Currently, there is no UN mechanism with the mandate to collect and preserve evidence of the atrocities being perpetrated against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. While some evidence is being collected by researchers and NGOs, it is doubtful whether the evidence will be collected and stored in a way that would enable its use in future proceedings. Reports also suggest that some of the existing databases are being attacked by hackers in an attempt to destroy the evidence.

There are several mechanisms through which the UN can act, including at the levels of the UN Security Council, General Assembly, and the Human Rights Council. In the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda, the UN Security Council established commissions of experts to consider the available evidence, collect further information, and prepare an opinion to confirm the nature of the atrocities. Once the commission of experts confirms that the atrocities amounted to genocide, the UN Security Council passed resolutions establishing ad hoc tribunals to prosecute the perpetrators. For instance, in 2017, in response to the Daesh atrocities, the UN Security Council passed a resolution establishing the Investigative Team tasked with collecting, preserving, and storing evidence of Daesh atrocities in Iraq. Among others, the Investigative Team identified 1,444 suspected perpetrators responsible for the attacks against the Yazidis, including 14 members deemed most responsible for the atrocities classified as war crimes, crimes against humanity and even genocide. Furthermore, the Investigative Team has received requests for assistance in domestic proceedings from 14 states.

However, where such an action was not possible through the UN Security Council, other UN organs have stepped up. For example, as the UN Security Council was infamously blocked on every meaningful action on the situation in Syria, predominately because of Russian vetoes, in 2016 the UN General Assembly established the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (‘IIIM’) for Syria, to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the most serious crimes under international law committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. The resolution establishing IIIM was strongly opposed by Syria. However, it was adopted by a recorded vote of 105 in favour and 15 against, with 52 abstentions. Since its creation, IIIM has collected a significant amount of evidence, and has been collaborating with 12 jurisdictions to enable domestic prosecutions based on the principle of universal jurisdiction.

Lastly, similar investigative and evidence gathering mechanisms have been established by the UN Human Rights Council, most notably the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) in 2018 and, more recently, a mechanism for Sri Lanka in 2021.

As such, the UN organs reflect a significant legacy in establishing mechanisms to collect and preserve the evidence of atrocities. While States have been calling for unfettered access to Xinjiang, and China has been delaying it, it is crucial to recognise that a mechanism for evidence collection does not depend on access to the region. Indeed, as it is clear from the examples of IIIM and IIMM, while these bodies have not been granted access to the region, they have been doing this work remotely, and ensuring that a step towards justice is being taken.

 A UN mechanism to collect and preserve evidence of the atrocities against the Uyghurs is the next crucial step and one that cannot be postponed. Without securing this evidence now, the prospects of justice is the future are zero.

 The Genocide Amendment received significant House of Lords’ support (287 to 161), affirming that the majority of the House of Lords did not want the UK to trade with states perpetrating genocide. On 19 January 2020, the Genocide Amendment proceeded to the House of Commons. After a vivid debate, where the Genocide Amendment appeared to be of significant focus, at division, it was defeated by 319 to 308. This included 34 Tory rebels. The Genocide Amendment will now return to the House of Lords to consider the amendments, which if agreed upon, will then go back to the House of Commons, in ping-pong.

The UK Government appears reluctant to support the Genocide Amendment. Despite the fact that the House of Lords’ movers of the amendment made it clear for weeks that they were willing to work with the Government on refining the amendment, the Government refused to consider it. Further, even though the Minister for Trade Policy had the refined version for a week in advance of the debate, he did not appear to be familiar with it, and refused to comment. Finally, despite agreeing that the Genocide Amendment would become relevant only in a very few cases (ultimately, genocide does not happen that often), the Government challenged it at both houses.

