondig hun huiswerk hadden gemaakt (para 118). Het Hof baseerde zich, net als het HvJ-EU en het Grondwettelijk Hof, op het aanbod aan onverdoofd geslacht vlees in het Brusselse Gewest (waar geen dergelijk verbod geldt) en in andere landen (para 122).

Tenslotte stelde het Hof, weerom zonder argumentatie, dat er geen sprake was van discriminatie, aangezien de jacht geenszins vergelijkbaar is met religieuze slachtingen.

Analyse

Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel is een welgekend basisbeginsel van het Europees recht, doch daarom geen reden om de vereiste van bewijs te laten vallen. Een Europees toezicht op vlak van mensenrechten verliest elke bestaansreden als het EHRM ja-knikkend stelt dat een lidstaat haar huiswerk wel gemaakt heeft. In plaats van de vereiste noodzakelijkheid en evenredigheid aan te tonen, baseerde de Belgische Staat zich op eerder theologische argumenten.

Daarnaast zet het Hof, net als het HvJ-EU, ook een mogelijke houdbaarheidsdatum op haar eigen arrest door te stellen dat de personen in kwestie nog steeds onverdoofd geslacht vlees kunnen consumeren, zolang het vlees elders geslacht werd (para 122). Deze rechtvaardiging vervalt immers eens andere staten soortgelijke maatregelen treffen. Bovendien betekent dit dat de rechten van minderheden afhangen van de productie van zulke producten in andere (delen van) staten.

Bovendien negeert het Hof, door te focussen op de consumptie van het vlees, een belangrijk deel van de bescherming in Artikel 9. Het is immers niet enkel de vleesconsumptie die onder de geloofsbelijdenis valt, maar ook de bijhorende slachtingsrituelen. Een vergelijkend voorbeeld: de vrijheid van geloofsbelijdenis van christenen zou flagrant geschonden zijn indien de consecratie door de priester verboden is, maar christenen wel buitenlandse geconsacreerde hosties zouden mogen eten.

Hoven en rechtbanken zijn zich terecht bewust van het feit dat een proportionaliteitstoets kan leiden tot een vermomd tweede wetgevend proces. Echter is het ook mogelijk om te ver in de andere richting door te slaan. Als een beperking op een mensenrecht dat recht bijna tenietdoet, moet het Hof wel grondig nagaan of er sprake is van discriminatie en proportionaliteit. Het Hof heeft in casu de essentie van een mensenrecht opgeofferd zonder zelf enig onderzoek te verrichten. De beslissing is misschien politiek verantwoord, ze is dat allesbehalve op mensenrechtelijk en juridisch vlak en wordt terecht aangevochten bij de Grote Kamer.

** Many thanks to Rob Rooman for the Dutch translation of this post **

Hintergrund

Die Vorschriften in den belgischen Regionen Flandern (2017) und Wallonien (2018 (als Kodifizierung eines früheren Erlasses aus dem Jahre 2017)) schreiben die Betäubung vor der Tötung von Wiederkäuern vor. Diese Dekrete enthalten pauschale Ausnahmen für die unbetäubte Schlachtung bei der Jagd oder Fischerei sowie bei der Schädlingsbekämpfung. Für religiöse Schlachtungen beinhalten sie eine „Ausnahme“, die weiterhin eine Form der Betäubung vorschreibt. Die jüdischen Gesetze und einige Schulen des islamischen Rechts verbieten jedoch die Betäubung eines Tieres vor der Schlachtung in jeder Form.

Die Garantie in Artikel 9 EMRK, seine Religion zu bekennen, kann durch ein Gesetz eingeschränkt werden, wenn dies in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft zum Schutz der öffentlichen Moral, der öffentlichen Ordnung oder der Rechte und Freiheiten anderer notwendig ist. Der EGMR musste sich mit der Frage befassen, ob die auferlegten Beschränkungen notwendig waren, um ihr Ziel zu erreichen, und ob der daraus resultierende Eingriff in die Rechte von Muslimen und Juden verhältnismäßig war.

Belgien behauptete zu Recht, dass der Tierschutz in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft als ein legitimes Ziel gelte. Weitaus weniger überzeugend führte Belgien aus, das Betäubungselement sei aus religiöser Sicht nicht besonders relevant (siehe z.B. Rn. 84). Die auf Seiten Belgiens plädierenden Anwälte haben zu ihren talmudischen und haditischen Fachkenntnisse jedoch nichts vorgetragen. Mit fester Überzeugung, wenngleich ohne Beweise behauptete Belgien, dass keine andere Maßnahme das Wohlbefinden der Tiere schützen könne und dass das Gebot, Tiere zu schützen, in diesem Lichte bedeute, dass die radikale Maßnahme verhältnismäßig sei.

