Financiarización, turistificación y transformación del espacio residencial

La turistificación se ha descrito como “un proceso en el que el espacio se produce con fines turísticos, lo que implica un cambio en la naturaleza y el uso de barrios enteros”. Este proceso puede transformar los espacios residenciales en infraestructuras diseñadas principalmente para el turismo, modificando el carácter y la función de los barrios y afectando a “los servicios que una población más permanente necesita para su vida cotidiana”.

Estos procesos están estrechamente relacionados con la financiarización de la vivienda, un proceso que Hohmann señala que está en auge en la economía política mundial. La financiarización representa un cambio desde la concepción de la vivienda como hogar y como base de la comunidad hacia su consideración como un medio para generar y acumular riqueza financiera.

Esta transformación puede debilitar el papel que desempeña la propiedad residencial en la sostenibilidad de las familias y las comunidades. Ciudades como Barcelona, Atenas y Venecia han recibido una considerable atención académica en este contexto.

También pueden observarse dinámicas similares en Santiago de Compostela, Galicia, donde el crecimiento del turismo ha contribuido a la transformación de barrios residenciales en zonas cada vez más orientadas hacia los visitantes. Esto ha ido acompañado de una proliferación de tiendas de recuerdos y de un declive de los servicios y actividades cotidianos para los residentes.

Estas cuestiones no se limitan a las zonas urbanas. Las comunidades rurales también se ven cada vez más afectadas por la interacción de los procesos de turistificación y financiarización, con consecuencias que van más allá de la asequibilidad de la vivienda y afectan a la sostenibilidad cultural y lingüística de las comunidades.

Turistificación y comunidades lingüísticas

La financiarización y la consiguiente turistificación de regiones que históricamente han sido centros de lenguas minorizadas plantean preocupaciones en relación con el patrimonio lingüístico. Cuando la vivienda se orienta cada vez más hacia el alojamiento vacacional o la inversión, las personas que desean vivir y trabajar permanentemente en estas comunidades encuentran mayores dificultades para acceder a una vivienda asequible. Esto puede afectar a la capacidad de las comunidades para mantener sus prácticas lingüísticas y culturales.

Un ejemplo puede encontrarse en las regiones de Gaeltacht de Irlanda, donde el irlandés es la principal lengua de la comunidad. En estas zonas, la proliferación de viviendas vacacionales y la financiarización de la vivienda están limitando la disponibilidad de propiedades residenciales. Cuando los miembros de las comunidades de habla irlandesa no pueden acceder a una vivienda, también puede verse afectada su capacidad para mantener el irlandés como lengua comunitaria viva.

Preocupaciones similares surgen en algunas partes del Reino Unido, particularmente en Gales, donde la compra de segundas residencias y la conversión de viviendas residenciales en alojamientos turísticos de corta duración han contribuido a aumentar la presión sobre las comunidades locales, que tienen dificultades para acceder a una vivienda adecuada y asequible.

Reconsiderar la propiedad a través de su función social

Estos ejemplos demuestran la necesidad de reconsiderar la relación entre los derechos de propiedad y los derechos a la vivienda. En su excelente libro, Hohmann analiza en profundidad la relación entre la vivienda y los derechos de propiedad y proporciona una sólida base para examinar la propiedad desde la perspectiva de su función social. Su análisis también conecta con argumentos más amplios presentes en este debate, en particular los planteados por el Relator Especial de las Naciones Unidas Koldo Casla.

Según Hohmann, la función social de la propiedad concibe la propiedad no como un derecho en sí mismo, sino como una función social que existe para cumplir objetivos sociales, como el derecho a la vivienda. Esto cuestiona la concepción de la propiedad como un derecho absoluto que está “internamente libre de restricciones” (internally unfettered), y sostiene, en cambio, que la propiedad está “inherentemente limitada” (inherently limited). A la luz de la aportación de Hohmann, podemos considerar hasta qué punto los usos financieros y turísticos de la propiedad residencial pueden encontrar un límite en la sostenibilidad y viabilidad de la vida social, cultural y económica de las comunidades.

Financialisation, Touristification and the Transformation of Residential Space

Touristification has been described “as a process in which space is produced for tourist purposes, involving a shift in the nature and use of entire neighbourhoods.” This can transform residential spaces into infrastructures designed primarily for tourism, changing the character and function of neighbourhoods, and impacting “the services that a more permanent population need for their everyday lives.”

These developments are closely connected to the financialisation of housing, a process that Hohmann notes is increasing in the global political economy. Financialisation represents a shift from understanding housing as a home and a basis for community, towards treating it as a means of generating and storing financial wealth. This transformation can weaken the role that residential property plays in sustaining families and communities. Cities such as Barcelona, Athens, and Venice have received considerable academic attention in this context.

