Bangladesh’s judiciary has long struggled to transform constitutional guarantees of independence into a practical reality. While the landmark Masdar Hossain judgement in 1999 laid down the foundation for the separation of the judiciary from the executive, core administrative functions, including promotions, postings of subordinate court judges, and  budget and resource allocation, have continued to remain under the control of the executive branch. A recent High Court directive requiring the establishment of a separate judicial secretariat within three months, together with the Hon’ble Chief Justice’s Judiciary Reform Roadmap, and the 2025 Judicial Reform Commission’s report highlighting the need for a fully independent secretariat, has reignited calls to complete this unfinished constitutional project.

Judicial independence is not just a lofty constitutional principle; it is the backbone of a democratic State. In Bangladesh, this principle is written into the Constitution itself. Article 22 is unambiguous: separating the judiciary from the executive is one of the fundamental principles of State policy. While not directly enforceable in courts, the State must endeavour by all means to realise it. Yet, more than fifty years after independence, the institutional foundations to make this principle a reality remain incomplete.

As a result, the demand for establishing a separate judicial secretariat under the sole control and supervision of the Supreme Court is significant. It is not about bureaucratic reshuffling or administrative convenience. It is about ensuring that the judiciary has the independence it needs to fulfil its constitutional role. Without such a safeguard, the promise of separation of powers risks being reduced to mere rhetoric.

The Supreme Court itself has long recognised this. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the landmark Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Masdar Hossain case (1999), set down the framework for judicial independence by declaring that judges must not be under executive control for recruitment, promotion, discipline, or financial management. These functions, the Court held, should be exercised by the judiciary itself to give effect to Articles 109 (High Court Division’s superintendence over subordinate courts)  and 116A (independence of judicial officers of subordinate courts in performing their functions) of the Constitution. The judgement was celebrated as a breakthrough, often described as the “charter of judicial independence”.

A significant step was taken in 2007 when the judiciary was formally separated from the executive. Yet, the fuller autonomy envisioned in the Masdar Hossain case never truly came to fruition. Core administrative and financial responsibilities, including promotions, postings of subordinate judges, and budget and resource allocation, remained under executive control, leaving the judiciary structurally dependent on the executive. In practice, this has meant that the independence secured in principle has often been compromised in operation.

This year has rekindled momentum for reform. Following the 2024 July mass uprising and the establishment of the interim government, citizens, civil society, and the legal community demanded a truly independent judiciary, centred on a separate judicial secretariat – an issue highlighted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice in his Judiciary Reform Roadmap on 21 September 2024, and acknowledged by the government. On 2 September 2025, the High Court reaffirmed this call, ordering the establishment of the secretariat within three months and restoring the Supreme Court’s 1972 constitutional authority over subordinate judges, emphasising that independence requires institutional mechanisms rather than constitutional text alone. The timing of this judgement is crucial, coming in the same year that the Judicial Reform Commission published a report advocating the same reform.

Judicial independence is not merely about judges deciding cases free from external pressure; it requires the judiciary to possess the institutional strength to sustain that independence. A separate judicial secretariat would secure genuine administrative and financial autonomy, professionalise court management, and enhance accountability through transparent reporting and benchmarking. The High Court’s directive, the Judicial Reform Commission’s blueprint, and the Chief Justice’s Roadmap collectively provide both the opportunity and the responsibility to complete what the Masdar Hossain judgement set in motion more than two decades ago. Its proper implementation will reflect the State’s commitment to upholding the Constitution’s promise of an independent judiciary.

The establishment of a separate judicial secretariat under the Supreme Court is therefore not merely desirable; it is indispensable. Without it, the Constitution’s promise of independence will remain unfinished. Its implementation would enable Bangladesh to take a decisive step towards a judiciary that is both independent and accountable, and a democracy genuinely rooted in the rule of law.