Entscheidung des EGMR

Der EGMR teilte die Meinung, dass es nicht Belgiens Aufgabe ist, zu befinden, welcher Teil des religiösen Schlachtens heilig ist (Rn. 85); die Anhänger in dem Rechtsstreit und ihre kohärente, ernsthafte und wichtige Überzeugung in Bezug auf die Art und Weise des religiösen Schlachtens werden durch Artikel 9 geschützt (Rn. 87). Der Gerichtshof kam außerdem zu dem Schluss, dass der sich entwickelnde Begriff der „öffentlichen Sittlichkeit“ den Tierschutz umfassen könnte (Rn. 100) und dass die Staaten sich dafür entscheiden könnten, innerhalb ihres Ermessensspielraums den Tierschutz besonders zu betonen (Rn. 106).

Als es jedoch darum ging, die Verhältnismäßigkeit und Notwendigkeit zu beurteilen, rief der EGMR „Subsidiarität“. Der Gerichtshof verwies vollumfänglich auf die Schlussfolgerungen Belgiens hinsichtlich der Verfügbarkeit weniger restriktiver Maßnahmen und versicherte, dass die Regionalparlamente ihre Hausaufgabe gründlich gemacht hätten (Rn. 118). Der EGMR, wie zuvor der EuGH und der Belgische Verfassungsgerichtshof, wies auf die Verfügbarkeit von Fleisch aus betäubungsloser Schlachtung in Brüssel (wo es kein solches Verbot gibt) oder aus anderen Staaten hin (Rn. 122).

Der EGMR stimmte bereitwillig (wieder ohne hinreichende Begründung) zu, es liege keine Ungleichbehandlung vor, denn die Jagd lasse sich nicht mit dem Schächten gleichsetzen.

Anmerkung

Der Ermessensspielraum nationaler Behörden ist eine abgedroschene Tugend des Europarechts, dieser Grundsatz ersetzt jedoch nicht das Erfordernis an Begründung und Beweis. Wenn der Gerichtshof die schlichte Behauptung eines Staates, er habe seine Hausaufgabe erledigt, abnickt und billigt, dann entbehrt die richterliche Kontrolle der Menschenrechte jeglichen Sinnes. Belgien bemühte sich nicht wirklich um eine Rechtfertigung und brachte vielmehr Argumente vor, die theologische Aspekte berührten.

Wie schon der EuGH, fügt auch der EGMR seiner Entscheidung eine potenzielle Auslaufklausel hinzu. Die in Rn. 122 angeführte Rechtfertigung durch die Möglichkeit der ausländischen Beschaffung entfällt offensichtlich, wenn andere Staaten in einem Dominoeffekt ähnliche Verbote verhängen. Dies bedeutet auch, dass die Rechte von Minderheiten in einem Staat davon abhängen, ob andere Staaten solche Produkte herstellen oder nicht.

Darüber hinaus schweigt das Urteil mit seiner Hervorhebung des individuellen Fleischkonsums über den Kerngehalt der Garantie nach Artikel 9. Für diejenigen, die sich zu dem betreffenden Glauben bekennen, ist sowohl der Verzehr des nach dem Ritual hergestellten Fleisches als auch der Zugang zu dem Ritual selbst Art des religiösen Ausdrucks. Um es in einer vergleichenden Perspektive zu betrachten: Die katholische Religionsausübungsfreiheit (hier die Gemeinschaft mit Christus) würde verletzt, wenn die Hostienkonsekration vor Ort verboten würde, der Verzehr konsekrierter Hostien anderswo aber garantiert wäre.

Ferner zeigt sich die Judikative darüber besorgt, dass diese Vorgehensweise bei der Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung dazu führen kann, dass die gerichtliche Überprüfung zu einem Gesetzgebungsverfahren wird. Es ist auch möglich, zu weit in die andere Richtung abzubiegen. Wenn ein Eingriff ein wichtiges Recht auslöscht, muss die Angemessenheit ordnungsgemäß geprüft werden und offensichtliche Diskriminierungen sind zu hinterfragen. Der EGMR hat zugelassen, dass der Wesensgehalt eines Grundrechts geopfert wird, ohne eine einzige Nachfrage gestellt zu haben. Das mag gute Politik sein, aber es ist miserable Menschenrechtsrechtsprechung und wird nun zu Recht vor der Großen Kammer angegriffen.