Similar dynamics can also be observed in Santiago de Compostela, Galicia, where the growth of tourism has contributed to the transformation of residential neighbourhoods into areas increasingly oriented towards visitors. This has been accompanied by an overabundance of souvenir shops and a decline in everyday life for permanent residents.

These issues are not confined to urban areas. Rural communities are also increasingly affected by the overlapping processes of touristification and financialisation, with implications that extend beyond housing affordability to the cultural and linguistic sustainability of communities.

Touristification and Linguistic Communities

The financialisation and ensuing touristification of regions which have historically been centres of minoritised languages raise concerns regarding linguistic heritage. Where housing becomes increasingly oriented towards holiday accommodation or investment, people who wish to live and work in these communities permanently face greater difficulty accessing affordable housing. This can affect the capacity of communities to sustain their linguistic and cultural practices.

An example can be seen in the Gaeltacht regions of Ireland, where the Irish language is the main community language. In these areas, the prevalence of holiday homes and the financialisation of housing is limiting the availability of residential properties. When members of Irish-speaking communities are unable to access housing, the capacity of those communities to sustain Irish as a living community language may be affected.

Similar concerns arise in parts of the UK, particularly in Wales, where the purchases of second homes and the conversion of residential homes into short-term tourism accommodation have contributed to pressures on the local community as they struggle to access affordable, adequate housing.

Reconsidering Property Through Its Social Function

These examples demonstrate the need to reconsider the relationship between property rights and housing rights. In her excellent book, Hohmann interrogates the relationship between housing and property rights and provides a strong basis for examining property through the lens of its social function. Her analysis also resonates with broader arguments in this debate, particularly those advanced by the UN Special Rapporteur Koldo Casla.

According to Hohmann, the social function of property conceives of property not as itself a right, but as a social function that exists to fulfil social aims, such as the right to housing. This challenges the understanding of property as an absolute right which is “internally unfettered”, but instead argues that property is “inherently limited.” In light of Hohmann’s contribution, we can consider the extent to which financial and touristic uses of residential property may find a limit in the sustainability and viability of the social, cultural, and economic life of communities.

 In fact, this problem is not entirely new, and can already be seen in a case  of 18 January 2018, Ruiz Conejero. These two rulings stand out the incorrect adaptation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) to the Spanish legal system concerning employment extinctions of people with disabilities.

The Spanish situation is linked to the disability characterization expansion as a result of art. 2 CRPD. The international standard incorporates a disability concept which connects long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments with social barriers. So, the shift  from  the previous model based on an entirely medical concept to a social concept which focuses on accessibility and accommodation has meant an increase of situations that can lead to discrimination on grounds of disability. In fact, the Court has appreciated that the social concept of disability requires an extra effort to achieve full employment of people with disabilities, and in particular it has to be focused on preventing the termination of employment contracts.

Employment extinctions: reasonable accommodation

In Ca Na Negreta, it points out the need to keep improving employers’ extinction faculties and disability protection. Spain has allowed to automatically terminate  employment contracts due to the official recognition of a work invalidity (Incapacidad Permanente) since 1979, which the Court found does not comply with the prohibition of disability-based discrimination in the Employment Equality Directive. The duty to provide reasonable accommodation plays a very important role in this discussion, which the Spanish legislator has not integrated  in practically any termination modality to date. The Court emphasized the purpose to maintain the employment as a priority to eliminate disability discrimination, given that the CRPD focus is to achieve equal opportunities by enabling him or her to participate fully and effectively in professional life on an equal basis with other workers, through reasonable accommodations (see, to that effect HR Rail, para. 41 and 43). In particular, Spanish legislation allowed an automatic extinction without fulfilling the duty to provide reasonable accommodation, and it is precisely this omission that the Court considers to be a key argument, as CRPD states that disability discrimination includes also denial of reasonable accommodation (para. 42 Ca Na Negreta and art. 2 CRPD).

Therefore the Court provides a clear statement that is in line with the strong protective character it has shown over the last few years, holding that reasonable accommodation is a duty that has to be always fulfilled as a control prior to terminations affecting people with disabilities.

This is crucial to ensure effective protection against discrimination on grounds of disability. And although this has been pointed out on different occasions by scientific doctrine/legal scholarship, Spanish case law, with some exceptions, has not fully integrated the importance of this corporate duty. Thus, for example, the procedure for Spanish objective terminations due to economic or production reasons should change to include the obligation to make reasonable adjustments beforehand.

