On 13 November 2025, the Supreme Court of India in In Re Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary ordered the State of Jharkhand to declare 31,468.25 hectares (approximately 314 sq. kms) of the Saranda Forest as a wildlife sanctuary. This post highlights the significance of the judgment, specifically concerning the intersection between the Forest Rights Act, 2006 (FRA), and the Wildlife Protection Act, 1927 (WLPA). It is argued that the judgment articulates a harmonious reading of the two statutes, successfully navigating the fragmented architecture of Indian environmental law.

Background

In the erstwhile unified State of Bihar, the Saranda forest was declared as the Saranda Game Sanctuary under the Bihar Forest, Hunting, Shooting and Fishing Rules, 1958. On bifurcation of the states Bihar and Jharkhand, the forest fell within the State of Jharkhand [para 2].

The issue arose after Jharkhand failed to declare the area as an eco-sensitive zone, despite massive iron ore mining projects in the region, which disrupted local wildlife habitat [para 3]. This inaction prompted litigation: first before the National Green Tribunal in July 2022, which directed the State to examine a sanctuary declaration; and subsequently, due to inaction, before the Supreme Court in 2024 seeking recognition of the 1968 area as a deemed sanctuary under the WLPA [para 5].

The crux of the dispute, however, appeared to be the shifting positions of the State, regarding the sanctuary’s extent — initially identifying 314 sq. km, later expanding to 575 sq. km, and finally reducing it to 249 sq. km [paras 11-33].

A Forest Rights-Compatible Reading: Forest Tribes and Environmental Protection

One of the key arguments made by the State of Jharkhand justifying this inconsistency appears to be the protection of forest rights of tribal communities under the FRA. Specifically, the State argued that the area in question was inhabited by various forest tribes for centuries [para 42], and in declaring these portions to be part of a wildlife sanctuary, their rights would be adversely affected [para 86]. However, the Supreme Court offered necessary clarification on reading the provisions of the FRA and the WLPA.

Citing the Preamble of the FRA, the Court suggested that the ‘vesting’ of recognised rights of forest dwelling tribes includes the ‘responsibilities and authority for sustainable use, conservation of biodiversity, and maintenance of ecological balance.’ [para 88]. This effectively dispenses with the State’s line of reasoning that forest rights of tribal communities are incompatible with wildlife protection.

This rejection of the dichotomy between wildlife protection and forest rights as mutually exclusive domains is important as it allows the Court to engage with the core legislative intent of the FRA as a welfare legislation. As rightly identified in Orissa Mining Corp. v MOEF, the FRA seeks to protect the rights of traditional forest dwellers to use forest land as a community forest resource [para 51]. This is distinguished from traditional proprietary understandings of exclusion and exploitation associated with possession or ownership of land.

Thus, through the ‘vesting’ of rights in these tribal communities, the FRA also envisions their responsibility (or duty) in ensuring sustainable land use and conservation (this is also confirmed by Section 5 of the FRA). Hence, the State could not tenably argue that these communities are obstacles to these very goals, and thereby reduce the limits of the sanctuary area.

FRA’s “Stringent” Protections Apply Within Wildlife Sanctuaries

The Court also underscores that, if there must be a modification of forest rights or resettlement of tribal persons in critical wildlife habitats for the purposes of wildlife conservation, such action must proceed strictly within the FRA’s framework and in accordance with its ‘very stringent provisions’ [para 92] (Section 4(2), FRA). Thus, the WLPA cannot be invoked to displace rights under Section 3 of the FRA, which will continue to protect these rights ‘even after declaration of the said area as a wildlife sanctuary’ [paras 93-96].

Conclusion

In conclusion, while this case joins the growing jurisprudence grappling with India’s tussle between development and ecological protection, it is distinct for its reinforcement of the ecological underpinnings of the FRA and the necessity of reading it in concert (and not conflict) with India’s environmental goals. The distinct cultural and spiritual relationship that forest dwelling communities have with their land (Orissa Mining above, [para 46]) emerges here as a vital asset that advances environmental protection under a different statute — the WLPA. Given the fragmented architecture (or ‘regulatory stew’) of Indian environmental law, such a harmonious reading is both necessary and overdue.