Background to the gender persecution charge

In 2007, the Office of the Prosecutor to the ICC (‘OTP’) was granted an arrest warrant for Abd-Al-Rahman for his role in atrocities committed against Darfuri civilians. The warrant included persecution charges, though none on gender grounds. Only in 2020 was Abd-Al-Rahman arrested, triggering the charge confirmation process, and providing the OTP an opportunity to reconsider its charges. In the intervening thirteen years, the OTP had released its 2014 policy paper on sexual and gender-based crimes, and in 2019 the Pre-Trial Chamber (‘PTC’) had for the first time confirmed the charge of gender persecution in the Al Hassan case.

In early 2021 the OTP filed its brief in Abd-Al-Rahman’s case, including persecution on gender, political and ethnic grounds for two charges. It identified the targeted groups as Fur males at two locations within Darfur, each location being a separate charge. The OTP argued that the males were targeted on gender grounds because of the ‘socially-constructed gender role presuming males to be fighters’ [para 129]. No underlying act was of a sextual nature: instead, the acts were torture, murder, and cruel treatment. This was a novel construction by the OTP: at first a ‘less obvious form of gender persecution, absent women, and absent sexual violence’, as I have argued elsewhere.

Also novel was the OTP’s explicit positioning of the discriminatory grounds as intersectional. It described these ‘multiple intersecting discriminatory grounds’ as best encompassing the persecutory conduct [para 129]. By mid-2021 the PTC confirmed each count, a significant development for recognising the gendered victimisation of males within mass atrocities.

Gender persecution, the judgment

Even more significant were the recent convictions, following an almost two-year trial. In finding Abd-Al-Rahman guilty, the Trial Chamber methodically considered the myriad complex persecution elements (from para 778), drawing on jurisprudence from the Al Hassan, Ongwen, and Ntaganda trial judgments. It had no difficulty addressing the broad underlying acts and the intersecting forms of discrimination. Moreover, this was a unanimous judgment with no separate opinions, unlike the Trial Chamber who in 2024 acquitted Al Hassan of gender persecution, with more decisions than judges.

This judgment is a milestone. We see how the charge of gender persecution can surface the multi-layered relationship between gender as it relates to constructed notions of masculinities, violence, politics, and ethnicity. It also allows us to better understand what it means to be persecuted on gender grounds, and to better understand gender in international criminal law. In turn, it demonstrates what more the charge can and should do in protecting civilians from persecution.

What next?

The Trial Chamber will deliver its judgment on 9 December 2025, the parties’ having only filed their sentence submissions and conducted their oral argument in November. . However, Defence have already filed notice of their appeal, including specifically that the Chamber erred in its approach to gender persecution.

Meanwhile the ICC’s Said trial has all but concluded its gender persecution charges largely mirroring Abd-al-Rahman, with closing statements occurring in late November 2025. Earlier in November, the PTC confirmed the charges in absentia against Jospeh Kony, including three charges of persecution on age and gender grounds. Earlier in July, the PTC issued arrest warrants for two Taliban leaders for persecution on gender grounds against girls, women and other persons non-conforming with the Taliban’s policy on gender, gender identity or expression. The situations in Nigeria and Bangladesh/Myanmar continue, also with a focus on gender persecution.

As the OTP itself acknowledged in its 2022 policy paper on gender persecution, ‘despite over 20 years of official recognition, the Office has only just begun to bring charges of gender persecution … leaving a gap in the development of international criminal jurisprudence’ (4). That gap appears now to be closing.  

Sudan’s application to the ICJ was the latest in a string of cases brought to the Court on the basis of the Genocide Convention (most notably, South Africa v. Israel, Ukraine v. Russia, The Gambia v. Myanmar). However, Sudan faced one major obstacle to obtaining justice from the Court: the UAE has a reservation to Article IX Genocide Convention, which contains the compromissory clause (the jurisdictional clause) which Sudan was seeking to base the Court’s jurisdiction upon. Only 16 States in total have made reservations to this Article to exclude the Court’s jurisdiction from cases concerning the application, interpretation, or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention. Nevertheless, at the provisional measures stage, the Court need only be satisfied that it has prima facie jurisdiction and does not need to ‘satisfy itself in a definitive manner that it has jurisdiction as regards the merits of the case’.