New challenges on disability discrimination: Disproportionate burden

However, from a broader perspective, there is another issue regarding the duty to provide reasonable accommodation that has been little explored even by the Court. Reasonable accommodation has to be offered unless this would constitute a “disproportionate burden”. The latter is a concept on which the Court has not yet had the opportunity to rule, and Ca Na Negreta was a good opportunity to address this issue. So, for example, the social security benefit resulting from the recognition of the situation of permanent incapacity could be assessed as an element of the excessive burden. In more detail, the social security benefit is recognized in situations of limited capacity to work, and the amount of the benefit recognized can be a crucial circumstance in determining whether the worker has a need to continue to provide services.

In conclusion, the Employment Equality Directive is now 25 years old and protection against the dismissal of people with disabilities has been an issue that gained prominence over the years. In fact, it has  triggered national challenges, especially from a Spanish perspective, which, thanks to the protective will of the Court, has led to building stronger legal systems protecting the employment of people with disabilities and ensuring the fulfillment of the duty to provide reasonable accommodation. However, outstanding issues, like the definition of disproportionate burden, still remain as a challenge to achieve full employment of people with disabilities.

In 2023, a controversial legislative proposal was agreed between the Spanish Government and the main Catalan pro-secession parties which grants amnesty for those actions that may incur criminal, administrative or accounting liability carried out in the context of the votes held in Catalonia on 9 November 2014 and on 1 October 2017, including their preparations and their consequences. In essence, acts linked to the ‘Catalan Process’, such as those of promotion and achievement of independence, as well as those of resistance and public disorder related to this process.

Like most legal orders, Spanish Law distinguishes between pardons (indultos) and amnesties (amnistías). Pardons are non-legislative acts issued by the Executive that affect specific individuals, whereas amnesties are legislative acts themselves passed by the Legislature that potentially apply to all persons. The Spanish Constitution remains silent on amnesties, although it does forbid ‘general pardons’ (indultos generales). Should this prohibition be understood as extending to amnesties? Besides limiting the powers of the Executive more than those of Parliament, this prohibition also pushes for amnesty statutes to express themselves in a general, abstract and impersonal manner in order to comply with the separation of powers and the rule of law, which demand respect for independent and impartial courts, and granting them the power to decide on whether individual cases are eligible for amnesty.

Ordinary amendments or repeals of criminal offences have a general, future application. By contrast, amnesties apply only retrospectively and to persons under certain circumstances in extraordinary contexts. As amnesty laws exempt from prosecution and punishment, the principle of equality demands justifying amnesties properly. This principle, as well as the rule of law, requires treating like cases alike. However, exceptional circumstances may justify exceptional responses.

Whether or not an amnesty is constitutionally justified may depend on different ways of reasoning. Arguably, a first question could require a more political and philosophical perspective while a successive question a more legal and technical analysis:

1. Does the Amnesty Act pursue legitimate purposes considering the relevant facts and circumstances as well as the relevant legal rules and principles? We may call this the question of reasonable ends.
2. If the previous question is answered affirmatively, the subsequent question could be the following: is this law drafted coherently, adequately and proportionally taking into consideration both the legitimate purposes of the amnesty and the relevant legal provisions? We may call this the question of acceptable means.

Typical legitimate purposes of amnesty laws may be divided into more deontological ends (such as rectifying past wrongs and compensating the victims of a harsh conflict) and more utilitarian ones (such as smoothing processes of self-determination and democratisation, as well as facilitating reconciliation).

Reconciliation seems the aim of the ‘Agenda del Reencuentro’, an ongoing plan of the Spanish Government intending to set the basis for a project for unity, to recover affections and share a future in common that can only be based on dialogue and mutual trust. Beyond favouring political dialogue between the Spanish and Catalan governments, the Agenda also includes the target of ‘avoiding the judicialisation of politics’.

As part of this agenda, amnesty and its will for appeasement, reconciliation and dialogue between Spain and Catalonia seem not the product of laudable principles or a clear electoral mandate, but that of PM Sánchez and his left-wing coalition government needing parliamentary support from the Catalan pro-secession parties to remain in power. Moreover, it may look like a self-amnesty since it was promoted by secessionist parties to protect their members and voters. Despite all this, a legitimate purpose may still exist from a legal perspective.

Reconciliation of political and national pluralism was a key purpose of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, and this was pursued through a dialogue that resulted in a broad compromise. This purpose may be regarded in line with the Amnesty Act 2024. In fact, the most important precedent of this statute is the Amnesty Act 1977, which was passed while the Spanish Constitution was being drafted by its seven founding fathers.