Among the claims it made were that this additional power to the High Court would affect the separation of powers, it would enable judicial activism and clog up courts, and that the Amendment being very limited in scope, would amount to virtue signaling alone. All these concerns were addressed in the debates at the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The refined amendment tabled by Lord Alton clarified that while it gave the power to the High Court to make a determination of genocide, such a determination would not automatically revoke the trade deal in question. Instead, once the determination of genocide was made, the Lord Chancellor would lay it before both Houses of Parliament and a Minister of the Crown would arrange for the motion to be debated in each House. The Government would then be required to set out its course of action, which might include a withdrawal or termination of the trade agreement. In other words, the Genocide Amendment respected the separation of powers. Further, the Genocide Amendment was limited in scope, and was much narrower than the earlier Genocide Determination Bill. It was also tailored to the Trade Bill, and only introduced a mechanism to ensure that the UK does not trade with states perpetrating genocide, and so become complicit in the genocide of other states. Its narrow scope meant that it would not necessarily clog up the judicial system with litigation. Despite these clarifications, the Government refused to endorse the amendment.

 What, then, is behind this reluctance? It appears that the UK Government does not want to be constrained in matters of trade, even in cases of genocide. During the House of Lords debate, the Government was called to rethink its trade relationship with China, which stands accused of committing genocide against the Uyghurs. Shortly before the vote, the Minister, in a last attempt to persuade members to vote against the Genocide Amendment, reminded the House of the value of UK’s trade with China: ‘UK/China trade is currently worth approximately £76 billion. China is our fourth-largest trading partner, the sixth-largest export market and the third-largest import market.’ This hints at a prioritisation of trade over the human rights of communities targeted for annihilation.

 In the next post, I specifically deal with the Government’s objections to the High Court as a venue for the determination of genocide.

First, the judgment in the case of Ratko Mladić refers to individual criminal responsibility for genocide in the case of the Bosnian genocide, and not the interim determination of genocide for the purposes of informing a state’s responses. Second, waiting for such a judicial determination for over a decade after the genocide has been perpetrated means that the UK would not be able to trigger the duty to prevent, under Article I of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide(Genocide Convention) and as discussed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro.

Furthermore, if this determination, as according to the UK Government, is dependent on an ad-hoc tribunal, or even the International Criminal Court (ICC), such determination would not be made in many situations. For instance, the cases of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the Yazidis and Christians in Iraq could not be considered and determined by international judicial bodies, as currently there is no international tribunal with jurisdiction. Further, any attempt to refer these situations to the ICC by the UN Security Council could be vetoed by one of the permanent members. The same applies to establishing an ad-hoc tribunal, which can be done only by way of a UN Security Council resolution. The Government said little about the option of the ICJ dealing with the issue, and indeed, despite leaving the question of genocide determination to international judicial bodies, the UK does not engage with the ICJ, as discussed below. 

The Government’s response also misses the elephant in the room. The UK, and not international judicial bodies, are the duty bearers under the Genocide Convention. The UK has a questionable legacy of triggering the duty to prevent genocide when it learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed. The underlying reason for this failure is that the UK does not conduct its own analysis of the risk factors of genocide, in order to determine the situation as posing a risk of genocide. The UK instead voluntarily delegates this to the ‘international judicial systems.’

However, ironically, despite relying on the argument, the UK does not engage with international judicial bodies to make such determination. For example, The Gambia initiated proceedings against Myanmar at the ICJ, alleging that the Government of Myanmar was involved in atrocities against the Rohingya Muslims, in violation of the Genocide Convention. A few months later, Canada and the Netherlands supported the initiative. The UK, however, continues to only monitor the situation. The underlying message is thus that while the UK wishes international judicial bodies to determine genocide, it will not do anything to initiate or support such action to ensure that an international judicial body indeed makes such a determination.

In this context, the Genocide Amendment has the potential of strengthening the UK’s responses to genocide. It would enable the High Court to make an interim determination of genocide that in turn could help the Government inform its responses. It would thus ensure that the UK is not complicit in genocide perpetrated by its trade partners. Of course, the Genocide Amendment does not change the fact that the individual criminal responsibility will need to be determined by domestic criminal courts or international criminal tribunals, or that state responsibility would need to be determined by the ICJ. The Genocide Amendment would however enable the UK to take back control over some aspects of its genocide response. About time. However, more work is needed there.

