On 21 August 2025, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) delivered its judgment on preliminary objections in Chirinos Salamanca y otros v. Venezuela, later made public on 26 August. The Chirinos Salamanca case concerns the torture and unlawful deprivation of liberty of 14 police officers and is the first before the IACtHR concerning human rights violations post-2013 in Venezuela. The key issue was whether Venezuela remains bound by the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) following its 2013 denunciation of the treaty by Nicolás Maduro’s government and 2019 instrument of re-accession deposited by Juan Guaidó’s interim government. The Court held that Venezuela continues to be bound by the Convention and subject to its jurisdiction, stating in its judgment that “the American Convention on Human Rights is in force in Venezuela.”

The dispute sits at the intersection of Article 78 of the ACHR and rules of state consent to treaties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Article 78(1) permits denunciation of the Convention with one year’s notice, after which obligations terminate. In September 2012, Hugo Chávez announced Venezuela’s withdrawal, which became effective in September 2013. Maduro’s government thereafter insisted that Venezuela was no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the IACtHR. However, in July 2019, Guaidó’s interim government deposited an instrument of accession with the Organisation of American States (OAS), purporting to restore Venezuela’s membership in the Convention and its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 62. The preliminary objection in Chirinos Salamanca therefore required the Court to decide whether these competing acts—the denunciation by Maduro and the accession by Guaidó—had binding legal effect.

Article 46 of the VCLT provides that a state may not invoke internal law as invalidating its consent to be bound by a treaty unless the violation of internal rules is “manifest” and concerns rules of fundamental importance. The Court’s reasoning reflected this principle, as it treated Guaidó’s instrument of re-accession was formally valid on the international plane because it was deposited with the OAS Secretary General, who accepted it without reservation. This reasoning echoes prior IACtHR jurisprudence, such as Advisory Opinion OC-26/20, where the Court stressed that denunciation of the ACHR cannot undermine the effectiveness of human rights protections or deprive individuals of guarantees already secured under the treaty.

The domestic leadership tensions created a deeper difficulty for international legal application: Maduro exercised de facto control over the Venezuelan state, while Guaidó claimed legitimacy under Articles 233 and 333 of the Venezuelan Constitution and was recognised by numerous states. The Court avoided taking a position on which claimant represented Venezuela, thereby sidestepping the traditional recognition problem that international law has long wrestled with. Instead, it relied on the pro persona principle, also known as the favourability clause, enshrined in Article 29 of the ACHR, which requires interpreting the treaty in a way that most effectively protects individual rights. By prioritising human rights protection over political recognition, the Court effectively neutralised the legal interpretation quandary for this case.

Applying international legal principles retroactively, the Court found that Venezuela remained bound by the Convention and subject to its supervisory jurisdiction despite the contested status of its governments. Invoking Article 7(2)(a) of the VCLT, the Court held that, “in accordance with positive international law, the ‘Interim’ President, who was appointed by the National Assembly of Venezuela, was empowered to conclude treaties with the States that granted him recognition, including multilateral treaties…as in the case of the OAS.” Article 7(2)(a) establishes that that Heads of State, Heads of Government, and Ministers for Foreign Affairs are considered as representing their State by virtue of their functions without needing to produce full powers when performing acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty. Further, the Court’s conclusion is also consistent with the collective nature of the ACHR. Article 1 obliges states parties to respect and ensure rights to all persons within their jurisdiction, and Article 62 establishes the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The IACtHR has repeatedly held that states cannot unilaterally diminish their obligations in ways that deprive individuals of rights protections, as seen in cases such as Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru and Gelman v. Uruguay.

The implications of the ruling are far-reaching. First, it reinforces the doctrine that human rights treaties differ from ordinary reciprocal treaties and cannot be terminated or suspended in a manner that frustrates their protective object and purpose. Second, it illustrates a pragmatic approach to recognition disputes: rather than adjudicating which government is legitimate, the Court anchored its reasoning in the continuity of obligations under international human rights law.

However, this approach also raises the deeper question, should the application of human rights treaties be conflated with the recognition of governments? By treating Guaidó’s accession as effective because it preserved rights protection, the Court risked blurring the line between recognition decisions, normally reserved for states and political organs, and international legal reasoning. One possible consequence is that courts may appear to confer legitimacy indirectly, even when they insist that they are not ruling on recognition. Another risk is that states facing contested governments might exploit this doctrine, invoking treaty continuity selectively to advance political claims.

Still, the Chirinos Salamanca decision affirms that Venezuela remains accountable under the ACHR and subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. By grounding its reasoning in the special character of human rights treaties, the Court safeguarded the continuity of “commitment to full respect for and guarantee of human rights” in Venezuela despite profound political instability. This is particularly stark given that Venezuela has long-suffered from human rights abuses, intensified by Maduro’s dictatorship.

The ruling underscores a key lesson for international human rights law and other states: obligations endure even when state authority is fragmented, and the protection of individuals cannot be held hostage to disputes over governmental legitimacy.