** Many thanks to Dawid Marusczyk for the German translation of this post **

Contexte

Les régions belges de Flandre (2017) et de Wallonie (2018; une codification d’un décret antérieur de 2017) exigent l’étourdissement avant l’abattage des ruminants. Les décrets pertinents contiennent des exceptions générales autorisant l’abattage sans étourdissement dans le cas de la chasse ou de la pêche, ainsi que pour la lutte contre les nuisibles. Pour l’abattage rituel, ils contiennent une « exception » qui exige toujours une forme d’étourdissement. Cependant, la loi juive et certaines interprétations de la loi islamique interdisent l’étourdissement d’un animal avant l’abattage sous quelque forme que ce soit.

La garantie prévue à l’article 9 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme consistant en la liberté de manifester sa religion peut être restreinte par la loi, si cela est nécessaire dans une société démocratique pour la protection de la morale publique, de l’ordre public ou des droits et libertés d’autrui. La tâche de la CEDH était de décider si les restrictions en question étaient nécessaires pour atteindre leur objectif, et si la violation consécutive des droits des musulmans et des juifs était proportionnée.

La Belgique a affirmé, avec justification, que le bien-être animal est un objectif légitime dans une société démocratique. Avec beaucoup moins de justification, elle a également suggéré que l’élément de l’étourdissement n’était pas particulièrement essentiel sur le plan religieux (voir, par exemple, le paragraphe 84). Avec force, mais sans preuve jusqu’à présent, la Belgique a en outre affirmé qu’aucune autre mesure ne pourrait préserver le bien-être animal et que la nécessité de protéger les animaux signifiait que la mesure absolutiste était donc proportionnée.

La décision de la CEDH

La CEDH a accepté qu’il n’appartient pas à la Belgique de dicter quelle partie de l’abattage rituel est sacrée (paragraphe 85) ; les adeptes impliqués dans le litige et leur croyance cohérente, sérieuse et importante concernant le mode de l’abattage rituel sont protégés par l’article 9 (paragraphe 87). La Cour a également conclu que la notion évolutive de “morale publique” pouvait englober le bien-être animal (paragraphe 100) et que les États pouvaient choisir, dans le cadre de leur marge d’appréciation, de mettre l’accent sur la protection des animaux (paragraphe 106).

Cependant, lorsqu’il s’est agi de la proportionnalité et de la nécessité des mesures spécifiques, la CEDH a seulement fait valoir la “subsidiarité”. Elle s’en est entièrement remise aux conclusions de l’État quant à la disponibilité de mesures moins restrictives et  nous a assuré que les parlements régionaux avaient bien fait leurs devoirs (paragraphe 118). La CEDH, tout comme la CJUE et la Cour constitutionnelle belge avant elle, s’est appuyée sur la disponibilité de viande provenant d’abattages sans étourdissement dans la région de Bruxelles (où il n’y a pas une telle interdiction) ou provenant d’autres États (paragraphe 122).

La CEDH a également volontiers convenu qu’il n’y avait pas de discrimination puisque la chasse n’était en rien comparable à l’abattage rituel, à nouveau sans fournir de raisons.

Analyse

La déférence envers les autorités nationales est une vertu bien connue du droit européen, mais elle ne permet pas de contourner l’obligation de fournir des preuves. Le fait que la CEDH se contente d’acquiescer à un État qui prétend avoir fait ses devoirs rend le contrôle juridictionnel européen en matière de droits de l’homme inopérant. La Belgique s’est à peine souciée de justifier ses actes, préférant avancer des arguments touchant à des points de théologie.

Tout comme la CJUE avant elle, la CEDH ajoute également une éventuelle clause de fin de validité à son propre jugement. La justification au paragraphe 122 de la possibilité de s’approvisionner à l’étranger disparaît clairement si et quand les États, dans un effet domino, commencent à imposer des interdictions similaires. Cela signifie également que les droits des minorités dans un État dépendent de la disponibilité de tels produits dans d’autres États.

Le jugement, en mettant l’accent sur la consommation individuelle de la viande, ne traite pas de ce qui est sans doute une partie essentielle de la protection de l’article 9. Pour ceux qui professent la foi en question, ce sont la consommation de la viande produite conformément aux rites et l’accès aux rites eux-mêmes, qui font partie de cette expression religieuse. Pour mettre cela en perspective comparative : la liberté religieuse catholique (ici la Communion avec le Christ) serait violée si la Consécration de l’Hostie était interdite localement mais que la consommation d’Hosties Consacrées ailleurs était autorisée.

