While ‘disability’ has not been mentioned as a ground of discrimination in the Indian Constitution, the promulgation of the Right of Persons with Disabilities, 2016 has assisted in preventing disability discrimination and simultaneously providing reasonable accommodation. While this beneficial legislation seeks to provide a comprehensive framework for persons with disabilities in India, several interpretative issues have recently arisen warranting immediate judicial scrutiny.

Over the years, the Indian Supreme Court has attempted to provide a progressive interpretation of disability rights to ensure a dignified life to persons with disabilities. The Court has also not shied away from imposing hefty fines on airplanes for illegally deplaning a disabled woman, from elaborately providing for accessibility measures regarding road safety and transport facilities, and from directing higher education institutes to provide disability infrastructure and assisted pedagogy. However, recently we see the Court attempting to reconcile ‘benchmark disabilities’ with reasonable accommodation and effective participation in society.

Benchmark disabilities are defined to be disabilities of more than 40% of a specified disability. These kinds of disabilities were categorised and quantitatively earmarked in order to provide special provisions for them, ranging from reservation to free education. Unfortunately, several institutions, such as the judicial services or the medicine council, have resisted the admission of people with benchmark disabilities solely on them having a disability more than 40%. Moreover, positive entitlements have been denied to persons with disabilities on the ground that they do not satisfy benchmark disabilities. Thus, benchmark disabilities were legislatively incorporated to indicate an upper limit and higher extent of disability which entitled the provision of certain benefits. This percentage-based numerical classification while being unique to India, creates an arbitrary distinction between disabled individuals. Every person having an extent of disabilities above 40% are clubbed together and treated the same irrespective of the varying percentages of disability.

In this backdrop, a significant question has been raised of whether a person having benchmark disabilities should be automatically disqualified from accessing their bundle of rights? The recent case of Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India delivered in October 2024 sheds some light on the answer. However, it is imperative to trace the origins of this problem and navigate the Court’s evolving jurisprudence vis-à-vis disability rights interpretation.

In the case of V Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court held that a judicial officer in a State has to possess reasonable limit of the faculties of hearing, sight and speech in order to hear cases and write judgments. Therefore, stipulating a limit of 50% disability in hearing impairment or visual impairment as a condition to be eligible for the post is a legitimate restriction. As a result, all people with benchmark disabilities were automatically disqualified from judicial services irrespective of whether the disability accentuated their inability to effectively participate in the profession.

However, this ruling was implicitly over-turned in the case of Vikash Kumar v. UPSC. The Apex Court held that such reasoning stood on a legally vulnerable footing since the 2016 Act has replaced the 1955 Act on which the earlier judgment was premised. Moreover, the question asked in the case was whether the disabled person would have been able to discharge the duties after being provided the reasonable accommodations necessitated by their disability? Hence, while Vikash Kumar answered the question in the affirmative i.e., irrespective of the quantifiable number of benchmark disability, reasonable accommodation had to be provided; the reasoning was restricted only to the limited question of the provision of accommodation.

In the Omkar Gond case, a medical student having 45% permanent disability was denied participation in the national medical examination, solely on the ground of having a benchmark disability. While Vikash Kumar’s reasoning could have alleviated the petitioner’s concerns since reasonable accommodation was not provided, the Court herein took one step forward and attempted to dim the allure of benchmark disabilities.

First, the Court undertook a constitutional analysis of the restrictive medical regulations which prohibited the petitioner’s admission and stated these legislative instruments were over-broad since they treat dissimilar placed people, similarly. According to the equality provision in Article 14, categorising and  classifying together persons with benchmark disabilities who can pursue the medicine course with those with the same disabilities who, in the opinion of the Medical Board, cannot pursue the course would be tantamount to over inclusion. Second, the Court drew an analogy with women being barred from seeking a permanent military commission, and stated that a blanket non-consideration of disabled persons highlight an absence of an individuated justification which was not sustainable in law. Third, the Court observed that while all persons with 40% or more disability are uniformly barred from pursuing the medical course, a Court ought to probe as to whether beneath the veneer of equality, is there any invidious breach of Article 14. Accordingly, a ‘one size fits all’ solution was dismissed. Thus, the Court conclusively held that quantified disability per se will not dis-entitle a candidate with benchmark disability from being considered.

As we navigate disability jurisprudence within India, the Omkar Gond case depicts the progressive realization of people with disability’s right to work and educate. The Court was aware of not only institutional barriers which restricted their participation but also societal perspectives which stereotyped people with disabilities as inefficient. This judgment is a step in the right direction and has significantly led to the judicial removal of both institutional and social obstructions.