The applicant, an Iranian national who allegedly converted to Christianity, reportedly sought asylum in the UK out of fear of persecution in Iran. It is well reported on that converts to Christianity in Iran often face severe persecution. The persecution affects their ability to practice their new religion. In some cases, this persecution is so severe that the converts must flee the country out of fear for their lives. According to the Home Office letter, in his application, the Iranian Christian argued that he converted to Christianity as he believed Christianity was a religion of peace. The Home Office letter cited passages from the Bible and claimed that ‘these examples are inconsistent with [the applicants] claim that [he] converted to Christianity after discovering it is a ‘peaceful’ religion, as opposed to Islam which contains violence, rage and revenge.’

Since the emergence of the letter, the Home Office has not disputed the authenticity of the letter, however, it suggested that the response was not in accordance with its policy.

The question is then what is wrong with the response. Instead of considering the facts and applying the law and procedure in considering the asylum application, the Home Office letter engaged in a debate on whether Christianity was a peaceful religion. A debate that is theological in nature and outside of the scope of the work of the Home Office.

The content of the letter demonstrates a glaring lack of understanding of the law and procedure, and what, in accordance with the law and procedure, the caseworker was asked to do.

In order to apply for asylum in the UK, the applicant is asking to be recognised as a refugee as per the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. To qualify for protection as a refugee, one ‘must owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country…’

In the reported case, the applicant claimed to have feared religious persecution in Iran because of his conversion to Christianity. In the review of his application, the caseworkers should have considered, for example, whether the conversion was genuine, whether he was persecuted in Iran or whether he had a well-founded fear of persecution in Iran (this could be considered on the facts of the case and in light of the general situation of coverts to Christianity in Iran).

The genuineness of the conversion is relevant but not the reasons for such conversion themselves. Also, whether he had a full understanding of the Bible or whether he had a mistaken understanding of the Bible – is irrelevant. The Home Office should not act as a theologian and/or make value judgements whether a religion is peaceful or not, it is not relevant for the validity of an asylum application.

While religious literacy training is a sensible option, it is not enough to address the above raised issues. It is crucial that any case worker dealing with the issue of religious persecution understands the anatomy of religious persecution in general but also the specifics in relation to various groups in different countries. Furthermore, the understanding of the law and procedure that governs such application is a must. The Home Office must do more to ensure that case workers are given adequate training in the law and procedure applicable to asylum cases as well as in understanding the geopolitics of religious and other forms of persecution.

The case concerns Mr John Catt, a 94-year-old activist from Brighton, who had been included in the Extremism Database. The Extremism Database is a police database which at all relevant times was under the National Public Order Intelligence Unit of the Police (the NPOIU). Mr Catt was twice arrested at Smash EDO demonstrations for obstructing the public highway but has never been convicted of any offence.

In March 2010, Mr Catt made a request to the police under Section 7 of the Data Protection Act 1998 asking for any personal information about him. As a result, he received sixty six entries concerning events between March 2005 and October 2009. In August 2010, Mr Catt asked the Association of Chief Police Officers (the ACPO) to delete the entries but ACPO declined to do so.

In its judgment, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 8. The ECtHR raised several concerns in relation to the database and how long the information is kept for but also in the scope of the information held. It expressed concerns about the ‘ambiguity of the legal basis for the collection of the applicant’s personal data. In particular […] the loosely defined notion of “domestic extremism” and the fact that applicant’s data could potentially be retained indefinitely.’

The definition of ‘domestic extremism’ relied upon by NPOIU was as identified by the National Coordinator of NPOIU – ‘not prescribed by law. It is a descriptor generally used by the police service and partners to describe the activity of individuals or groups who carry out criminal acts of direct action to further their protest campaigns, outside the democratic process.’ This definition of domestic extremism used by ACPO was scrutinised by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in 2012.  The Inspectorate found that the ‘definition could incorporate a very wide range of protest activity and its breadth means that it affords limited guidance to authorising officers applying RIPA (whatever its merits for other purposes).’ It proposed to narrow the definition of domestic extremism to limit it to threats of harm from serious crime and serious disruption to the life of the community arising from criminal activity.

