The Legality of Indore’s Anti-Begging Notification

by | Apr 23, 2025

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About Parvathi Menon and Varun Bansal

Parvathi Menon is an Advocate practicing at the High Court of Delhi, India. Her research interests include Criminal Law, Privacy Law, and Feminist Jurisprudence. Varun Bansal is an Advocate practicing at the High Court of Delhi, India. His research interests include Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, and Human Rights.

The District Administration of the city of Indore, India has issued a notification under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 (the new Criminal Procedure Code), penalising begging, without demonstrating urgency or necessity; the two pillars for exercise of power under the said section. Moreover the judiciary has consistently ruled against criminalising begging, identifying it as a social evil requiring welfare measures by the State. This notification sets a precedent for evading legislative oversight and enacting punitive steps that are inconsistent with constitutional principles.

The Office of District Magistrate (DM), Indore, a city in the state of Madhya Pradesh, India issued a strange notification in January 2025, penalising begging and giving of alms in the city of Indore. This rule was imposed for a period of two months from the date of publication of notification, and was subsequently renewed for a further period of two months thereby remaining in effect until May 2025. The notification identifies begging as a social evil, stating that various illegal activities are being conducted in its guise and considers it as a contributory factor of many road accidents. The notification violates the fundamental rights of life and freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Moreover the extra-legal manner in which the notification was brought into existence raises serious legal concerns.

The subject of begging is covered under the head ‘vagrancy’ and is enumerated in the concurrent list of the Indian Constitution. Accordingly, both the Central and State Governments are empowered to pass laws on the subject. However, in the absence of any Central law on the matter, approximately 20 states have enacted laws penalising begging.

The constitutional validity of one such anti-begging law, the Bombay Prevention of Begging Act, 1959, as applied in Delhi, was challenged before the Delhi High Court. The Court held the provision penalising begging to be unconstitutional and violative of fundamental rights to life, and freedom of speech and expression. Further, the Supreme Court of India also declined to ban begging in traffic junctions and public places during Covid times when the matter came before it. The Supreme Court took the natural and sociological law approach and held that This is a human problem which has to be redressed by the welfare State in a manner which accords with Part III and IV of the Constitution.” Therefore, the judiciary has consistently taken a stance against anti-begging laws.

It is pertinent that Madhya Pradesh has an anti-begging law which has not, at the time of writing this article, been declared unconstitutional. However, despite the existence of such a law, the District Magistrate of Indore has chosen to invoke the notification under Section 163 BNSS.

Section 163 BNSS is generic in nature empowering the District Magistrate to issue notifications only to prevent urgent cases of nuisance, annoyance, injury, or danger to public peace, health, or safety or to prevent riot, affray, or disturbance to public tranquility. It is identical to Section 144 of the Old Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC, 1973). The Section empowers the State to pass ex-parte measures for a period of two months which can be renewed only in cases of danger to human life, health or safety or where there is likelihood of riot or an affray. The Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye v SDM (1971), observed that “The gist of action under s. 144 (old criminal procedure code) is the urgency of the situation, its efficacy in the likelihood of being able to prevent some harmful occurrences.” (page 15/26)

The city administration of Indore, by issuing notification banning begging under Section 163 BNSS, not only exceeds the intended scope of the provision but also violates the principles governing its use. Absence of reasons in the notification to demonstrate urgency or to showcase how such a measure is necessary for public safety in the notification seems to violate the tenets on which the power was to be exercised.

The act of begging stems from the basic urge for survival and thus laws prohibiting such activities not only violate human rights but have been found unconstitutional by Courts in India. In light of that, measures such as the improper invocation of Section 136 BNSS reflects a brute positivist approach and highlights a disregard for constitutional safeguards and the limits on state power.

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