Spanish acts of mercy do not challenge the unity of the Spanish State and the sovereignty of the Spanish People (enshrined in Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution). In fact, clemency and magnanimity by the Spanish leading forces may strengthen rather than weaken Spanish unity and sovereignty, as indicated by the results of the Catalan elections of 12 May 2024.

As amnesties may embolden their beneficiaries to commit further crimes, the United Nations has opposed amnesties for gross violations of human rights, including in the context of peace negotiations. Despite the initial intention of excluding such crimes from the amnesty of 2024, exclusions were narrowed following the widely criticised prosecution of secessionist leaders on terrorism charges. Perhaps a case could be made in favour of distinguishing amnesties for systematic violations of human rights, which are often orchestrated, encouraged or tolerated by the deep state, from other amnesties to make up for the opponents and victims of the state.

Read more:

• Catalonia: Human Rights Violations in the Imprisonment and Conviction of the Pro-Independence Political Leaders
• The dark side of amnesty laws: impunity guaranteed. The case of Nicaragua
• Catalonia: The Right to Secede and the Right to Self-Determination
• Reconciliation and the Northern Ireland Legacy Act: A Human Rights Perspective

Community sentencing, also known as community service, is recognised as a form of sentencing in various jurisdictions around the world, though it is yet to gain mainstream acceptance in India. The only current recognition of community sentencing is Section 18(1)(c) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015, which provides for community sentencing for convicted minors.

In the past, attempts to introduce community service have proven unsuccessful. For instance, the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill 1978 provided that community sentencing could be awarded for offences punishable with fewer than three years’ imprisonment, with work hours ranging between forty and one thousand hours. The Law Commission in its 156th report, as well as the Malimath Committee Report, both recommended implementing community service, though these recommendations never came into effect.

Still, it is worth emphasising that the Indian courts have passed several orders awarding community service as punishment by invoking section 482 of the 1973 Criminal Code, which confers inherent power upon the High Court to secure the overarching goal of justice. For instance, under this discretionary provision, the High Court of Delhi has directed offenders to clean shoes and rinse utensils at a Gurudwara. Yet, although the Indian judiciary has taken this initiative to grant community service, its discretionary nature may lead to inconsistent application and a lack of transparency, and cannot replace a proper legislative framework.

Introducing community sentencing for petty offences is a progressive step as it addresses various concerns. First, the inhumane conditions in overburdened prisons and the exposure to hardened criminals can negatively impact petty offenders rather than promoting their rehabilitation. Even after an offender’s release, the stigma of serving a prison sentence persists, which can inhibit their reintegration into the community. Secondly, community sentencing eases the burden on the incarceration system and the state exchequer. Emphasising this issue, the Rajasthan High Court observed in Pappu Khan v State of Rajasthan that the welfare state cannot afford a sizeable non-productive prison population as it imposes a heavy burden on the state exchequer.

These adverse implications of incarceration indicate the pressing need to reform the prison system and lessen the use of prisons by moving towards alternate sentencing. Community sentencing is based on the fundamental principle of ‘abhor the crime, not the criminal’. It is arguably the most effective alternative for first-time offenders convicted of petty crimes as this form of punishment is proportional and reflects the gravity of the offence.

Community sentencing also seeks to render services beneficial to the community, alongside rehabilitating the offender and assisting them in acquiring new skill sets. In jurisdictions that practice community sentencing, consideration is generally given to the specific type of community work appropriate to the individual, focussing on the correlation between the nature of the work assigned and the offence committed, to enable the offender to witness or contribute to remedying the first-hand damage caused by their crime. This approach has been successful in jurisdictions such as Spain and Singapore.

The introduction of community sentencing in India is a promising step, though it requires careful planning and implementation. The proposed framework in its current form only provides for community service as a punishment, overlooking its potential to benefit both the offender and the community. In order to enhance the efficacy of the framework, a comprehensive series of guidelines needs be established, outlining relevant elements like duration of work and the rights of the offender. Given the complexity of introducing a scheme for community sentencing, India should pay heed to the importance of engaging an independent agency to supervise the process of implementation, so that its potential benefits to both the community and to offenders can be maximised. All the same, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita Bill’s endorsement of a community sentencing framework is to be welcomed as a step forward for India’s criminal justice system.

Yet, neither this law nor the current state of transitional justice in Spain can be celebrated. There are substantial structural deficiencies, such as a pattern of reliance on officials in positions of power and a lack of secured funding which can, as occurred last month in Barcelona, frustrate the fulfilment of justice and truth.