The ECtHR also identified that this definition is not the only one used in the UK. For example, a different, but similarly broad definition is incorporated in the Counter-Extremism Strategy 2015 as ‘the vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values…’ As the Inspectorate noted ‘this definition may not be suitable for the police as it is not limited to criminality or police work.’

Further, the ECtHR noted that ‘the police do not appear to have respected their own definition (fluid as it may have been in retaining data on the applicant’s association with peaceful, political events: such events are a vital part of the democratic process’  even after the police concluded and the domestic courts had affirmed that Mr Catt was not a danger to anyone. It also referred to the heightened level of protection attached to the data collected as it revealed Mr Catt’s political opinion.

The Government claimed that it would have been too burdensome to review the database and delete the entries as the database is not fully automated. However, the Code of Practice on the management of police information requires the data to be reviewed after six years and deleted. The Court added that ‘it would be entirely contrary to […] Article 8 if the Government could create a database in such a manner that the data in it could not be easily reviewed or edited.’

It remains to be seen what the Government’s response to the raised concerns will be. It is clear that, at least in the case of Mr Catt, the information contained in the database does not refer to extremism under ACPO’s definition. Furthermore, despite the procedures in place, the reviews are not undertaken and the information is not deleted. How many more non-violent Mr Catts there are in the database remains a question. However, in light of the judgment, it is clear that the UK needs to reconsider its approach.

The right to freedom of speech at universities is guaranteed under Education (No. 2) Act 1986. Furthermore, freedom of speech at universities is also protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (and in conjunction with other rights, for example, Article 11 of the ECHR, the right to freedom of assembly and association). As confirmed by the Committee, the right to freedom of speech includes ‘the right to say things which, though lawful, others may find offensive. Unless it is unlawful, speech should normally be allowed.’

The right to freedom of speech is not absolute and is subject to some limitations. Under the ECHR, those limitations include ‘such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’ However, as explored in the course of the inquiry, the limitations identified by the Committee in universities do not necessarily fall within these prescribed limitations.

The Committee identified the challenges to the right to freedom of speech at universities. Many of the challenges arose from restrictive or burdensome policies, such as: ‘unnecessary bureaucracy imposed on those organising events; fear and confusion over what the Prevent duty entails; regulatory complexity; unduly complicated and cautious guidance from the Charity Commission; concern by student unions not to infringe what they perceive to be restrictions.’

However, the Committee also indicated that the right to freedom of speech at universities is limited by ‘intolerant attitudes, often incorrectly using the banner of ‘no platforming’ and ‘safe-space’ policies; incidents of unacceptable intimidatory behaviour by protestors intent on preventing free speech and debate.’ As found by the Committee, some protests at universities aim to prevent a speaker from appearing or expressing their views or to close down the events entirely. This should not be allowed at universities where conflicting opinion or ideas supposed to be discussed and challenged rather than silenced. The Committee concluded that ‘it is unacceptable for protestors to deliberately conceal their identities, break in with clear intention to intimidate those exercising their rights to attend meetings or to seek to stop events.’ 

The Committee identified some good practices that could help to uphold the right to freedom of speech at universities, including some processes for having external speakers as long as they are reasonable and do not involve undue bureaucracy or unreasonable conditions attached, codes of practice as long as they facilitate freedom of speech and do not unduly restrict it. The Committee criticised, for example, any requirement to provide the speech in advance and indicated that a confirmation from the speaker that their speech will be lawful should suffice.

The Committee concluded that there was no evidence of ‘wholesale censorship of debate in universities’ as suggested by media. Nonetheless, the reported incidents of restrictions may have a chilling effect on the enjoyment of the right to freedom of speech at universities in general.

Another challenge, which also affects the public more broadly, is the Prevent duty, which requires certain authorities, including local authorities, the health sector, prisons and probation and the police, take steps to prevent people being drawn into terrorism. The Committee referred to the recent case of Salman Butt v Secretary of State for the Home Department and explained how the duty should be understood.  The judgment narrowed down the scope of the Prevent duty to terrorism and violent extremism that may result in people being drawn to terrorism (but not non-violent extremism as suggested in the Counter-Extremism Strategy 2015). The government has not yet implemented this judgment, and continues to apply the very broad definition of extremism as ‘the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also regard calls for the death of members of our armed forces as extremist.’  The Committee restated its recommendations from another inquiry, focusing on counter-extremism strategy, to review the Prevent duty and to ensure that it does not infringe rights excessively.

