The question of whether religious symbols may be displayed in courtrooms has come before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case of Union of Atheists v. Greece. While under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), states must remain neutral and impartial in matters involving religion, what is at stake in this case is not merely the presence of Orthodox Christian icons in Greek courtrooms, but a deeper and recurring question in Strasbourg jurisprudence: what does state neutrality truly require under the ECHR? Given the Court’s authority and the breadth of its jurisdiction, the judgment will affect public buildings and courtrooms across all 46 member states of the Council of Europe.

The applicants argue that displaying an icon of Jesus Christ in Greek courtrooms violates their rights under Articles 6 and 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protect the right to a fair trial and freedom of religion or belief respectively. They contend that such symbols undermine judicial impartiality, particularly where proceedings concern matters related to freedom of religion or belief. Greek courts rejected these claims, holding that the icon reflects a long-standing national tradition and does not affect the objectivity or fairness of judicial proceedings.

The Court’s jurisprudence provides a clear reference point. In Lautsi v. Italy, the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber held that the display of crucifixes in Italian public school classrooms did not amount to indoctrination and fell within Italy’s margin of appreciation. The Court characterised such symbols as “passive” and emphasised the absence of coercion or proselytism. Importantly, it rejected the notion that pluralism requires the elimination of religious symbols from public space.

That reasoning applies with equal force to courtrooms. While judicial impartiality under Article 6 requires that judges be free from bias, the ECtHR has consistently assessed it by reference to concrete facts. In Piersack v. Belgium, the Court clarified that subjective perceptions of bias are insufficient; doubts must be objectively justified. The mere presence of a religious symbol, without evidence of pressure, discrimination, or influence on judicial reasoning, does not meet the threshold of a Convention violation (see Pitkevich v. Russia).

The applicants’ argument relies on a conception of neutrality that equates it with the absence of religious reference. Yet neither the Convention nor the Court’s case law supports such an approach. Neutrality under the Convention is a principle of restraint: it requires states to avoid coercion or proselytism, not to erase symbols rooted in a society’s historical, cultural and religious identity.

Forced removal of long-standing religious symbols does not create a neutral space; it substitutes one worldview for another. A symbol-free courtroom is not ideologically neutral but reflects a substantive secular vision of the public sphere. As the Court has made clear in Leyla Şahin v. Turkey and S.A.S. v. France, states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in regulating religion in public life, particularly in cases involving historical traditions.

In Greece, the presence of Orthodox icons in courtrooms is deeply embedded in national tradition and constitutional identity. Their display does not compel litigants to engage in religious practice, nor does it signal judicial alignment with a particular party.

Comparative European practice further supports this interpretation. Religious and historically rooted symbols remain present in courts and public buildings across Europe. Italian state institutions display crucifixes; historic court buildings in Austria and Spain contain religious artwork; and in Bavaria crosses are displayed in government offices. Even in France—often cited as a model of strict secularism—domestic courts have accepted religious imagery in public buildings where it serves a cultural or historical purpose rather than a confessional one.

The Union of Atheists v. Greece, therefore, offers the ECtHR an opportunity to reaffirm a principled understanding of neutrality. Drawing on the Grand Chamber’s reasoning in Lautsi v. Italy, neutrality under the Convention does not require historical amnesia, nor the erasure of cultural and religious markers that have shaped Europe’s legal orders.  Properly understood, neutrality safeguards pluralism by allowing diverse traditions to coexist in the public sphere, provided the state refrains from compulsion or exclusion.

If the Court were to equate neutrality with the systematic removal of religious symbols, it would risk transforming a principle designed to protect freedom into a tool for enforcing uniformity.