Firstly, while the law dictates that four explicit crimes are incapable of being subject to Spain’s Amnesty law, the amnesty law may inhibit the newly established Prosecutor’s office – which is charged with the promotion of justice – in investigating violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Consider, for example, factors such as the absence of guidance as to whether all crimes can be submerged under the four explicit crimes which are incapable of being subject to amnesty; the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, such as Sentencia 101/2012 which has determined that the amnesty law is an obstacle to any investigation; the judiciary’s report (Consejo General de Poder Judicial)  that reiterated the limitations on transitional justice; and, even in Barcelona, the public prosecutor’s office did not even refer to the new law. As such, the law is dependent on its interpretation by the courts and officials occupying these positions.

Secondly, the Democratic Memory Council aims to collate and clarify the truth in order to provide official recognition to the victims, to hold the government to account by providing public annual progress reports, and to formulate the Plan with the participation of victims’ organisations. However, the pursuit of truth is fundamentally weakened due to a lack of independence and concern for civil society’s ability to participate effectively, as well as the absence of secured funding. For example, structurally, the President of the Council is a Minister in charge of the competent Ministry, so there is a lack of institutional independence; furthermore, the plan itself is subject to approval by the government and there is no binding requirement to listen to these representatives. Essentially, the Spanish government has a “second bite” at undermining the participation of civil society and can ignore these groups, albeit at a political cost.

Despite these issues, the obstacles are not insurmountable. The Prosecutor can interpret the legislation as providing a mandate for investigation into all crimes, as one Madrid court has. Firstly, the amnesty law should itself never have been an obstacle to investigation. The law itself presupposes an investigation as it suspends criminal responsibility once the facts have been decided and for specific people, so without a prior investigation there can be no means to suspend or extinguish responsibility, nor to determine who is the suspect. Secondly, the make-up of the Constitutional Court has shifted so it may now be more receptive to the investigation of such crimes. Lastly, there is heavy textual support – such as the link between exhumation and the duty to immediately inform the Prosecutor’s office of the existence of indications of crimes – which implies investigatory powers for human rights abuses. Similarly, the Commission has the potential to secure the right to truth, but there must be serious reform to ensure a sufficient and secured budget to preserve and entrench these policies for the future. The Council can, in the creation of regulations, further secure the participation of memorial entities and arrange for other measures to provide financial security.

Therefore, the Ley de Memoria Democrática has great potential, but it is up to political and judicial players to further the promises in the law. Otherwise, the law serves only as another tool of revictimisation and an “empty name that is given to a temporary stage in a process which allows the claims to live on” as Pablo De Grieff cautions.

Want to learn more?

• Read: Spain: Judicial Intervention by the Tribunal Constitucional in a Key Parliamentary Debate
• Read: Coup, Constitution and Commission in Zimbabwe
• Read: The 2019 Sudanese Coup and Omar Al-Bashir: A Blow to the ICC

Hace casi 13 años, 71 diputados del Partido Popular presentaron un recurso de inconstitucionalidad contra varios preceptos de la Ley Orgánica 2/2010, de 3 de marzo, de salud sexual y reproductiva y de la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo. La ley establece un modelo de plazos que permite la interrupción del embarazo a petición de la mujer durante las primeras 14 semanas del embarazo (Artículo 14). Hasta las 22 semanas de gestación, establece un modelo de causales que permite el aborto cuando exista un grave riesgo para la vida o la salud de la embarazada, o si existe un riesgo de graves “anomalías” en el feto (Artículo 15 (a) y (b)). Después de las 22 semanas, el aborto solo está permitido cuando haya “anomalías” fetales incompatibles con la vida, o si se detecta en el feto una enfermedad extremadamente grave e incurable (Artículo 15(c)). La ley también regula la objeción de conciencia de profesionales sanitarios, y exige una perspectiva de género en la formación de los profesionales de la salud. Los diputados argumentaron que estas disposiciones eran inconstitucionales por no proteger el derecho a la vida del nasciturus, y, así mismo, violar otros preceptos constitucionales como el derecho a la no discriminación (Artículo 14), la seguridad jurídica (Artículo 9), la objeción de conciencia y la libertad de pensamiento (Artículos 16 y 18.1), y la libertad académica (Artículo 20.1.c).

El TC desestimó el recurso y declaró la constitucionalidad de las disposiciones con fundamento en el principio de proporcionalidad. Para el Tribunal, la regulación prevista en la ley acusada constituía un justo equilibrio entre el interés de proteger la vida prenatal y los derechos fundamentales de las mujeres. De esta forma, gran parte del debate se centró en si el nasciturus, o el no nacido, tenía derecho a la vida. El TC determinó que tal derecho no estaba respaldado ni por el derecho constitucional español, ni por la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos ni tenía fundamento en otros tratados de derechos humanos. Sin embargo, reconoció el deber de proteger la vida prenatal, aunque en un grado diferente a los derechos de las mujeres.