During the oral proceedings, Sudan argued that the UAE’s reservation to Article IX Genocide Convention was vague and non-specific, and that at least at the prima facie stage the Court should not interpret the reservation so as to definitively exclude its jurisdiction. The UAE argued, on the other hand, that the reservation was clearly drafted to show that it does not consent to the Court’s jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Court decided that it did not have prima facie jurisdiction over the dispute to indicate provisional measures (by a majority of 14-2). However, alongside this, by a majority decision of 9-7, the Court also removed the case from its docket due to a ‘manifest lack of jurisdiction’ [para. 36]. This has only ever occurred twice (see here and here) in the 80 years history of the Court at the provisional measures stage.

The dissenting and partly dissenting opinions to the Order speak volumes here. In the joint part dissent of six judges, they argue that the rushed judgment on jurisdiction ‘effectively punishes Sudan for seeking the indication of provisional measures’ [para. 1]. Indeed, if Sudan had not requested provisional measures, the case would have likely proceeded to the preliminary objections phase (presuming that the UAE contested the Court’s jurisdiction). At this stage, the Court would have been able to more thoughtfully engage with the question raised by Sudan’s application and request: namely, is it still compatible with the Genocide Convention’s object and purpose for a State to make a reservation to Article IX – the one provision in the Convention which allows for a State to be held responsible for violations of the Convention at the ICJ?

The Court considered this question in its 1951 Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, concluding that reservations to Article IX were permissible, and has affirmed this reasoning since. But the growing importance of the Court in settling disputes and finding State responsibility under the Genocide Convention, as well as the nature of the obligations contained in the Convention as erga omnes partes (obligations owed to all other States parties), could have led the Court to a different conclusion.

Perhaps this issue of compatibility was answered by the majority of the judges in removing the case from the Court’s docket. Nevertheless, even then the Court’s reasoning is unclear, dedicating just one short paragraph in its Order on its finding of a manifest lack of jurisdiction. It seems that the hoped-for effect of this finding is one of deterrence and the prioritisation of ‘judicial economy’. It is, however, hard to reconcile the resulting manifest lack of justice with the primary role of the Court in the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and its role in the protection of human rights.

The people of South Sudan had participated in civil wars with enormous consequences before independence from Sudan in 2011. Many hoped that the people of South Sudan would never experience violence again. Unfortunately, two years later, conflict erupted; this time between SSPDF and SPLM/A-IO.

The basis for these conflicts is tied to ‘ethnic factors and leadership personalities’. Given these conflicts, attempts have been made through peace agreements to bring and maintain peace in South Sudan.

The first peace agreement after the 2013 conflict was reached in 2015 but did not take long to ‘collapse’. However, this conundrum was addressed in 2018 with the signing of the R-ARCSS between the government of South Sudan (GOSS) and the SPLM/A-IO and other parties.

Connecting the White Army to the SPLM/A-IO

The GoSS has detained Dr Riek Machar and other members of the SPLM/A-IO. Their detention is connected to the possible role played by SPLM/A-IO members to the events that led to the death of SSPDF in Nasir and Ulang. The arrest could be in line with the agreement because article 2.1.10.10 requires parties to ‘ensure accountability for the breaches’ of its provisions. It further mandates parties under article 2.1.10.8 to ‘respect and ensure full compliance with international humanitarian law’.

While their detention may be in line with the agreement, holding them incommunicado is in contravention. In this respect, the way forward is to press charges and produce them before a competent court of law for either directly coordinating the Nasir and Ulang attacks or failing to hold the perpetrators accountable. The latter would be relevant if it is established that the White Army is still under the command of the SPLM/A-IO.

In the event that they are taken to court and are found guilty, it is presented that the government should request the SPLM/A-IO members that would replace them. However, if they are acquitted, they should be released and returned to their positions.

