On 17 March 2026, the State Assembly of Maharashtra, India, passed the Maharashtra Freedom of Religion Bill (FRB). The stated objective of the bill is to regulate religious conversions and prevent unlawful practices such as forced or induced conversions, defining “unlawful conversion” under section 2(b) of the bill as any conversion carried out through coercion, fraud, inducement, misrepresentation, or undue influence. While the bill and its stated objective may appear innocuous, it conceals blatant violations of fundamental rights within its provisions. The bill in its entirety produces a framework of intrusion: it exposes the individual’s decision to public scrutiny, then arms hostile family members with criminal machinery, and ultimately empowers the state to prosecute without any complaint. By mandating public disclosure of personal faith and subjecting personal decisions to third-party scrutiny and state intervention, the bill not only intrudes on the right to privacy but also undermines personal autonomy.

Article 21: Right to Privacy Compromised

The Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) unanimously recognised privacy as a fundamental right stemming from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court held that privacy includes decisional autonomy, that is, the freedom to make intimate and personal choices central to one’s identity (para 248 & 297). The Court acknowledged that privacy is not an absolute right and laid down a threefold test of legitimacy, rational connection, and proportionality on the basis of which the said right could be restricted (para 310). Section 6 of the FRB, however, mandates individuals who convert to submit personal and religious details within 60 days; these details are then displayed publicly for objections. This compels individuals to reveal their personal decisions that are fundamental to their identity, defeating the right to privacy.

Indeed, the Himachal Pradesh High Court struck down a similar provision under the Himachal Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 2006, holding that faith is inherently personal, and the State has no right to compel disclosure of beliefs without compelling justification. This reasoning applies with equal force to Section 6 of the FRB, which similarly transforms a private decision of faith into a matter of public record, compelling disclosure without any justification.

Family Standing: A Familial Override Through the Backdoor of Criminal Law

Section 8(1) of the bill empowers the converted person’s parents, siblings, and anyone related by blood, marriage, or adoption to file a complaint against the conversion. While the State may argue that such a provision is a reasonable safeguard for the protection of vulnerable individuals, it stands in stark contrast with the constitutional mandate as laid down by the Supreme Court in Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. (2018). The Court in no uncertain terms held that “Choices of faith and belief as indeed choices in matters of marriage lie within an area where individual autonomy is supreme. Neither the state nor the law can dictate a choice of partners or limit the free ability of every person to decide on these matters. They form the essence of personal liberty under the Constitution.” (para 75) Essentially, Section 8 smuggles back a familial control/say into what is constitutionally envisioned to be an autonomous decision. An adult who has made a conscious, and consensual choice of faith can find their partner prosecuted the moment their family disapproves.

Faith Displaced: From Individual Conscience to the State’s Docket

Article 25 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion, has already placed faith within the sovereign domain of the individual; yet Section 8(3) proceeds to relocate it entirely. This section empowers the police to take cognizance of a conversion on its own without any complaint, aggrieved party, or grievance. The mandate of Section 8(3) strips faith of its personal character and removes it from the individual’s conscience to the state’s docket. A decision which was central to one’s identity now ends up in the public domain, up for the state authorities to investigate, scrutinise, and prosecute all on their own accord. The individual is no longer the author of their own belief. The state is.

The FRB does not benignly regulate conversion: it constructs a machinery of exposure, familial prosecution, and state surveillance around a decision the framers of the Constitution deliberately placed beyond the reach of any external authority. The Supreme Court has taken cognizance of the growing constitutional unease surrounding similar anti-conversion laws, transferring pending petitions before various High Courts to itself and seeking responses from the Union of India and twelve states. As the court gears up to examine the validity of such laws, it will have to ask a rather discomforting question: whether a law that compels disclosure of faith and intrudes upon the individual’s autonomy can ever be reconciled with the spirit of the Constitution. The answer must surely be no.