Redefining Parenthood: A Milestone for Adoptive Mothers and the Quest for Gender-Neutral Parental Benefits in India

by | Apr 14, 2026

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About Udai Yashvir Singh and Soumili Kundu

Udai Yashvir Singh is currently practising as an advocate at the Punjab & Haryana High Court. He specializes in constitutional law, service law, and criminal law. He has earned his undergraduate degree from the National Law University, Delhi. | Soumili Kundu is a legal researcher and a student at Lloyd Law College, India. She frequently writes for various domestic and international law reviews, such as the Harvard Undergraduate Law Review, St. Andrews Law Review, International Legal Consortium Blog of Jindal Society of International Law (JSIL), RMLNLU Law Review Blog, and several others. Her works majorly focus on constitutional law, employment law, and human rights.

On 17th March 2026, the Supreme Court of India (‘The Court’) in Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India & Ors struck down Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 (erstwhile Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 2017) and declared it unconstitutional since it only entitled mothers who legally adopted children below the age of three months to seek maternity benefits. The Court held that the roles and responsibilities of women who adopt children aged three months or above are similar to women who adopt children below three months of age, and thus the provision violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India (‘Constitution’). Further, stipulating an age limit of three months does not allow adoptive mothers to exercise their right to decisional autonomy, dignity, and bodily integrity under Article 21 of the Constitution. The decision marks a landmark shift in the understanding of motherhood and the objective of granting maternity benefits, while also making notable observations on the importance of paternity leave.

The Court has emphasized that the purpose of providing maternity benefits is not solely associated with the biological process of childbirth but rather with a holistic understanding of attainment of motherhood. This perspective positively reinforces the ideology that adoptive mothers require the same time, protection, and institutional support to build a secure attachment with the child. This not only benefits adoptive mothers but also promotes the nurturing of adopted children.

However, a question sure does arise: do the physical, emotional, and social demands placed on the mothers remain constant as a child progresses through different age levels? Clearly the case is not so. The object of maternity leave is to provide economic security to new mothers while they nurture and care for their young children. Allowing the extension of the same maternity benefits in the case of infants and adolescents, for example, creates a scenario of over-inclusiveness as the intensity and nature of a child’s physical, emotional, and social needs evolve significantly with age. Young children require constant care and physical presence due to their high dependency on parents; however, such dependency progressively decreases as a child grows older. The legislature can address this issue by providing different maternity benefits for adoptive mothers, calibrated to the age and corresponding emotional requirements of the child.

The court has, however, praiseworthily considered the negative social impact of the provision on children with disabilities, whose adoption would be discouraged since they would require the presence of the parents during the initial period of adjustment after adoption, or on single adoptive mothers who might have to shoulder the full responsibility of integrating such a child into a familial environment while simultaneously balancing their professional duties. By embracing inclusiveness, this approach paves the way for adoption laws to reflect genuine lived experiences, thereby offering greater protection to society’s most vulnerable adoptive mothers and children.

Re-emphasizing the right to privacy and decisional autonomy in relation to reproduction and family life, the Court also expanded the scope of reproductive autonomy by including adoption alongside biological reproduction.

However, the most significant contribution by the Court lies in the obiter dictum on paternity leave. The Court discussed and recognized the need for paternity leave and the importance of the active presence of the father in the early years of a child’s life. Maternity leave is grounded in the gendered assumption that care-giving responsibilities rest solely with mothers. The Court remarked that paternity leave dismantles such gendered roles and encourages fathers to take an active role in childcare, thus advancing the best interest of the child. Such recognition by the Court is seminal in the advancement of a gender-neutral framework for parental benefits. It further supports the theory of relational care, emphasizing care-giving as a shared and relational responsibility rather than an individual responsibility. Indian courts on previous occasions have missed the opportunity to address the clear legislative gap in relation to paternity leave. However, the judgement establishes a foundational stepping stone towards the attainment of gender-neutral institutional frameworks for parental rights.

The Hamsaanandini judgement is a progressive and necessary step towards an inclusive understanding of motherhood and paternity rights. However, clear statutory enactments are still necessary to delineate the contours of paternity leave as well as maternity benefits for adoptive mothers of children of varying ages. Such enactments would institutionalize a gender-neutral and child-centric egalitarian framework based on the equality and dignity of parents and children alike.

 

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