Disconnecting the White Army from the SPLM/A-IO

A ruling that vacates charges against the arrested SPLM/A-IO members would mean that the White Army is a non-state actor with no links to any party. In this light, the leaders that have been arrested should be released and engaged by the government on how to devise strategies to arrest the situation in Nasir and Ulang. Subsequently, they must collectively hold the White Army responsible for its actions in Nasir and Ulang. Notably, the A-ARCSS provides for the establishment of the Hybrid Court by the African Union with ‘majority of judges’ drawn from other African countries. The Court’s mandate is to entertain cases concerning genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ‘other crimes under international’ and South Sudan laws ‘committed from 15^th December 2013 through the end of the Transitional Period’. This article suggests that this A-ARCSS accountability mechanism be established and employed.

Along the same line, the government must ensure that its forces fully comply with international humanitarian law: rules of engagement must be complied with and those that have breached these rules, for example, by having indiscriminately killed children, must be investigated and sanctioned for their actions. This approach means that the GoSS and the SPLM/A-IO continue to work together in ensuring the full implementation of the R-ARCSS.

Conclusion

The R-ARCSS rubber stamps the legitimacy of the government of national unity and further provides basis for holding those that have breached the provisions of the agreement accountable. Nevertheless, it does not support the incommunicado detention of the individuals alleged to have committed these violations.

The UNHCR has reported that “women and girls have borne the brunt of this conflict.” This is reflected by the fact that they comprise 53% of the 7.9 million people displaced since the war’s onslaught, leading to Sudanese women becoming increasingly vulnerable to targeted violence, poverty, and mental health issues. The RSF has been singled out for their extensive use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. Lateita Bader, deputy Africa director at Human Rights Watch, said, “[t]he Rapid Support Forces have raped, gang raped, and forced into marriage countless women and girls in residential areas in Sudan’s capital.” It is known that women and girls aged 9 to 60 years old have been sexually assaulted by RSF combatants, with many dying from injuries related to this violence. These reports reveal a mass epidemic of sexual violence, which is leaving Sudanese women mentally and psychically debilitated.

The effectiveness of relief efforts in supporting these women is mixed. Despite the best efforts of dedicated service providers, their impact has been hindered by RSF and SAF forces who have attacked local responders, healthcare facilities, and blocked vital aid (violating Rule 25 of Customary International Humanitarian Law). RSF combatants have additionally committed sexual violence against service providers to deter support for rape victims and the reporting of RSF sex crimes. Consequently, response mechanisms have been undermined, and many Sudanese women face immense challenges without access to essential physical and/or mental health services. These factors place Sudanese women in an untenable situation, as the essential resources required for their well-being are either grossly insufficient, inaccessible, or prohibited, forcing them to suffer in silence or to die from their injuries.

Despite the extent of the challenges that Sudanese women are facing, the crisis has failed to garner significant international attention, with many humanitarian organisations criticising the weak international and regional responses to the crisis. One potential explanation for this is that the crisis has been viewed as subtext in an already forgotten war that suffers from insufficient media coverage and that is failing to compete with more prominent humanitarian crises‘ in Gaza and Ukraine. This lack of attention has led to less awareness, which has hindered relief efforts and affected the availability of material and financial support.

A revitalised swift and decisive response is essential for addressing the urgent crisis in Sudan. The current situation is marked by severe underfunding, highlighting the need for international donors to increase their financial support, particularly for first responders and aid agencies that face significant obstruction from armed groups. These agencies often serve as the sole lifeline for victims in their communities, underscoring their critical role in crisis management. Moreover, the support of UN Human Rights Council members for Independent International Fact-Finding Missions (FFM) is crucial for ensuring accountability and facilitating the enquiries of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Establishing this accountability is vital for fostering a culture of progress and laying the groundwork for lasting peace. The UN Security Council Resolution 2736 is an important response to the hostilities, but it must be supported with a UN mandated civilian protection force deployment to prevent further attacks on women and girls. This protection is imperative for avoiding additional casualties. Finally, it is essential to recognise the central role of Sudanese women in the response process. Their unique understanding of the crisis equips them with the insights necessary for developing effective solutions, securing sustainable peace in the region, and becoming agents of change.

