The Immigration and Asylum Bill, introduced in the UK Parliament in June 2026, has been scrutinised around its new appeals body, implications for Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and its single ‘protection’ status for refugees. However, its implications for immigration bail have received far less attention. This blog argues that clause 12 of the Bill seemingly introduces an individual’s procedural conduct as a statutory factor against liberty, which continues the punitive trajectory of immigration detention.
Under clause 12(1), if someone served with a ‘claim notice’ that gives information in response to that notice after the deadline set out therein, does so while detained, or does so after being given notice of departure details, all of their appeal proceedings automatically enter the ‘late-claims process’. The new Independent Immigration Appeals Authority must prioritise those appeals where reasonably practicable (clause 12(2)), and will also decide some immigration bail requests (clause 1(2)(b)).
Clause 12(3) adds a factor that bail decision-makers must weigh in deciding whether to grant bail and on what conditions: whether the person’s proceedings are (or, if none have begun, would probably be) in the late-claims process (Immigration Act 2016 (2016 Act), Sch 10, para 3(2)(eza), as inserted). The Bill does not say which way this factor cuts, though it is hard to imagine that lateness would help the applicant. Moreover, decision-makers already consider whether the person has failed, without reasonable excuse, to cooperate with processes concerning leave or removal (2016 Act, Sch 10, para 3(2)(ea)). The new factor has no reasonable-excuse qualifier.
Immigration detention is not formally punishment: it requires no conviction, and those held are not serving a sentence. Four common law principles circumscribe the detention of migrants (Hardial Singh [1984]; Lumba [2011]): detention is valid only for the sole purpose of deportation; the detention period must be reasonable; detention must end if removal is no longer possible within a reasonable timeframe; and the Secretary of State must act with reasonable diligence and expedition.
Article 5(1)(f) ECHR permits detention only to prevent unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation. Saadi v UK [2008] and A v UK [2009] accept that detention need not be shown necessary to prevent absconding, but confirm that it must be in good faith, closely connected to the stated purpose of deportation, and not arbitrary.
Existing scholarship has already drawn into question the purpose of immigration detention, noting: the penal character of the institution—razor wire, uniformed surveillance; the fact that the majority of “illegal” migrants are never detained; and how the system historically facilitates the removal of less than half of those confined. The ostensible legal purpose of immigration detention may remain the administration of removal; however, the substantive conditions determining whether an individual can obtain release increasingly incorporate assessment of their allegedly blameworthy procedural conduct.
While late claims may frustrate removal, a ‘late’ claim may equally reflect barriers to legal advice and information in detention, not culpable delay by the detainee (HM Inspectorate of Prisons 2022). Yet clause 12(3) makes a claimant’s procedural lateness itself relevant to bail, with no statutory requirement to ask which it is, including where the lateness, and the statutory consequence of that lateness, is only anticipated.
The predictive limb asks decision-makers to assess whether the late-claims process ‘would be likely to apply’ to individuals who have not yet begun appeal proceedings, so a person’s prospects of release can turn on a forecast about information they have yet to give. This blurs the line between detention justified by removal and detention with a punitive rationale.
Whatever its system-wide aim, clause 12(3) does not ask whether detaining this person advances their removal. It makes liberty a lever to induce earlier disclosure, by them and by others like them (see explanatory notes, para 104). This imports a deterrent and disciplinary reasoning—the classic logic of punishment—into immigration detention that sits uneasily with the strategic limits imposed by Hardial Singh and Article 5(1)(f).
As the Public Bill Committee undertakes line-by-line scrutiny over the next couple weeks, it should delete clause 12(3) or, at least, add a reasonable-excuse qualifier.






0 Comments