In March 2026, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) presented Resolution 1/26 providing states in the Americas with 50 recommendations to address organised crime. At its core lies a simple but significant premise: effective security policies are compatible with, and indeed strengthened by, compliance with human rights obligations. In a region with the highest homicide rates in the world and an expanding influence of criminal groups, the IACHR resolution challenges the persistent narrative that only militarised or rights-restrictive approaches are capable of addressing insecurity. Yet, its impact will ultimately depend on how states respond in practice and how the meaning of “effective” security policy is shaped by scholars and organisations.

Organised Crime in the Americas

Across the Americas, organised crime operates through a range of often transnational activities, including drug trafficking, illegal mining, and human trafficking. Criminal groups not only infiltrate public institutions or collude with state actors but, in some contexts, exercise territorial control. These dynamics severely undermine the protection and enjoyment of people’s human rights, particularly economic and social rights under the Protocol of San Salvador such as access to work (Article 6) and education (Article 13), as well as civil and political rights under the American Convention on Human Rights, including the rights to life (Article 4) and freedom of expression (Article 13).

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) in Reyes Mantilla y otros vs. Ecuador affirmed that “states have an obligation to guarantee security and maintain public order within their territory and, consequently, must employ the necessary means to combat crime, drug trafficking, and organised criminal activity,” [para 137] albeit within the limits imposed by human rights law. While approaches vary across countries, governments in the region have increasingly relied on states of emergency, militarisation, and large-scale arrests to curtail criminal gangs—measures which often become sources of human rights violations themselves.

The Resolution

The IACHR resolution is important because it clearly states that effective security policies are compatible with human rights. The Commission seeks to assert that it is possible to dismantle criminal gangs while respecting due process, personal freedoms, and human dignity. It goes further by saying that a human rights approach “constitutes an essential element for the legitimacy, effectiveness, and sustainability of public policies and strategies in the field of security.” [page 1]

To support its claim, the IACHR sets out 50 recommendations, including strengthening judicial and prosecutorial capacities (22 and 27), limiting the use of states of emergency (43-44), addressing corruption and impunity (36-37), and recovering illicit assets (30). These measures reflect an understanding of organised crime as a structural and polycentric phenomenon, rather than merely a law enforcement problem, while still recognising the need for urgent state action.

The Commission also highlights the differentiated impact of organised crime on vulnerable groups, building on its previous work on children, women, LGBT persons, and human rights defenders. This is significant, as it calls for tailored responses that address the specific ways in which these groups experience both criminal violence and state policies.

Shortcomings and the Future

Some limitations should nevertheless be noted. First, the IACHR resolution is not binding and forms part of the system’s body of soft law. Adopted under Article 41(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights, which empowers the Commission to make recommendations, its impact ultimately depends on states’ willingness to implement them.

Second, there seems to be an unanswered question on what constitutes “effective” security policies, particularly when short-term reductions in violence come at the expense of long-term institutional erosion. In its preambular paragraphs, the IACHR critiques coercive approaches for leading “to the disproportionate increase in the prison population without achieving an effective reduction in crime rates,” [page 8] relying on a 2008 academic article. Such policies should indeed be questioned where they undermine human rights, but their effects should not be overstated or generalised, particularly in light of ongoing debates in contexts such as El Salvador, where there are credible reports of improvements in the security situation alongside concerns about their sustainability and their long-term impact on the rule of law and democratic institutions.

These limitations do not detract from the document’s overall significance. The resolution reinforces the IACHR’s role in shaping regional standards at a time of acute insecurity and growing pressure for effective responses across the Americas. More importantly, it affirms that, regardless of political orientation, designing security policies consistent with human rights is a shared challenge across the region.

The resolution is an important, though neither the first nor the final, step towards consolidating a human rights-based approach to organised crime. Its impact will ultimately depend on whether states, nongovernmental organisations, and scholars take it seriously and further develop it.