Though it remains unclear which side prompted the fighting, tensions over authority have been rising in recent months. As of May 9th, the death toll in Sudan is 604 people, with 5,100 injured. Moreover, the fighting has caused over 700,000 people to flee their homes.

One impact of the fighting has been the severe decline in healthcare availability, accessibility, and quality in Sudan over the past four weeks. Movement restrictions caused by ongoing violence and insecurity have compromised the accessibility of healthcare facilities. Personnel shortages and a lack of life-saving medical supplies have rendered many medical services unavailable. Several organizations have reported attacks on healthcare facilities, personnel, and transport in Sudan. The Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors (CCSD) reported 39 out of 59 hospitals in Khartoum and nearby states are out of service, while Sudan’s Health Ministry reported that 16 hospitals were damaged. Insecurity Insight published a list of incidents that occurred between April 15 – 19, including the murder of a doctor, multiple healthcare facilities being looted, and instances of violence preventing ambulances from reaching their intended destinations. Currently, the RSF are strategically occupying the Omdurman Maternity Hospital to take cover from airstrikes. Given the frequency of electricity and internet outages in Sudan, there is a high likelihood that more incidents are occurring unreported.

Attacks on healthcare facilities, personnel, and patients are prohibited by International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and are considered war crimes. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 mandate ensured specific protections for medical facilities, personnel, transports, and the right of access to care. Nevertheless, the right to health during conflict is not confined to health services only. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 14 emphasized the connection between the right to health and underlying determinants of health like food and water—both of which have been reported insufficient in Sudan for a long time.

In response to the ongoing violence, Sudanese people have shown an exceptional sense of community to overcome the current situation. Social media platforms like Twitter and What’s App became tools to help the Sudanese community share information in an attempt to realize the right to health amidst the chaos. For instance, individuals tweet using #حوجة_الخرطوم (Translation: #Needed_Khartoum) to share information about which hospitals are open and the availability of healthcare supplies like insulin and oxygen tanks. Sudanese communities living abroad have also mobilized to provide support. For instance, the Sudanese Doctors Association in Qatar has launched a campaign to provide a hotline for medical consultations through What’s App for patients unable to access healthcare services.

Although the right to health of the Sudanese people is protected under international law, more efforts are needed to ensure that these laws are respected on the ground. Similar situations have been observed in several countries, including Ukraine and Palestine. The latest Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition report in 2021 identified 1,335 incidents of violence or obstruction against healthcare officials. Unfortunately, international support has been limited to failed attempts at a truce and condemnations. There has been a heavy focus on evacuating foreign nationals, leaving Sudanese citizens to their fate.

On April 18, the World Health Organization “strongly condemned” attacks on Sudan’s health personnel, health facilities, and ambulances, identifying them as a violation of international law and the right to health. However, condemnations are not enough. The international community should use different mechanisms to reinforce IHL and warn all sides that referrals can be made to the UN Security Council, International Criminal Court, or other tribunals, as has been done in recent conflicts.

In the midst of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, internal conflicts across multiple countries in West Africa and West Asia, natural disasters, and climate change crises, it may be easy to overlook the latest news from Sudan. However, doing so would be a mistake. The effects of conflicts, like pandemics, cross borders and impact us all. Both need to be addressed through stronger international cooperation and solidarity.

Want to learn more?

• Read: The pandemic, insurgent birth certificates and conflict-affected children
• Read: Reading Room Exhibition: Child Survivors’ Drawings of the Genocide in Darfur
• Read: Sudan’s Elusive Justice

On the morning of the 3rd of June, Janjaweed militias attacked sit-ins in the Sudanese capital Khartoum, killing more than 100 people, injuring over 500, and raping 48 women and men. The high number of rapes occurring over just three days whilst Muslims were in fasting Ramadhan and preparing for Eid celebrations shocked the world and brought back the memories of the civil war in Darfur in 2013. During the civil war, the same militias were responsible for carrying out countless human right abuses, including sexual violence, rape, and murder. Those atrocities committed under religious and ethnic pretexts underscore the atrocities committed today.

