Death penalty exceptionalism, the idea that the irreversible nature of death penalty warrants the highest degree of procedural protection, has led to heightened constitutional scrutiny in capital cases in India. A key trend identified in the Death Penalty in India: Annual Statistics Report 2016-2025 by The Square Circle Clinic is that appellate courts are increasingly commuting death sentences to life imprisonment terms that exclude remission (i.e., the possibility of early release through statutory executive powers). These sentences reveal the limits of death penalty-centric reform, particularly when imposed without any discernible sentencing principles. This blog argues that sentencing jurisprudence in India must move beyond its narrow focus on capital punishment towards a principled framework governing life imprisonment without remission.

Development of Death Penalty Safeguards

India’s death penalty jurisprudence has evolved to structure judicial discretion within a limited statutory framework. Section 393(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) requires ‘special reasons’ for imposing death sentence but leaves the term undefined. In Bachan Singh, the Supreme Court sought to address this indeterminacy by mandating courts to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances and impose death only where life imprisonment is “unquestionably foreclosed.” While Macchi Singh diluted this standard by allowing the imposition of death penalty where life imprisonment was “inadequate”, Santosh Bariyar clarified that death may be imposed only where the sentencing aim of reformation is unachievable.  More recently, in Manoj, the Supreme Court mandated consideration of prison conduct reports, psychiatric evaluations, and probation officer assessments, reflecting a conscious attempt to structure sentencing discretion. In Vasanta Dupare, the Court elevated these requirements to the status of fundamental rights, holding that non-compliance would vitiate the sentencing process by virtue of violating fundamental rights. In April 2026, in Aman Singh, the Supreme Court reinforced that such material must be gathered at the trial stage, underscoring the need for timely assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors to meaningfully evaluate reformation. Yet, these safeguards remain confined to death penalty cases, reinforcing the exceptionalism that ‘death is different.’

The Unguided Expansion of Life Imprisonment without Remission

Appellate courts in India are empowered to commute a death sentence into different forms of ‘life imprisonment.’ In what may be termed ‘life imprisonment simpliciter’, the sentence carries the possibility of early release, typically after 14-16 years, under the BNSS and remission policies. However, in Swamy Shraddhananda, the Supreme Court held that appellate courts may exclude remission, requiring convicts to serve fixed terms (20-60 years) or the remainder of their natural life in prison. This power was affirmed by a 3:2 majority in V. Sriharan.

Recent trends indicate that nearly 60% of death sentence commutations in the past decade excluded remission. These sentences lack a principled framework and rarely engage with the question of reformation. This omission is significant, since excluding remission forecloses periodic review of incarceration and assumes incapacity for reform. Only recently has the Supreme Court begun to address this gap.

In Vikas Chaudhary, while examining a fixed 30-year sentence without remission, the Court cautioned against a purely retributive approach and engaged with the prisoner’s prospects of reformation. This reasoning suggests that exclusion of remission must be justified through an individualised assessment of reform. Similarly, the Court in Navas held that commutations must be guided by proportionality but framed it in backward-looking terms of gravity of offence and circumstances of the offender (mental health, socioeconomic status, age, etc.). It did not engage with the normative basis of remission, which rests on periodic reassessment of continued incarceration in light of conduct, reformation, and reintegration. Subsequent decisions illustrate this gap by showing that courts continue to exclude remission without articulating clear principles justifying such exclusion.

In Shambhubhai Padhiyar, the Court imposed a 25-year sentence without remission despite noting mitigating factors (youth, no prior criminal record, intellectual disability, and good prison conduct), without explaining why remission was foreclosed. Similarly, in Ramesh Naika, the Court surveyed prior cases but articulated no governing principle, ultimately imposing life imprisonment without remission for the remainder of natural life. These decisions reflect the absence of a coherent normative framework justifying foreclosing early release. Since remission enables early release through executive discretion, its exclusion necessitates material on record to justify foreclosing this possibility.

Conclusion

Across the decisions in Vikas, Navas, and Shambhubhai, courts invoke proportionality and reformation without explaining how these principles justify sentences that exclude remission. This leaves the basis on which the possibility of release is foreclosed insufficiently articulated. The exclusion of remission calls for a principled justification, given its implications for the continued justification of deprivation of liberty and pains inherent in punishment. While mathematical exactitude in sentencing may be impossible, the resulting discretion risks remaining unguided, echoing the concerns Bachan Singh sought to address. This calls for a principled sentencing framework that meaningfully governs the exclusion of remission in life imprisonment sentences.