The inquiry conducted by the Committee was much needed to explore the challenges to the right to freedom of speech at universities. Those challenges, while not amounting to ‘wholesale censorship’, must be met to ensure that universities continue to be fit for their purpose and equip generations of young people with skills to engage in debates, challenge opinion or ideas they do not agree with.

Victims of modern day slavery struggle to have their voices heard. What is more, even if they are heard, there is no guarantee that they will receive the assistance they need. The provision of support to victims is still greatly failing. In England and Wales, victims of modern day slavery do not have any automatic entitlement to housing, financial support, or any other practical support that would assist them post-abuse and enslavement. After escaping the offender, they often become homeless and extremely vulnerable to further exploration and abuse. However, the picture is not as bleak everywhere in the United Kingdom. In Northern Ireland and Scotland such support is required by law, in accordance with international standards, for example, the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011.  While England and Wales may meet their obligations under Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights, they could and should do more for victims, as Northern Ireland and Scotland do.

In response to these failings, Lord McColl of Dulwich, put forward the Modern Slavery (Victim Support) Bill, a Private Members Bill that is due to have its second reading on 8th September 2017. The Bill would make two main amendments to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (the MSA 2015) that require consideration, namely, assistance to individuals whose victimhood for the purposes of the MSA 2015 is yet to be determined, and assistance to the individuals already determined to be victims of modern day slavery.

The proposed section 48A concerns the provision of assistance and support during the ‘reflection and recovery period.’ The reflection and recovery period is the period of 45 days from the date on which the referral of a potential victim to the National Referral Mechanism (the NRM) was made. Under what would be section 48A(3), the assistance and support is to be provided unless a determination was made that ‘there are there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a victim of modern slavery’, ‘the person is a victim of modern slavery’ or ‘the person is not a victim of modern slavery.’ The proposed section 48B concerns assistance and support for victims of modern slavery following conclusive determination that the individual is a victim of modern day slavery. Under section 48B(3), ‘assistance and support is to be provided for a period of 12 months.’ Furthermore, under section 48(B)(4) ‘the Secretary of State must ensure that a person to whom this section applies is granted leave to remain in the United Kingdom for as long as necessary for that person to receive support.’ Lastly, section 48C clarifies what is meant by ‘assistance and support’; it includes safe accommodation, financial assistance, medical help, counselling, a support worker, appropriate information, translation and interpretation services, legal assistance, and assistance with repatriation.

Lord McColl’s proposed Bill addresses the failings of the current mechanisms in England and Wales concerning the provision of assistance and support to the victims or potential victims of the modern day slavery. To encourage victims to speak out, they need support to re-establish their lives after the time they spent enslaved, abused, and exploited. Victims and suspected victims must be sure that if they escape or seek help, they will not be left alone. They deserve the state’s assistance and support. We need to recognise that while rescuing victims from their oppressors is crucial, once free, they require help and assistance that currently, under the law in England and Wales, is not available.

Almost seven decades later, the two core promises of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (‘the Convention’), namely, prevention and prosecution, have gone unfulfilled. States are reluctant to recognise atrocities as genocide even if the particulars of genocide are present. Similarly, states are unwilling to prosecute the acts as genocide, and instead prosecute for lesser offences.

The UK is no different and does not have a good record in keeping the promises under the Convention. The underlying problem is that the UK has a history of failing to recognise mass atrocities as genocide, whether the historical Armenian genocide or current and ongoing Daesh genocide against Yazidis, Christians and other religious minorities.

While such a failure to recognise genocide is glaring in every case, the denial of making such recognition in the event of an ongoing genocide is unacceptable. The Convention obliges the UK Government to make such a determination in every case of genocide, to prevent (or to stop) genocides and to prosecute the perpetrators.

The UK Government has refused to acknowledge that genocide is occurring in Syria and Iraq, despite growing political support in the UK (and all over the world).