Many parallels can be drawn between past and recent events in Sudan and Algeria. During the War of Liberation (1954-1962) Algerian women were raped, tortured and killed by French colonisers, only to later face a similar fate of rape and torture, but this time by the Algerian so-called ‘brother’ during the Civil War in the 1990s.  My current research on Sexual Violence in Algeria during the Civil War show that women were targeted for many reasons, including local and regional motives to ‘re-Islamise’ the region. During my fieldwork, a woman in her late 70s, came accompanied by her husband. After interviewing them together, the husband insisted that I talk to his wife in private. She reported that she was raped by a young man who was her son’s age. She says “I begged him, and I said I am old enough to be your mother. He wouldn’t listen… It took me 10 years to be able to talk about it” (Interview, 09. 11.2018). Similarly, it was in the year 2000, after more than 50 years, when Louisette Ighilahriz, the Algerian war veteran, brought her own traumatic experience of rape and torture at the hands of the French military before the French and Algerian public. Prior to that, in her initial testimonial texts, Ighilariz describes the brutality of Graziani, her interrogator, without referring to her rape. In fact, she intentionally dismisses the possibility of rape by saying she felt she was too disgusting for him to even think of raping her. The discrepancy between the two testimonies reveals the difficulty in narrating rape.

In both Algerian conflicts, women’s bodies were battlefields regardless of whether the perpetrator was the French coloniser or the fellow Algerian; sexual violence accompanied war. Unlike any other war crimes, sexual violence serves a particular militant purpose: it targets not only the survivor but also, cuts through the fabric of the society. It relies on the fact that survivors of sexual or related abuse suffer from stigma and risk being cast out of their own communities.  In Sudan, crimes committed by the same militias, in Darfur have been left unpunished. Most eye-witnesses say that recent crimes were similar to what happened in Darfur. “It is not about sex, it is about degradation, humiliation and beating of the spirit. This is part of what they did in Darfur – they did it as a weapon of war”, says Ms. Sharif, a mental health worker. The question to ask is: will UN Resolutions have any impact if there are no tougher implementation mechanisms to combat sexual violence in conflict?

Last month, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC found that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a State party to the Rome Statute, had failed to comply with its obligations under Article 27 of the Rome Statute, by refusing to surrender al-Bashir to the ICC while he was on Jordanian territory in 2017. It also affirmed the absence of Head of State immunity under customary international law, but reversed the Pre-Trial Chamber II (PTC II) decision and refused to refer Jordan to the Assembly of State Parties and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for non-cooperation. Then Head of State, al-Bashir, is wanted by the ICC for committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Darfur since 2005. The UNSC referred the situation of Darfur to the ICC which later issued two arrest warrants. Al-Bashir’s case represents the confusion of international lawyers, scholars, and international institutions over Heads of State immunities and the interplay between Articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute.

Was Jordan, as a State member to the Rome Statue, obliged under international law to surrender al-Bashir to the ICC? Evolution of customary international law in relations to the question on Heads of State immunity arises at vertical and horizontal levels. While the former addresses immunities accruing to Heads of States vis-à-vis the ICC, the latter is concerned with third States executing a request from the ICC to arrest or to surrender the accused.  Article 27 clearly stipulates that any immunities of individuals with official capacity shall not bar the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction. Yet, Article 98 requires the ICC not to request the execution of arrest or surrender if that would require the requested State to violate its obligations under international law and agreements.

Provoking Articles 98, Jordan notified the ICC that al-Bashir enjoyed immunity on its territory in accordance with a pre-existing treaty, namely the 1953 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Arab League. The treaty provides that ‘privileges and immunities are accorded to the representatives of Member States’ rendering the ICC’s request patently at odds with Article 98. Furthermore, Jordan argued that the UNSC Resolution 1593 did not expressly impose obligations on third States to lift the immunity on al-Bashir.

