Pre-trial detention is intended to secure criminal proceedings, not to anticipate their outcome. Yet when the seriousness of an accusation becomes sufficient reason to imprison a suspect, detention risks becoming punishment before a conviction which justifies it. In Reyes Mantilla et al. v. Ecuador, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights exposed the danger of allowing anti-drug legislation to displace meaningful judicial scrutiny, thereby undermining the presumption of innocence before guilt has been established. The judgment illustrates a fundamental tension in criminal justice: although states have a legitimate interest in prosecuting serious offences, their pursuit of public security remains subject to the obligation to justify every deprivation of liberty under international human rights law.

Security policy and the presumption of innocence

The case arose from criminal proceedings against Walter Ernesto Reyes Mantilla, Vicente Hipólito Arce Ronquillo, and José Frank Serrano Barrera, following State operations targeting drug-trafficking organisations linked to the Cali cartel between 1995 and 1999. Reyes and Serrano spent more than three years in prison before being acquitted, while Arce was convicted, although his sentence was subsequently reduced.

Ecuadorian legislation prevented the release of individuals prosecuted for certain drug-related offences, effectively restricting the possibility of assessing whether continued detention was necessary in each individual case. The Court held that the resulting regime was incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights, finding violations of the rights to personal liberty and the presumption of innocence under Articles 7 and 8(2), as well as equality and non-discrimination under Article 24 (paras 206-210). The Court also found violations of judicial guarantees and judicial protection under Articles 8 and 25, arising from the deficiencies in the criminal proceedings (paras 304-311) and the remedies available to challenge detention (paras 230-232), respectively.

By making the alleged offence decisive, the legal framework subordinated individual judicial assessment to a general legislative rule. The judgment therefore demonstrates that statutory restrictions on release cannot, in themselves, justify continued detention without an assessment of its necessity in the circumstances of the individual case. The consequence was that detention could become automatic, even where the particular circumstances of the accused did not establish its necessity. A measure ostensibly intended to secure criminal proceedings thus risked acquiring the character of anticipatory punishment.

Individualised scrutiny as a legal requirement

The Court’s reasoning reflects the relationship between Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention. Article 7 prohibits arbitrary detention and safeguards judicial control over deprivation of liberty, while Article 8(2) requires that every accused person be presumed innocent until their guilt is legally established. These guarantees cannot be treated as merely procedural formalities: together, they require the state to demonstrate why detention is justified in the circumstances of a particular case.

The Court also identified deficiencies in the safeguards available to the three men. The authorities had not adequately informed them of the grounds for their detention, and the state had not established that they had been brought promptly before a judicial authority. Moreover, their habeas corpus applications were directed to a mayor, rather than an authority capable of providing the judicial protection required by the Convention. These failures reveal a broader institutional problem: the existence of a remedy in domestic law offers little protection when it cannot provide effective scrutiny of the legality of detention.

From judgment to institutional reform

The Court ordered Ecuador to investigate the cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment suffered by the men, identify those responsible and, where appropriate, impose sanctions (para 397.12). This measure addressed not only the treatment inflicted during detention but also the state’s failure to investigate the allegations with due diligence.

Beyond the investigation, the Court required the removal of Reyes’s and Serrano’s information from criminal records (para 397.13), and measures to eliminate the legal consequences of Arce’s conviction (para 397.14). It also ordered the implementation of training programmes for police officers, judicial police officers and prosecutors in criminal matters, as a guarantee of non-repetition (para 397.17).

The effectiveness of these remedies, however, depends on more than redressing the harm suffered by the individual victims. Training cannot compensate for a legal framework that prevents meaningful judicial review, just as correcting criminal records cannot undo the institutional practices that enabled prolonged detention. Compliance must therefore address the underlying rules and procedures that allow detention to become routine rather than exceptional.

The judgment does not suggest that pre-trial detention is never justified in drug-trafficking cases. Rather, it establishes that the seriousness of an accusation cannot, by itself, supply the necessary justification. Reyes Mantilla thus offers a clear reminder that public security must be pursued within the legal constraints that protect individual liberty. Where detention becomes automatic, the presumption of innocence may remain intact in theory while being eroded in practice.