The UK Government’s response is that the decision whether the acts constitute genocide or not is a matter for the ‘international judicial system’ and not Governments or other non-judicial bodies. This is a long-standing government policy, but it is contrary to the UK Government’s obligations under the Convention. To take decisive action to prevent genocide, the very first step must be to recognise when genocide is taking place or is attempted.

In the case of Daesh atrocities in Iraq, the UK has taken steps, but they fall short of meeting the Convention obligations. On 19 November 2016, the UK launched a global campaign to bring Daesh to justice for its crimes committed in Iraq. The Daesh atrocities committed in Iraq against religious minorities constitute genocide, and hence the global campaign may seem like the UK fulfilling its obligation to prosecute the acts of genocide under the Convention. However, the UK has not formally recognised the Daesh genocide yet. Furthermore, the coalition has not progressed with any concrete proposals. The step to bring Daesh to justice is a one-off act and does not change the UK’s poor record under the Convention.

To combat the UK Government’s long-standing poor record, Lord David Alton of Liverpool introduced the Genocide Determination Bill, a private members’ bill, with the aim to ‘provide for the High Court of England and Wales to make a preliminary finding on cases of alleged genocide; and for the subsequent referral of such findings to the International Criminal Court or a special tribunal.’ The bill had its first reading on 13 June 2016, namely, 68 years after the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention. Because of the snap election, the bill did not progress any further. Now the new Parliament is up and running, Lord Alton has brought the bill back before the House of Lords. The bill was re-introduced on 13 July 2017. However, as the bill is 58th in line, the chances are very weak for the bill to be debated anytime soon, even though it has now been 69 years since the Convention was adopted. The UK simply needs to do more to prevent and prosecute acts of genocide: Lord Alton’s bill would be a good start.

UK counter-terrorism law and strategy have been strict for years following the introduction of the Terrorism Act 2000, subsequent pieces of legislation, and the counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST.  However, in 2015, the UK Government proposed to introduce legislation to ‘prevent radicalization, tackle extremism in all its forms, and promote community integration.‘  In October 2015, the UK Government released its ‘Counter-Extremism Strategy’ addressing the issue of ‘extremism’. While after the recent attacks, many may agree that such an approach is needed, the devil is in how the strategy defines ‘extremism.’ The strategy does not focus on violent extremism exclusively. In fact, any unpopular views can be categorised as extremist under its approach. Furthermore, the strategy relies on the notion of ‘British values’. However, this vague term is often erroneously interpreted as including an obligation to promote equality at the price of other rights, for example, religious freedom. Consequently, the strategy targets religious communities or individuals with unpopular but non-violent views. Such a broad approach is problematic as it opens the door to ungrounded complaints made by individuals against others with unpopular but non-violent views, taking away the focus and resources from the cases of violent extremism, terrorism and complicitous acts.

The strategy departs from work done on the topic by the United Nations (UN). One of the fundamental differences between the approaches is in the scope of the focus. The UN focuses on countering terrorism and violent extremism. Some of the examples cited by the UN include the atrocities committed by Daesh or Boko Haram. Rightly so. This narrower approach is evident from Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and the UN General Assembly Resolution 70/291 on the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review. In fact, the wording used by the UN often refers to ‘violent extremism conducive to terrorism and incitement to commit terrorist acts’, emphasising the link between violent extremism and terrorism.

The UK’s broad approach comes with a price tag. Broadening the approach means more investigations and cases, requiring more human resources and funding at a time of spending cuts. If no resources are found to cover the costs flowing from the strategy, investigations will be conducted with insufficient resources, leading to inefficiency in handling cases. Ultimately, the police will be responding to non-violent extremism rather than focusing on terrorism and violent extremism. There will be too many suspects and leads to follow up. Having large databases of potential ‘extremists’ will not achieve much if there are no resources for the follow-up.

Furthermore, the strategy has a second price tag. The vague language of the strategy aims to give flexibility to respond to the terror threat as needed, but this can limit the enjoyment of human rights. The first rights that are targeted by the strategy are freedom of religion and freedom of expression – the rights that constitute the very foundation of a democratic society and are the very kernel of British values. As the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly indicated after his visit to the UK, it is evident from the recent cases that the Prevent strategy may target religious groups.