However, the Appeals Chamber held that ‘there is neither State practice nor opinio juris that would support the existence of Head of State immunity under customary international law vis-à-vis an international court’ and affirmed the absence of customary international law recognizing immunity ‘for the horizontal relationship between States when a State is requested by an international court to arrest and surrender the Head of State of another State’. With regard to Article 27, the Appeals Chamber asserted that it ‘is relevant not only to the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Court, but also to the Court’s ‘enforcement jurisdiction vis-à-vis States Parties to the Rome Statute’.

The Appeals Chamber blurred the line between immunity of Heads of States before international courts and their immunity from arrests by other States by establishing that there is no immunity before international courts. It concluded that Article 98 is a procedural rule regarding when and if immunity exists. Addressing the legal nature of UNSC Resolutions, the Appeals Chamber asserted that by referencing the situation to the ICC, the UNSC had agreed on prosecution in accordance with the provisions of the Rome Statute including Article 27. Notably, regardless of whether the Heads of State are from a member State to the Rome Statute or have been implicated by the UNSC, the ICC has jurisdiction over them.

The argument of Heads of State immunity remains at the crux of this legal puzzle. Currently, al-Bashir is being held in Khartoum’s prison for corruption charges. However, given Sudan’s dysfunctional court system, al-Bashir’s international crimes, the UNSC resolution, and the Appeals Chamber’s decision, Sudan is fully responsible for executing the arrest warrants against al-Bashir.

On 22 June 2014, the Court of Appeal, Khartoum North and Sharg-el-nil Criminal Circuit, quashed the 11 May Al-Haj Yousif Criminal Court sentence of 100 lashes and the death penalty for Meriam Ibrahim for the crimes of sexual immorality and apostasy from Islam.

Following her release from prison on 23 June, Meriam, her husband, Daniel Wadi, and their two children sought refuge in the US Embassy in Khartoum. On 24 June, she obtained an official visa and the family attempted to fly to the United States, but were detained by the National Intelligence Security Services at Khartoum airport. Meriam was charged with falsifying a South Sudan emergency travel document. If convicted she faced a prison sentence of up to seven years.

The global media campaign intensified against this apparent grave injustice. On twitter and facebook, “#savemeriam” and “#freemeriam” were “trending.” There were many “Free Meriam” campaigns initiated, including by Amnesty International and Emily Clarke’s Change.org petition, which both gained over 1 million signatures.

This significant civil society pressure helped strengthen political diplomacy. Many individual governments spoke out against the initial sentence and her re-arrest. For example, Mark Simmonds, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, called for Sudan to respect Meriam’s human rights. Then the FCO and the British Embassy in Khartoum closely monitored the situation and provided advice to Meriam’s lawyers.

In the United Nations, Rupert Colville, the spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, voiced the UN’s, “deep concern about the situation of Meriam Ibrahim.” In the EU, following the EU Presidency’s of the Parliament, Council and Commission, expressed their “deepest dismay,” at Meriam’s inhumane treatment, the EU’s European External Action Service raised Meriam’s plight in the UN Human Rights Council. The European Parliament then adopted a resolution on the case on 17 July.

During the bilateral and multilateral initiatives, Lapo Pistelli, the Italian Deputy Foreign Minister visited the region, and it is now clear that the Italian government performed a very significant role in the subsequent quashing of the charges, the family obtaining new visas and flying out of Khartoum late on Wednesday 23 July. Their plane landed at Rome’s Ciampino airport on Thursday 24 July, and the Ibrahim-Wadi family had a meeting with Pope Francis at his Santa Marta residence.

Lapo Pistelli told Vatican Radio’s Susy Hodges, that the dialogue with the political authorities in Khartoum had been very fair and that President al-Bashir had stated Sudan had to, “rethink the Constitution and the Penal Code, and it is highly likely that the issue of apostasy will be modified and deleted.”