Par ailleurs, les tribunaux sont légitimement préoccupés par le risque que l’analyse de la proportionnalité ne transforme le contrôle judiciaire en un processus législatif. Pourtant, il est possible de basculer trop loin dans l’autre direction. Lorsqu’une restriction porte atteinte à un droit significatif, la proportionnalité doit être évaluée correctement et une discrimination évidente doit être remise en question. La CEDH a laissé l’essence d’un droit être sacrifiée sans même poser une seule question approfondie. Cela peut être une bonne politique, mais c’est une loi sur les droits de l’homme abyssale, et c’est à juste titre qu’un appel est porté devant la Grande Chambre.

** Many thanks to Charlotte de Meeûs for this French translation of this post **

Background

The Belgian regions of Flanders (2017) and Wallonia (2018; a codification of an earlier, 2017 decree) both mandate stunning before the killing of ruminants. The relevant decrees contain blanket exceptions allowing unstunned slaughter for hunting, fishing, or pest control. For religious slaughter they contain an ‘exception’ which still requires a form of stunning. However, Jewish law and some interpretations of Islamic law prohibit stunning an animal prior to slaughter in any form.

The guarantee under Article 9 ECHR of the freedom to manifest one’s religion may be infringed by law as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of public morals, public order, or the rights and freedoms of others. The ECtHR’s task was to decide whether the restrictions at issue were necessary to achieve their aim and whether the consequent infringement of the rights of Muslims and Jews was proportionate.

Belgium claimed, with justification, that animal welfare is a legitimate aim in a democratic society. With far less justification, it also suggested that the stunning element was not particularly religiously essential (see, eg [84]). Yet no Talmudic and Hadith expertise was claimed by Belgium’s lawyers. With sweeping force but without evidence to this point, Belgium further claimed that no other measure could possibly preserve animal welfare and that the need to protect animals meant that the absolutist measure was thus proportionate.

The ECtHR’s decision

The ECtHR accepted that it is not for Belgium to dictate what part of religious slaughter is sacred [85]; the adherents in the litigation and their coherent, serious, and important belief regarding the manner of religious slaughter are protected by Article 9 [87]. The Court also concluded that the evolving notion of ‘public morals’ could come to encompass animal welfare [100] and that States could choose to, within their margin of appreciation, emphasise the protection of animals [106].

However, when it came to proportionality and necessity, the Court merely cried out ‘subsidiarity’. It entirely deferred to the defending State’s conclusions as to the availability of less restrictive measures and assured us that the regional parliaments had thoroughly done their homework [118]. The ECtHR, like the CJEU and the Belgian Constitutional Court before it, fell back on the availability of meat from unstunned slaughter in the Brussels region (where there is no such ban) or from other states [122].

The ECtHR also readily agreed that no discrimination was present since hunting was nothing like religious slaughter, again without providing reasons.

Analysis

Deference to national authorities are trite virtues of European law, but they do not erase the requirement for evidence. The Court simply nodding to a State which claims to have done its homework, makes European human rights judicial control nugatory. Belgium barely bothered with justification, instead advancing arguments that touched onto points of theology.

Like the CJEU before it, the ECtHR also adds a potential sunset clause to its own ruling. The paragraph 122 justification of the possibility of foreign procurement clearly falls away if and when States in a domino effect start imposing similar bans. This also means that the rights of minorities in any one State become dependent on whether or not other States produce such products.

The judgment with its emphasis on the individual’s consumption of the meat also fails to engage with a core part of the Article 9 protection. To those professing the faiths at issue, both consumption of the meat produced in accordance with the rites, and access to the rites themselves, are part of their religious expression. To put it in a comparative perspective: Catholic freedom of religious expression (the Communion with Christ) would be infringed if the Consecration of the Host were banned locally, but the consumption of Consecrated Hosts carried out elsewhere were guaranteed.

Further, courts are concerned that proportionality analysis may turn judicial review into a legislative process. Yet, it is possible to shift too far into the other direction. Where an infringement erases a significant right, proportionality must be properly tested and evident discrimination must be second-guessed. The ECtHR has let the essence of a core right be sacrificed without a single searching question. This may be good politics, but it is abysmal human rights law, and it is rightfully being appealed to the Grand Chamber.