On 5 March 2025, Sudan submitted an application instituting proceedings against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at the International Court of Justice (ICJ/Court), alleging that the UAE is in violation of its obligations under the Genocide Convention. These allegations are based on the UAE’s support of acts taken by the militia group Rapid Support Forces against the Masalit people in West Darfur. Alongside this application, Sudan also requested that the Court indicate provisional measures aimed at ordering the UAE to take measures within its control to prevent any genocidal acts against members of the Masalit group. The Court held the oral proceedings for the request for provisional measures on 10 April 2025 and delivered its final Order on 5 May 2025. In its Order, the Court struck out the case in its entirety, leaving Sudan with no avenue for justice at the ICJ.

Sudan’s application to the ICJ was the latest in a string of cases brought to the Court on the basis of the Genocide Convention (most notably, South Africa v. Israel, Ukraine v. Russia, The Gambia v. Myanmar). However, Sudan faced one major obstacle to obtaining justice from the Court: the UAE has a reservation to Article IX Genocide Convention, which contains the compromissory clause (the jurisdictional clause) which Sudan was seeking to base the Court’s jurisdiction upon. Only 16 States in total have made reservations to this Article to exclude the Court’s jurisdiction from cases concerning the application, interpretation, or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention. Nevertheless, at the provisional measures stage, the Court need only be satisfied that it has prima facie jurisdiction and does not need to ‘satisfy itself in a definitive manner that it has jurisdiction as regards the merits of the case’.

During the oral proceedings, Sudan argued that the UAE’s reservation to Article IX Genocide Convention was vague and non-specific, and that at least at the prima facie stage the Court should not interpret the reservation so as to definitively exclude its jurisdiction. The UAE argued, on the other hand, that the reservation was clearly drafted to show that it does not consent to the Court’s jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Court decided that it did not have prima facie jurisdiction over the dispute to indicate provisional measures (by a majority of 14-2). However, alongside this, by a majority decision of 9-7, the Court also removed the case from its docket due to a ‘manifest lack of jurisdiction’ [para. 36]. This has only ever occurred twice (see here and here) in the 80 years history of the Court at the provisional measures stage.

The dissenting and partly dissenting opinions to the Order speak volumes here. In the joint part dissent of six judges, they argue that the rushed judgment on jurisdiction ‘effectively punishes Sudan for seeking the indication of provisional measures’ [para. 1]. Indeed, if Sudan had not requested provisional measures, the case would have likely proceeded to the preliminary objections phase (presuming that the UAE contested the Court’s jurisdiction). At this stage, the Court would have been able to more thoughtfully engage with the question raised by Sudan’s application and request: namely, is it still compatible with the Genocide Convention’s object and purpose for a State to make a reservation to Article IX – the one provision in the Convention which allows for a State to be held responsible for violations of the Convention at the ICJ?

The Court considered this question in its 1951 Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, concluding that reservations to Article IX were permissible, and has affirmed this reasoning since. But the growing importance of the Court in settling disputes and finding State responsibility under the Genocide Convention, as well as the nature of the obligations contained in the Convention as erga omnes partes (obligations owed to all other States parties), could have led the Court to a different conclusion.

Perhaps this issue of compatibility was answered by the majority of the judges in removing the case from the Court’s docket. Nevertheless, even then the Court’s reasoning is unclear, dedicating just one short paragraph in its Order on its finding of a manifest lack of jurisdiction. It seems that the hoped-for effect of this finding is one of deterrence and the prioritisation of ‘judicial economy’. It is, however, hard to reconcile the resulting manifest lack of justice with the primary role of the Court in the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and its role in the protection of human rights.