Recently, Mexico’s President proposed a series of initiatives to reform the judiciary. This blog focuses on two of its elements: (1) replacing all judges with new ones elected by popular vote and (2) establishing a popularly elected Disciplinary Court to oversee judges. While welcoming the political will to reform the justice system, the blog first explains why these two elements violate international human rights standards and constitute a playbook on ‘autocratisation’: when a legitimately elected leader dismantles the capacity of other branches to check their power. Second, it argues that the proposal itself should raise alarms about declining judicial independence in the Americas.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has underlined the systemic threat involved in increasing executive or legislative control over courts. While laws that alter how judges are appointed or removed are not necessarily indicative of capture, such changes should be interpreted as autocratic when they undermine courts’ ability to check political power or increase the influence of political affiliations in their daily work. The proposal creates both kinds of risks.

Replacing all judges with popularly elected ones

A first risk of judicial capture arises as the proposal mandates the immediate removal of more than 1,500 federal judiciary members— including Supreme Court justices, federal judges, and magistrates – and their replacement with new ones to be elected by popular vote. The reform also provides that each of the 31 states and Mexico City should establish their own rules for electing approximately 5,000 local judges. The removal alone undermines the guarantee of tenure. Invoking the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has established that any removal from office must be based on permitted grounds, such as when judges have reached retirement age, their term of mandate has ended, or for serious misconduct or incompetence. None of those grounds appears to be applicable here, raising suspicion that the President’s motives are more about securing a politically inflected judiciary.

Even if overriding the principle of irremovability (and creating a serious disruption in active judicial processes) could be ultimately justified on grounds of institutional reform, electing judges might not be compatible with international human rights standards. While international law does not establish specific procedures for designating judges, it does mandate that their selection should be made exclusively based on their personal merits and professional qualifications. The judicial function must be guided by integrity and quality, not political endorsement. Notably, the UN Human Rights Committee has observed that electing judges for fixed terms does not ensure their independence.

Moreover, electing judges poses an enhanced risk in the Mexican context due to a significant problem with criminal organisations. The proposal states that public or private financing for judicial campaigns will be prohibited. However, it does not state how candidates will gain public support. It has been argued (see here and here) that such a measure would make candidates vulnerable to external pressures, not just from political parties or interest groups but also from organised crime.

Establishing a Disciplinary Court

A second risk of judicial capture arises with the establishment of a popularly elected Disciplinary Court. This Court would be exclusively responsible for the oversight and discipline of all federal judicial officials, and its decisions would be final. The proposal grants the executive and legislative branches the power to pre-select candidates who will run for the Court’s popular election. This design again fails the international human rights test. Any disciplinary system must be insulated from political interference and inspire confidence in the judicial official facing a disciplinary proceeding. In contrast, the pre-selection and popular election of members of the Disciplinary Court increases the possibility of appointment based on their political affiliation.

Additionally, the disciplinary grounds for sanctioning judges are vague and open-ended (eg “acts contrary to the public interest”) and thus incompatible with inter-American standards, which require those grounds to be clearly established in law under objective criteria. Such broad discretion cannot provide the breathing space that judges need to check political power and protect minority rights.

In sum, the President’s proposal poses serious risks of autocratisation through judicial capture. Even if not approved, the proposal itself signals the erosion of judicial independence as a democratic value in public discourse. It showcases the impact of derogatory rhetoric against the judiciary, which was pervasive during the current administration and has now become widespread. This should set off alarm bells not only in the country but also throughout the Americas. While the international community has recently expressed concerns about the proposal, there is a need for further mobilisation to prevent an expansion of this much-anticipated autocratic wave in the region.