The haunting image of fifteen-year-old Felani Khatun’s body hanging from a barbed wire fence after being shot by the Border Security Force  (BSF,) the extrajudicial killing of 1,926 individuals over the past 15 years, and the staggering 9,977 recorded rape cases in the last two years highlight the ongoing human rights crisis in Bangladesh. To investigate abuses and act as a bridge between the people and the state, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was established in 2009. However, over time, it has become more of a spectator than an enforcer, mainly due to fundamental flaws in its founding law, the National Human Rights Commission Act 2009 (NHRC Act).

Independence

Firstly, as part of Bangladesh’s commitment to international human rights law, the NHRC must adhere to the Paris Principles standards requiring independence, pluralism, and effectiveness for national human rights institutions. Yet,  assessments in 2011, 2015, and April 2025 have all rated the NHRC with a ‘B’ status, reflecting only partial compliance with international standards.

Although legally defined as an independent body, the NHRC suffers from serious institutional limitations. Section 12 of the Act deprives it of any binding enforcement authority; it can only make non-mandatory recommendations to the government for their effective implementation. The government has discretion to ignore these recommendations as it is not legally bound to comply with them. This undermines its credibility and renders its findings ineffective. Since 2012, the NHRC has submitted 122 requests to the Home Ministry for reports on cases and allegations against law enforcement agencies, but only 44 were adequately addressed.

Moreover, Section 18 curtails the NHRC’s ability to independently investigate abuses by law enforcement, restricting it to merely requesting government reports, often from the very agencies accused of violations. This creates a shield for perpetrators from accountability. Section 17(3)(b) also prohibits the NHRC from intervening in any matter already before the courts which severely restricts the NHRC’s scope in addressing issues like arbitrary detention or unfair trials.

These issues are compounded by other structural flaws also hamper the NHRC’s autonomy – its lack of financial autonomy inhibits impartial action in cases involving state actors; while the requirement of presidential approval for rule-making, gives the executive undue influence over the Commission’s operations.

Appointments

Secondly, the appointment process is heavily influenced by government representatives, creating a risk of politicisation. As the Selection Committee, under Section 7(1), is largely controlled by the executive and ruling party, the final appointment is made by the President. Moreover, the Chairperson and Members must be appointed from among persons with notable contributions in law, human rights, education, social service, or human development, not requiring political independence or specific expertise.

The NHRC’s political partiality and inaction during the July 2024 movement was evident, as the Chairperson issued only a mild statement describing the situation as “unfortunate and a violation of human rights,” without calling for accountability or initiating an investigation. Meanwhile, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights(OHCHR) found credible evidence of systematic human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and violent protest suppression by the former government and its allies.

Comparative analysis highlights more effective alternatives. India’s NHRC, which shares socio-cultural similarities with Bangladesh, follows a stringent appointment process that requires the Chairperson to be a former Chief Justice of India or a Supreme Court Judge. Additionally, the members must include a Supreme Court Judge, a High Court Chief Justice, and three human rights experts, one of whom must be a woman.  Denmark, which is frequently ranked highest on human rights indices, ensures pluralism by including members from academia, civil society, and NGOs, thereby enhancing the legitimacy and expertise of its Human Rights Institute (DIHR).

To effectively fulfil its mandate of protecting and promoting human rights, the NHRC requires a comprehensive overhaul of its operational framework, including expert-led and transparent appointments, amendments to the NHRC Act, and guaranteed institutional and financial independence.