In September 2026, the Udhampur district administration in Jammu and Kashmir prohibited the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) for two months under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), following similar restrictions in Doda. Citing their alleged use to circumvent cyber restrictions and access prohibited content, the orders extended to individuals, institutions and businesses. Similarly, in July and October 2026, mobile internet was suspended around Delhi’s Jantar Mantar during protests, including demonstrations concerning electoral-roll revisions and the Chief Election Commissioner’s resignation. Internet connectivity remained available, but a means of accessing and securing digital communications was restricted. These developments invite reconsideration of how Indian courts assess the necessity and reach of restrictions on digital communication. Can the difficulty of preventing misuse justify restrictions that extend to lawful digital activity, in the name of proportionality?

In Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India (2020), the Supreme Court of India recognised constitutional protection for speech and professional activity conducted through the internet. It required restrictions to satisfy proportionality, including consideration of less restrictive alternatives and limits on their duration and territorial reach (paras 69-72, 152). In June 2026, the Delhi High Court applied this framework in Telegram FZ LLC v Union of India (analysed in an earlier blog post), upholding a nationwide block under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act 2000 (IT Act) ahead of the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (Undergraduate) examination.

The judgments converge on proportionality but expose a tension in its application. In Telegram, the High Court accepted that repeated content-specific takedowns had failed and that Telegram’s architecture allowed prohibited channels to reappear. Although approximately 150 million users, including lawful users, were affected, the Court considered the platform-wide restriction necessary because narrower interventions had proved ineffective and the measure was tied to an imminent examination (paras 38, 42, 45-47).

This reasoning raises a difficult question about the relationship between technical feasibility and constitutional necessity. The failure of narrower restrictions may establish the necessity of a wider measure, but necessity alone cannot settle its proportionality. The Court must still weigh the anticipated harm against the interference with lawful activity. Otherwise, the architecture of a digital service risks becoming its own justification for restricting everyone who uses it.

The VPN prohibitions sharpen this distinction. VPNs can facilitate circumvention, but they also provide privacy and security for legitimate communications. Their potential misuse does not establish that prohibiting their use throughout a district for two months is necessary. The authorities must demonstrate why measures directed at particular unlawful activities would be inadequate and why lawful users must bear the resulting restriction. Unlike the time-bound examination in Telegram, the VPN orders invoke preventive security concerns whose duration and geographical extent require independent justification.

There is a statutory distinction. Telegram concerned platform blocking under Section 69A of the IT Act, whereas the VPN orders invoke the preventive powers of Section 163 BNSS. However, though these powers operate under different statutory safeguards, neither escapes the constitutional requirement of proportionality. The choice of statutory authority cannot itself justify the breadth of interference with protected expression.

The Jantar Mantar shutdowns expose another dimension. On 2^nd and 9^th October 2026, the Internet Freedom Foundation reported that it could not locate a published suspension order. Anuradha Bhasin requires publication of existing and future suspension orders to enable affected persons to challenge them (para 152(a)). Disclosure only after a short restriction expires may preserve retrospective review while denying a meaningful opportunity to contest its operation. Repeated temporary shutdowns similarly invite scrutiny of their cumulative effects, even where each individual order is time-limited.

The authors’ continuing research into internet restrictions in Jammu and Kashmir examines precisely these questions of duration, geographical reach and administrative justification. The emerging constitutional problem is whether proportionality can adequately assess restrictions whose practical consequences exceed their formal boundaries. The availability of an internet connection establishes little about the freedoms exercisable through it. Constitutional scrutiny must examine what remains accessible, to whom, and at what cost to protected rights.