Un aspecto muy importante en la decisión fue el reconocimiento de un derecho autónomo de las mujeres a la autodeterminación en la decisión de interrumpir un embarazo. Esta determinación fue severamente criticada en algunos votos particulares. Sin embargo, la mayoría estableció que las mujeres tienen una esfera de libertad para tomar decisiones sobre sus vidas reproductivas sin coerción, y para elegir acceder a un aborto, dentro de las pautas contempladas por la ley recurrida. Sorprendentemente, el Tribunal no fundamentó la anterior decisión en el derecho a la igualdad. Para el Tribunal, los derechos involucrados eran el derecho a la integridad física y moral, en conexión con los derechos a la dignidad y al libre desarrollo de la personalidad. Si bien estos reconocimientos son importantes, pues en efecto son esenciales para la protección de la autonomía reproductiva, no se debe subestimar el impacto que los derechos reproductivos tienen en la igualdad sustantiva de las mujeres. Por ello, es desafortunado que el Tribunal no haya también anclado estas protecciones en el derecho a la igualdad.

Al revisar las disposiciones específicas de la ley acusada, el TC afirmó que el derecho penal no era un medio adecuado para proteger la vida prenatal en las primeras 14 semanas, ya que existían otras políticas públicas en su lugar. Esta posición refleja los recientes principios de la Comisión Internacional de Juristas que prohíben la criminalización del aborto, con fundamento en un enfoque basado en los derechos humanos para el uso del derecho penal, entre otros, bajo el principio de que el derecho penal debe ser utilizado como ultima ratio, en lugar de como primera instancia. El TC también estableció que el grado de protección de la vida prenatal es diferente al otorgado a las mujeres, ya que la vida prenatal no es titular de derechos. Esto es particularmente importante con respecto al argumento equivocado de que la ley discriminaba a las personas en situación de discapacidad. Por el contrario, el Tribunal consideró que exigir a las mujeres a que lleven un embarazo a término en casos de graves anomalías fetales es desproporcionado. Además, afirmó que la exigencia de una perspectiva de género en la formación del personal sanitario no incurre en “adoctrinamiento” estatal, ya que es un medio importante para garantizar la igualdad de género formal y sustantiva, que es un principio básico de la Constitución española y de una sociedad democrática.

Esta histórica decisión demuestra cómo el principio de proporcionalidad, entrelazado con consideraciones sobre los derechos a la dignidad, a la integridad física y moral, al libre desarrollo de la personalidad y a la igualdad, conllevan a otorgar una adecuada protección a los derechos reproductivos. La sentencia supone un avance en un tema contencioso y polarizado, que en los últimos años a menudo ha ignorado manifiestamente los derechos de las mujeres.

Want to learn more?

• Read: Ireland’s Abortion Law Reform
• Read: #JusticiaparaBeatriz Beatriz v El Salvador – A Matter of Equality and Case Law Consistency
• Read: X v NCT: One Step Closer to A Rights-Based Approach to Abortion in India?
• Listen: Gendered Constitutionalism
• Listen: Gauri Pillai on the Indian Abortion Decision
• Listen: Dobbs v Jackson: A Role for Equality?
• Read: Impact of the US Supreme Court Decision of Dobbs on Abortion Rights

Almost 13 years ago, 71 parliamentary members of the Spanish People’s Party challenged provisions of the Organic Law 2/2010 on sexual and reproductive health and the voluntary interruption of pregnancy. The statute establishes a gestational limits model, allowing abortion on request during the first 14 weeks of pregnancy (Article 14). From then until week 22, it establishes an indication model that allows abortion when women’s lives or health are at grave risk, or if there is a risk of grave foetal “anomalies” (Article 15 (a),(b)). After 22 weeks, abortion is only allowed when there are foetal “anomalies” incompatible with life, or if the foetus is diagnosed with an extremely grave and incurable illness (Article 15(c)). The law also regulates conscientious objection from healthcare providers, and requires them to be trained on gender, by incorporating sexual and reproductive health into academic curriculums, including the voluntary interruption of pregnancy. The parliamentarians challenged these provisions, arguing that they left the unborn’s right to life unprotected, and that they contravened constitutional rights including non-discrimination (Article 14), legal security (Article 9), conscientious objection and freedom of thought (Articles 16 and 18.1), and academic freedom (Article 20.1.c).