The review promised in the Queen’s Speech and a subsequent statement by Amber Rudd, the Home Secretary, is therefore welcome. The review will be conducted by David Anderson QC, former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. In this role he has already reviewed the UK counter-terrorism law and strategy and proposed a number of recommendations. He emphasised the dangers presented by vague or unclear counter-terrorism laws. He also commented upon the risks of broadening the counter-terrorism law to include non-violent extremism. He emphasised that the law as it stood was ‘well-stocked’, there were many challenges in prosecuting so-called ‘hate preachers’ that were a consequence of the insufficiency of evidence and not inadequacy in the law. Nonetheless, to date the recommendations have not been implemented.

It is to be hoped that the review will proceed in a rigorous way, tests counter-terror law and strategy against human rights, and tests the empirical evidence that was used to justify the Government’s approach. The acts of terror in London and Manchester that shook the world cannot happen again. However, human rights cannot perish in response.

A widespread, and often erroneous, perception is that refugees and IDPs want to move to other countries and resettle. But it is important to remember that refugees and IDPs are often forced from their homes, have to leave all of their belongings, and travel to a foreign land where they will likely encounter an unfamiliar culture and language. Many would prefer to be back in their homes.

The circumstances that force refugees and IDPs to flee may change; occupied zones may become liberated. In such cases, refugees and IDPs have a so-called ‘right to return’, namely, a right to go back to their countries and their homes. This right is protected under international law, for example under Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 12(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This right is sometimes also protected under domestic law, for example in the Iraqi Constitution under Article 44(2). However, the existence of this right does not mean that in practice it is easily achieved. It takes time, money, and effort for liberated areas to be safe for refugees and IDPs to return. According to a report by Aid to the Church in Need (a Pontifical Foundation of the Catholic Church), in nine Nineveh Plains towns over 12,000 houses were vandalised by Daesh. The cost of rebuilding the towns is in excess of $200 million.

Recent news reporting suggests that few IDPs and refugees are returning home. This is not only because of their hometowns being destroyed. Security concerns remain an issue that has not been adequately addressed. In response to this failing, NGOs continue to call upon international institutions to establish safe zones in Nineveh Plains. Establishing such safe zones is not without difficulty. As history has shown, the environment in safe zones may contribute to post-conflict community oppression. For example, while the ‘safe zones’ established in Bosnia in 1993, Rwanda in 1994 or Sri Lanka in 2009 provided humanitarian assistance, they failed to protect people from further abuse.

Establishing an autonomous administration, as in the case of Kurdistan in Iraq, may provide for a more sustainable and long-lasting solution. However, the establishment of Iraqi Kurdistan was not easy. The peace accord that granted the Kurdish autonomy in 1970 was followed by violent clashes and years of debate surrounding the autonomy arrangements. In October 1991, Kurdistan gained de facto autonomy after Iraqi forces left the region and the Kurdish government was established in 1992. Instability in the region continued in subsequent years. Nonetheless, as Kurdistan withstood the Daesh invasion in 2014, this option would need to be scrutinised, as it proved to be a more secure option than safe zones.

The inclination of states to exclude refugees is increasingly visible. However, over 65 million people are forcibly displaced worldwide. Over 21 million of them are refugees and 10 million stateless people. In 2015, only 107,100 of them were resettled. In 2015 in Iraq, the number of people of concern was at over 4.7 million, with over 4.4 million IDPs and over 270,000 refugees (mostly from Syria). The remaining millions are still in limbo without being able to resettle and move on with their lives.

While it is difficult to pressure states to accept more refugees, there are positive steps that can be taken by states to respond to the current challenges. This response should include efforts to protect refugees and IDPs on return to their homes. As the cases of safe zones and the Kurdistan autonomous region show, there are no easy solutions. But the guarantee of a right to return means nothing if returnees are left unprotected on returning to their region.

Featured image: European Commission DG ECHO / Flickr.