Susy Hodges asked, “Presumably…we have to thank the international outcry that broke out after the death sentence?” Pistelli answered, “Yes…the international attention given by the media has helped all the efforts of the international community or the American government or the Italian government, to be successful.”

On 1 August, Meriam and her family arrived in New Hampshire to begin a new life, and whilst welcoming her on a brief stopover in Philadelphia, Mayor, Michael Nutter, described her as a ‘world freedom fighter.’”

This human rights success story cannot be attributed to one fora of power or one single discourse. It is the weaving together of legal activism, political diplomacy and a unified civil society voice.

The global support for Meriam’s lawyers, the personal safety of the family provided by the US Embassy, the regional, and governmental diplomacy, with the important role of Italy, all came together to ensure that further gross human rights violations did not befall the Ibrahim-Wadi family in Sudan.

Her husband, Daniel Wani, a US citizen, was not found guilty, but Mrs Ibrahim was sentenced to 100 lashes for the zena crime and death by hanging for the ridda crime. These are Shari’a Hudud punishments. She was detained in the Omdurman’s Women’s Prison, with her 20 month old son, and on 27 May, whilst shackled, she gave birth to a daughter.

On 22 May, Mrs Ibrahim’s lawyers filed in the Sudanese Court of Appeal, in the Khartoum North and Sharg-el-nil Criminal Circuit, and claimed that the lower court had made errors in both procedure and merit.

It was argued in the defence petition that the court made a procedural error in that it did not have jurisdiction to hold the marriage null and void, and that the Personal Status of Muslims Code 1991 contained no conclusive provision banning such marriage (Christian and Christian, see below). Further, Article 61 of the Code establishes that, “a void marriage does not yield any consequence of marriage,” and yet, it was argued, “this judgment has impacted directly on the Appellant, her child and her [then] unborn baby.”

As to the merits, after stating that there is “no compulsion in religion” (Surat Al-Baqara, verse 256), the defence brief identified that Mrs Ibrahim had been a Christian who attended Khartoum Catholic Church, and met her husband whilst a practising Christian. Her marriage was conducted in public at the church on 19 December 2011, and the authorities only became aware of the Ibrahim family in September 2013 when a man claiming to be her brother, informed the authorities that she had married a Christian and that she had committed adultery. It was the misrepresented position of her personal faith and beliefs that set in motion the horrific events that followed.

Mrs. Ibrahim’s lawyers, along with Redress, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, the Sudanese Organization for Development and Rehabilitation, the Sudanese Human Rights Initiative and the Justice Center for Advocacy and Legal Consultancy, submitted a Complaint on 2 June, with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. On 10 June, an Urgent Appeal was lodged with the Special Rapporteur on Women’s Rights, Soyata Maiga. It was claimed that Sudan had violated the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACHPR”).

In essence, the claims were that Mrs Ibrahim suffered gender and religious discrimination under ACHPR, Articles 2 and 3, suffered torture and ill-treatment under Article 5, and that her right to liberty and security of the person had been violated under Article 6. Her right to a fair trial had been violated under Article 7, and her freedom of conscience and religion was violated under Article 8. Furthermore, her children’s rights were violated, contrary to Article 18(1), which states that “the family…shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical health and moral.”

As these appeals were pending, there was an immense global outcry by politicians and civil society, and on 31 May, Abdullahi Alazreg, Under-Secretary of the Sudanese Foreign Ministry, appeared to speak out of turn as he indicated that Mrs Ibrahim would be released. However, the domestic courts, and the African Commission, were still considering the case and so this statement was premature.

The Sudanese Court of Appeal judgment of 22 June, which overrules the Al-Haj Yousif Criminal Court judgment, is to be commended. It is judicial affirmation of the rule of law and a protection of human rights.

However, this case, and the international exposure it has received, has demonstrated that there are serious questions concerning women’s rights, religious freedom, the protection of the family, and the welfare of children, which the government of Sudan must address. If there is not legislative change to remedy these deficiencies, it is hoped that the lower courts in Sudan will adhere to this Court of Appeal decision and protect others from the horrific treatment which the Ibrahim-Wani family has recently endured.