The Court based its decision to reject the petitioners’ arguments on the proportionality test. In its view, the regulation adequately balanced the interest to protect prenatal life against women’s fundamental rights. The debate centred around whether the ‘nasciturus’, or unborn life, had the right to life. The Court found that such an entitlement was supported neither by Spanish constitutional law, nor the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and other human rights treaties. However, it did recognise the duty to protect prenatal life, though in a different degree to women’s own rights.

Importantly, the Court acknowledged women’s right to self-determination in deciding to terminate a pregnancy. This was a bold finding, strenuously criticised in the dissenting opinions. Yet the majority established that women have a sphere of freedom to make decisions about their reproductive lives without coercion, and to choose to have an abortion, within the regulatory guidelines. Surprisingly, the Court did not rely on the right to equality to reach this decision, but rather the right to physical and moral integrity, in connection with the rights to dignity and self-determination. While these acknowledgments are important, we must not underestimate the impact that reproductive rights have on women’s substantive equality: the Court’s failure to consider equality dimensions is therefore myopic.

In reviewing the specific provisions of the impugned statute, the majority asserted that criminal law was not an adequate means of protecting prenatal life in the first 14 weeks, as there were other alternative policies in place. This position mirrors the International Law Commission of Jurists recent principles which proscribe the criminalisation of abortion. Such principles uphold human rights based approaches to the use of criminal law, amongst others, under the principle that criminal law should be used as ultima ratio, rather than in the first instance. It also found that the degree of protection of prenatal life is different to that accorded to women, as prenatal life is not entitled to rights. This is particularly important with respect to the flawed argument that the law discriminated against persons with disabilities: rather, demanding women to carry a pregnancy to term in cases of foetal abnormalities was disproportionate. Moreover, the Court stated that the requirement to train healthcare providers on gender does not constitute “indoctrination” but is an important means of ensuring formal and substantive gender equality, which is a basic principle of the Spanish Constitution and of democratic society.

The Court’s landmark decision showcases how the proportionality test is intertwined with considerations of dignity, physical and moral integrity, personal autonomy and equality, which invoke greater protection for reproductive rights. The judgment is a welcome development on a contentious and polarised topic, which in recent years has often manifestly disregarded the rights of women.

Want to learn more?

• Read: Ireland’s Abortion Law Reform
• Read: #JusticiaparaBeatriz Beatriz v El Salvador – A Matter of Equality and Case Law Consistency
• Read: X v NCT: One Step Closer to A Rights-Based Approach to Abortion in India?
• Listen: Gendered Constitutionalism
• Listen: Gauri Pillai on the Indian Abortion Decision
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The intervention of the Tribunal Constitucional in the parliamentary debate in Spain, as discussed to in Part I, has attracted strong criticism, including four blunt dissenting opinions by the judges in the minority. This part considers the arguments used to justify the intervention in the decision.

To recall, the Court justified its intervention as a preventive measure to protect the political rights of the minority MPs in parliament, in face of an important reform being passed as an amendment of an unrelated bill in parliament (para. 6). The Court has not yet decided about the substance of the case: the Court is observing that there exists a prima facie violation of rights, and the suspension of the parliamentary debate is imposed as a preventive measure.

The disputed question here is whether the power to impose preventive measures by the Court includes the power to suspend a parliamentary debate. Article 56 of the LOTC – the regulating statute of the Court – clearly states that the general rule is the non-imposition of preventive measures: these will only be permissible in contexts of “exceptional urgency” (Art. 56.6), and “provided that the suspension does not cause a serious affectation to a constitutionally protected interest or to the fundamental rights of another person” (Art. 56.2).

There is clearly a constitutionally protected interest at stake in this case: the principle of parliamentary autonomy. The Court has previously recognized the importance of this principle, which is “founded in the necessity to remove Parliament from possible interferences from other institutions” (STC 38/2022 para. 3). This principle stems from the central position that the legislature occupies in the constitutional framework, being the only institution directly elected by citizens.

To protect parliamentary autonomy, the general procedure of review of constitutionality of legislation (recurso de inconstitucionalidad) operates exclusively a posteriori, once the law has been passed and published (Art. 31 LOTC). In this way, the Court cannot intervene until the will of parliament has been fully formed by the completion of all stages of the parliamentary process. A general mechanism of preventive review of legislation once existed, but it was removed by parliament in 1985 because it was regarded as a “distorting factor of the purity of our system of constitutional relations” (LO 4/1985, in the preamble).

The court oversteps this important rule in granting the recurso de amparo remedy, generally aimed at the protection of fundamental rights, to establish a de facto preventive review of constitutionality of the decisions of parliament. This measure causes a serious affectation to a constitutionally protected interest, the principle of parliamentary autonomy, and it is therefore a misuse of the power of the court to impose preventive measures, as regulated in Article 56 LOTC. In their dissenting opinion, justices in the minority indicate that this decision entails “surpassing the limits of constitutional justice […], converting the court in an umpire of the legislative process, altering the fundamentals of our parliamentary democracy” (first dissenting judgement, section 1).

The judgement answers these concerns by repeatedly stating that “the legislature must respect the limits of the constitutional text” (para. 5), and that “the centrality of Parliament in our democracy does not imply that it can exercise its functions […] without strict respect to the [Constitution]” (para. 9). But no one is disputing whether the acts of parliament should be in accordance with the Constitution and subject to the review of the Court. In dispute is whether this review can take place on a preventive basis, departing from the general rule of review a posteriori, violating the autonomy of parliament. No argument is given to respond to this concern.

Such an approach to the principle of parliamentary autonomy does not leave the Tribunal Constitutional at the complete mercy of the parliamentary majority. The defining elements of the Court, such as its basic rules of composition, its jurisdiction and, most importantly, its existence, cannot be amended by statute, because they require an extraordinarily costly and difficult process of constitutional amendment (Art. 168 of the Constitution).

The decision of the Tribunal Constitutional undermines the autonomy of parliament, dangerously altering the system of separation of powers of the Spanish constitution.

On the 19th of December 2022, the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional took a very controversial decision by suspending a parliamentary debate in the Senate about the reform of the rules of appointment of constitutional judges. The decision has attracted strong criticism, both from politicians and scholars, as well as four blunt dissenting opinions by the judges in the minority.

Constitutional courts are creatures operating in the terrain between law and politics. Although they take decisions based on legal reasoning, their decisions have far-reaching political implications. That is why their members’ appointment procedures are often different from those of ordinary courts, involving the intervention of democratic institutions. The Spanish Tribunal Constitucional is no exception: the Court is composed of 12 judges, 4 being appointed by the lower chamber of Parliament (Congreso de los Diputados), 4 by the upper chamber (Senado), 2 by the executive, and 2 by the council of the judiciary (Consejo General del Poder Judicial, or CGPJ).

This last institution, the CGPJ, is the governing institution of the judiciary. It is responsible for appointing 2 constitutional judges by a qualified majority of 3/5 of its members. For the last few months, the conservative minority within the CGPJ has been blocking the appointment of the 2 constitutional judges the institution is responsible for, refusing to reach an agreement with the progressive majority. As a result, some of the constitutional judges have been performing their duties with expired mandates. To overcome this obstruction, the governing parties proposed a reform of the rules of appointment of constitutional judges by the CGPJ, so that a qualified majority would no longer be required in case of failing to appoint the judges by the deadline.

The problem came with the formal instrument used by the governing parties to propose such a reform: instead of proposing a new bill to reform the rules of appointment of constitutional judges, they introduced the reform by adding amendments to another unrelated bill. According to the conservative opposition in parliament, this was a violation of their political rights as MPs. Indeed, according to the consolidated doctrine of the Court, an amendment “cannot give birth to a new reality” (STC 119/2022 para. 6); amendments should maintain a “relation of homogeneity” with the amended text, so that “new realities” should be conveyed through new bills. Using the amending power to introduce unrelated elements to a bill has the effect of unduly restricting MPs’ opportunities for deliberation, resulting in a violation of their political rights. Consequently, the conservative MPs brought the reform to the Court, alleging a violation of fundamental rights. This is where the Court, in admitting the appeal, suspended the parliamentary debate as a preventive measure.

The conservative MPs were correct to stand up for their rights. Passing such an important reform as a “rider” sets a dangerous precedent. However, suspending parliamentary debate as a preventive measure leads to a much more profound constitutional problem: the violation of the principle of parliamentary autonomy. This principle protects parliament from undue interventions from other powers, signalling the special position of the legislative power in the constitutional scheme, being the only institution directly elected by citizens.

Because of the principle of parliamentary autonomy, it is established that judicial review of legislation operates only a posteriori: the Court cannot decide about the constitutionality of a law until it has been passed and published (Art. 31 LOTC). In this way, decisions of the legislature are subject to the review of the Court, but that review does not entail an intervention while debate is ongoing. With this decision, the Court has unduly used its powers to impose a de facto preventive review of constitutionality of the decisions of the legislature, interfering in the parliamentary debate and, in consequence, violating the principle of parliamentary autonomy. It is the first time that this happens in the Spanish parliament – although there is some precedent of the Court suspending debates in the Catalan Parliament.

Further discussion about the reasoning used by the judges to justify such an intervention can be found in Part II.

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